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Abstract
A fundamental issue in multi-agent systems is to extract a consensus from a group of agents
with different perspectives. Even if the bilateral relationships (reflecting the outcomes of
disputes, product comparisons, or evaluation of political candidates) are rational, the collec-
tive output may be irrational (e.g., intransitivity of group preferences). This motivates AI’s
research for devising social outcomes compatible with individual positions. Frequently,
such situations are modeled as graphs. While the preponderance of formal theoretical stud-
ies of such graph based-models has addressed semantic concerns for defining a desirable
output in order to formalize some high-level intuition, results relating to algorithmic and
computational complexity are also of great significance from the computational point of
view.
The first Part of this thesis is devoted to combinatorial aspects of Argumentation Frame-
works related to computational issues. These abstract frameworks, introduced by Dung in
1995, are directed graphs with nodes interpreted as arguments and the directed edges as
attacks between the arguments. By designing a conflict-resolution formalism to make dis-
tinction among acceptable and unacceptable arguments, Dung initiated an important area
of research in Artificial Intelligence. I prove that any argumentation framework can be syn-
tactically augmented into a normal form preserving the semantic properties of the original
arguments, by using a cubic time rewriting technique. I introduce polyhedral labellings for
an argumentation frameworks, which is a polytope with the property that its integral points
are exactly the incidence vectors of specific types of Dung’s outcome. Also, a new notion
of acceptability of arguments is considered – deliberative acceptability – and I provide it’s
time computational complexity analysis. This part extends and improves some of the results
from the my Master thesis.
In the second Part, I introduce a novel graph-based model for aggregating preferences.
By using graph operations to describe properties of the aggregators, axiomatic characteri-
zations of aggregators corresponding to usual majority or approval & disapproval rule are
given. Integrating Dung’s semantics into our model provides a novel qualitative approach to
classical social choice: argumentative aggregation of individual preferences. Also, a func-
tional framework abstracting many-to-many two-sided markets is considered: the study of
the existence of a Stable Choice Matching in a Bipartite Choice System is reduced to the
study of the existence of Stable Common Fixed Points of two choice functions. A general-
ization of the Gale-Shapley algorithm is designed and, in order to prove its correctness, a
new characterization of path independence choice functions is given.
Finally, in the third Part, we extend Dung’s Argumentation Frameworks to Opposition
Frameworks, reducing the gap between Structured and Abstract Argumentation. A guarded
attack calculus is developed, giving proper generalizations of Dung’s extensions.
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Zusammenfassung
Ein grundlegendes Problem von Multiagentensystemen ist, eine Gruppe von Agenten mit unter-
schiedlichen Perspektiven zum Konsens zu bringen. Wa¨hrend die bilaterale Ergebnisse von Rechtss-
treitigkeiten, Produktvergleichen sowie die Bewertung von politischen Kandidaten wiederspiegeln-
den Beziehungen rational sein sollten, ko¨nnte der kollektive Ausgang irrational sein z.B. durch die
Intransitivita¨t von Pra¨ferenzen der Gruppe. Das motiviert die KI-Forschung zur Entwicklung von so-
zialen Ergebnissen, welche mit individuellen Einstellungen kompatibel sind. Ha¨ufig werden solche
Situationen als Graphen modelliert. Wa¨hrend die meisten formalen theoretischen Studien von Gra-
phmodellen sich mit semantischen Aspekten fu¨r die Definition eines wu¨nschenswerten Ausgangs
zur Formalisierung auf hohem Intuitionsniveau bescha¨ftigen, ist es ebenfalls von großer Bedeutung,
die Komplexita¨t von Algorithmen und Berechnungen zu verstehen.
Der erste Teil der vorliegenden Arbeit widmet sich den kombinatorischen Aspekten von Argu-
mentation Frameworks im Zusammenhang mit rechnerischen Fragen. Diese von Dung in 1995 ein-
gefu¨hrten abstrakten Frameworks sind gerichtete Graphen mit als Argumenten zu interpretierenden
Knoten, wobei die gerichteten Kanten Angriffe zwischen den Argumenten sind. Somit hat Dung mit
seiner Gestaltung eines Konfliktlo¨sungsformalismus zur Unterscheidung zwischen akzeptablen und
inakzeptablen Argumenten fu¨r einen wichtigen Bereich von Forschung in KI den Grundstein gelegt.
Die Verfasserin hat bewiesen, dass jedes Argumentation Framework sich in einer die semantischen
Eigenschaften der originalen Argumente bewahrenden normalen Form syntaktisch erweitern la¨sst,
indem man eine mit kubischer Laufzeit umwandelnde Technik verwendet. Neu eingefu¨rt werden
hier Polyhedrische Etiketten fu¨r Argumentation Frameworks. Dabei handelt es sich um einen Poly-
top, wessen ganze Punkte genau die Inzidenzvektoren von bestimmten Arten von Dungs Ausgabe
sind. Weiterhin wird ein neuer Begriff der Akzeptanz von Argumenten gepra¨gt, na¨mlich - delibera-
tive Akzeptanz - und dessen Komplexita¨t analysiert. Dieser Teil erweitert und verfeinert einige ihrer
Ergebnisse aus der Masterarbeit.
Im zweiten Teil wurde ein neuartiges graphenbasiertes Modell fu¨r die Aggregation von Pra¨ferenzen
erarbeitet. Hier werden axiomatische Charakterisierungen von Aggregatoren neu eingefu¨hrt, und
zwar durch die Verwendung von Graphoperationen zur Beschreibung der Eigenschaften von Aggre-
gatoren. Sie entsprechen dem u¨blichen Mehrheitsprinzip bzw. der Genehmigungs- & Ablehnungsre-
gel. Einen neuartigen, qualitativen Ansatz im Vergleich zu der klassischen Sozialwahltheorie bietet
die Integration der Semantik von Dung in dem neuen Modell, und zwar argumentative Aggregati-
on individueller Pra¨ferenzen. Desweiteren wird ein funktionales many to many zweiseitige Ma¨rkte
abstrahierendes Framework untersucht, indem statt die Existenz einer Stabilen Wahl Matching in ei-
nem Bipartite Wahlsystem zu studieren, wird die Existenz von Stable Common Fixed Points auf zwei
Wahlfunktionen erforscht. Im na¨chsten Schritt wird eine neue Verallgemeinerung des Gale-Shapley
Algorithmus entworfen und eine neue Charakterisierung der Wegunabha¨ngigkeitsfunktion gegeben,
die einen Korrektheitsbeweis fu¨r den Algorithmus ermo¨glicht.
Im dritten Teil werden schließlich Dungs Argumentation Frameworks auf Opposition Frame-
works erweitert und dadurch die in der gegenwa¨rtigen Forschung bestehende Lu¨cke zwischen struk-
turierter und abstrakter Argumentation verringert. Dafu¨r wird ein bewachter Angriffskalku¨l entwi-
ckelt, welches strikten Verallgemeinerungen von Dungs echten Erweiterungen fu¨hrt.
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Introduction
This thesis covers various areas in Social Reasoning having as central hub Abstract Ar-
gumentation, viewed as a graph-based modeling of the fundamental issues that arise in
defeasible domains. My own view of the well-known Argumentation Frameworks, intro-
duced by Dung [Dun95], is:
If the edges of a given directed graph are seen as attacks, how can a satisfactory
set of winner nodes be rationally selected and justified?
The nodes of such directed graphs are interpreted as arguments and in order to make
distinction among acceptable and unacceptable arguments, Dung defined some families
of sets of nodes (called extesions) representing sets of collectively accepted arguments.
General network reasoning models investigating the informal logic structure of many social
and economic problems instantiate Dung’s argumentation frameworks, and therefore can be
implemented based on an unifying principle.
A natural defeasible domain is provided by the classical Social Choice Theory (SCT)
[Arr63], where on a shared reasons space, a society expresses a set of possibly shared forms
of subjectivity, whose deeper interactions enable new consistent collective judgments, cre-
ating social inference relations. The corresponding graph models are bipartite digraphs in
which one part represents the set of alternatives and the other part the set of individuals,
the society. It follows a simple graph-based model for aggregating dichotomous prefer-
ences, paving the way of using graph operations to describe normative properties of the
aggregators.
One interesting application discussed by Dung in his original paper [Dun95], is to view
the Gale and Shapley stable matchings ([GS62]) as an instance of the stable output in an
appropriate argumentation framework. Generalizations of stable matchings (motivated by
many-to-many matchings in two-sided markets applications) can be also approached by
considering special graph-based models. We consider Bipartite Choice Systems as a family
of choice functions defined on the edge set of a bipartite multi-graph and indexed by the
vertices of this multi-graph. Then, a Stable Choice Matching is defined as a stable common
fixed point of two associated collective choice functions.
Dung’s argumentation frameworks have been generalized and extended in order to obtain
better models (see Brewka et al. [BPW14], or Modgil [Mod13]). We propose a new such
generalization, by using edge-labeled multi-digraphs.
1
Introduction
Structure of the Thesis
After a preliminary chapter, the thesis contains six chapters (organized in three parts as
described below) and a short concluding discussion chapter.
Preliminaries Basic notions and results of Dung’s Theory of Argumentation are presented
together with time-complexity results of the main related decision problems. An
entire section, entitled Graph-theoretic Digression, discusses related work (already)
done in Graph Theory, as a collection of small remarks. A nice treatment of quasi-
kernels using a two-way scan of the vertices of a graph is also presented.
Part 1 Combinatorial Aspects of Argumentation Frameworks
Chapter 1 A new type of acceptability of an argument, deliberative acceptance – in which its
attacking and defending sets of arguments are uniformly treated – is introduced.
We discuss how this and the classical acceptance notions interrelate and analyze its
computational properties.
Chapter 2 We say that an argumentation framework is in normal form if no argument attacks
a conflicting pair of arguments. An augmentation of an argumentation framework
is obtained by adding new arguments and changing the attack relation such that the
acceptability status of original arguments is maintained in the new framework. Fur-
thermore, we define join-normal semantics leading to augmentations of the joined
argumentation frameworks. Also, a rewriting technique which transforms in cubic
time a given argumentation framework into a normal form is devised.
Chapter 3 We define a polyhedral labelling for an argumentation framework AF = (A,D) as a
set of solutions x ∈ RA (xa is the label of the argument a ∈ A), to a system of linear
constraints, such that the integral solutions are exactly the incidence vectors of some
specific type of Dung’s extensions. The linear constraints vary from the obvious
xa = 1 for each non attacked argument a, or xa + xb ≤ 1 for each attack (a,b) ∈ D
(in order to assure Dung’s conflict-free condition), to more deep inequalities of the
form ”the sum of the label of an argument and the labels of all its attackers is at
least 1 ” or if (b,a) is an attack then ”the label of a is not greater than the sum of
the labels of all attackers of b”.
Part 2 Graphs and Social Choice Theory
Chapter 4 A novel graph-based model for aggregating dichotomous preferences is introduced.
We are not only interested into positive collective position (as is intensively done
in social choice theory) but also into the negative collective position (which can
be used also as an explanation of the selected positive facts). The set of individ-
ual opinions (called ”profile” in social choice theory) can be represented using a
bipartite directed graph, which we call debate. In this way, well-established graph
theoretical notions (digraph isomorphism, in-degree and out-degree of a vertex, in-
duced sub-digraphs, digraph operations, etc.) can be used in describing normative
conditions on the aggregating rules. The aggregate opinion can also be viewed
as a debate (bipartite digraph) in which each individual has the same sets of in-
neighbors and out-neighbors (called consensual debate). This is used to obtain
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new axiomatic characterizations of aggregators corresponding to usual majority or
approval & disapproval rule. We introduce argumentative aggregation of individ-
ual opinions in which collective opinions are obtained by merging the opinions of
non-conflicting coalitions of individuals.
Chapter 5 In the Economics Matching, broad generalizations of the classical model of Gale
and Shapley were considered by allowing centralized matching schemes where
there could be multiple partners on both sides (many-to-many) of the market and
the agent’s preferences were given by choice functions on the set of its neighbors.
We introduce a functional framework abstracting these models, propose a new gen-
eralization of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and, in order to prove its correctness, a
new characterization of path independence choice functions is obtained.
Part 3 Opposition Frameworks
Chapter 6 In this chapter we introduced a new generalization of Dung’s argumentation frame-
work which is conceptually different from other generalized abstract argumentation
frameworks. It formally exploits the link that exists between ”attacks” and ”node’s
positions” capturing some high-level intuition, not addressed by other proposals.
The ”nodes” of our Opposition Frameworks have a minimal content expressed as
finite non-empty sets of facts (the node’s position), which are used to relate the
”attacks” between two nodes to their positions. We introduced a simple recursive
definition of acceptance: a node (the position expressed by a node) is accepted if ei-
ther it can counterattack all attacks targeting it or there is another ”compatible” node
such that in the opposition framework obtained by ”contracting” these two nodes
in a single ”supernode”, this supernode is accepted. The use of the set of attacks
instead of the set of parents in the study of the acceptability of a node, simplifies
the description of a novel DPLL type backtracking acceptance algorithm. The char-
acterization of the basic outputs (admissible sets) by the models of a propositional
logic formula is also given.
Concluding Discussion A summary of the contributions of this work and a short dis-
cussion on further possibilities of improving it.
3

Preliminaries
0.1. Introduction
Abstract argumentation frameworks, introduced by Dung [Dun95], constitute a
common mechanism for studying reasoning in defeasible domains and for relating
different non-monotonic formalisms. General network reasoning models investigat-
ing the informal logic structure of many social and economic problems instantiate
Dung’s argumentation frameworks, and therefore can be implemented based on an
unifying principle.
This graph-theoretic model of argumentation frameworks focuses on the manner
in which a specified set A of abstract arguments interact via an attack (defeat) binary
relation D on A. If (a,b) ∈ D (argument a attacks argument b) we have a conflict.
A conflict-free set of arguments is a set T ⊆ A such that there are no a,b ∈ T with
(a,b) ∈ D. An admissible set of arguments is a conflict-free set T ⊆ A such that
the arguments in T defend themselves “collectively” against any attack: for each
(a,b) ∈ D with b ∈ T , there is c ∈ T such that (c,a) ∈ D.
In this model, the main aim of argumentation is deciding the status of arguments.
The acceptability of an argument a is defined based on its membership in an admis-
sible set of arguments satisfying certain properties (formalizing different intuitions
about which arguments to accept on the basis of the given framework) called se-
mantics. The attack graph is given in advance – abstracting on the underlying logic
and structure of arguments, as well on the reason and nature of the attacks – and
provides a defeasible-based conceptualization of commonsense reasoning.
0.2. Dung’s Theory of Argumentation
In this section we present the basic concepts used for defining classical semantics
in abstract argumentation frameworks introduced by Dung in 1995, [Dun95]. All
notions and results, if not otherwise cited, are from this paper (even some of them
are not literally the same). We consider U a fixed countable universe of arguments.
Definition 1 An Argumentation Framework is a digraph AF = (A,D), where A⊂U
is finite and nonempty, the vertices in A are called arguments, and if (a,b) ∈ D is a
directed edge, then argument a defeats (attacks) argument b. A, the argument set of
AF , is referred as Arg(AF) and its attack set D is referred as Def (AF). The set of
all argumentation frameworks (over U) is denoted by AF.
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Preliminaries
All definitions and concepts from graph theory are adapted implicitly or explic-
itly.
If AF = (A,D) is an argumentation framework and A1 ⊆ A, then the argumenta-
tion framework induced by A1 in AF is AF [A1] = (A1,D∩ (A1×A1)).
Two argumentation frameworks AF1 and AF2 are isomorphic (denoted AF1∼=AF2)
if there is a bijection h : Arg(AF1)→ Arg(AF2) such that
(a,b) ∈ De f (AF1) if and only if (h(a),h(b)) ∈ De f (AF2).
h is called an argumentation framework isomorphism, and it is emphasized by the
notation AF1 ∼=h AF2. If S⊆ Arg(AF1) then h(S)⊆ Arg(AF2) is the set {h(a)|a∈ S}.
Similarly, if M ⊆ 2Arg(AF1), then h(M)⊆ 2Arg(AF2) is h(M) = {h(S)|S ∈M}.
The extension-based acceptability semantics is a central notion in Dung’s argu-
mentation frameworks, which we define as follows (see also [BG07b]).
Definition 2 An extension-based acceptability semantics is a function σ that as-
signs to every argumentation framework AF ∈AF a family of sets σ(AF)⊆ 2Arg(AF)
such that
∀AF1,AF2 ∈ AF, if AF1 ∼=h AF2 then σ(AF2) = h(σ(AF1)).
A member E ∈ σ(AF) is called a σ -extension in AF .
If a semantics σ satisfies the condition |σ(AF)| = 1 for any argumentation frame-
work AF , then σ is said to belong to the unique-status approach, otherwise to the
multiple-status approach (Prakken and Vreeswijk, [PV02]).
The main types of argument’s acceptability status with respect to a given seman-
tics are defined as follows.
Definition 3 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework, a ∈ A be an argu-
ment, and σ be a semantics.
a is σ -credulously accepted if and only if a ∈⋃S∈σ(AF) S.
a is σ -sceptically accepted if and only if a ∈⋂S∈σ(AF) S.
Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. For each a ∈ A we denote
a+ = {b ∈ A| (a,b) ∈ D} the set of all arguments attacked by a, and a− = {b ∈
A| (b,a) ∈D} the set of all arguments attacking a. These notations can be extended
to sets of arguments. The set of all arguments attacked by (the arguments in) S⊆ A
is S+ =
⋃
a∈S a+, and the set of all arguments attacking (the arguments in) S is
S− =
⋃
a∈S a−. We also have /0+ = /0− = /0.
The set S of arguments defends an argument a ∈ A if a− ⊆ S+ (i.e., any a’s at-
tacker is attacked by an argument in S). The set of all arguments defended by a set
S of arguments is denoted by F(S):
F(S) = {a ∈ A|a− ⊆ S+}.
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If MAF is a non-empty set of sets of arguments in AF , then max(MAF) denotes
the set of maximal (with respect to set inclusion) members of MAF and min(MAF)
denotes the set of its minimal (with respect to set inclusion) members.
We now define the main admissibility extension-based acceptability semantics.
Definition 4 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework.
• A conflict-free set in AF is a set S⊆ A with property S∩S+ = /0 (i.e., there are no
attacking arguments in S). The family of all conflict free-sets is
cf(AF) = {S⊆ A|S is conflict-free set }.
• An admissible set in AF is a set S ∈ cf(AF) with property S− ⊆ S+ (i.e., defends
its elements). The family of all admissible sets is
adm(AF) = {S⊆ A|S is admissible set }.
• A complete extension in AF is a set S ∈ cf(AF) with property S = F(S). The
family of all complete extensions is
comp(AF) = {S⊆ A|S is complete extension }.
• A preferred extension in AF is a set S ∈ max(comp(AF)). The family of all
preferred extensions is
pref(AF) := max(comp(AF)).
• A grounded extension in AF is a set S ∈ min(comp(AF)). The family of all
grounded extensions is
gr(AF) := min(comp(AF)).
• A stable extension in AF is a set S ∈ cf(AF) with the property S+ = A− S. The
family of all stable extensions is
stb(AF) = {S⊆ A|S is stable extension }.
Examples:
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a b c
AF1
cf(AF1) = { /0,{a},{b},{c},{a,c}}
adm(AF1) = { /0,{a},{a,c}}
comp(AF1) = {{a,c}}
pref(AF1) = {{a,c}}
gr(AF1) = {{a,c}}
a b c
AF2
cf(AF2) = { /0,{a},{b}}
adm(AF2) = { /0,{a},{b}}
comp(AF2) = { /0,{a},{b}}
pref(AF2) = {{a},{b}}
gr(AF2) = { /0}
a b c
AF3
cf(AF3) = { /0,{a},{b},{c},{a,c}}
adm(AF3) = { /0,{a},{b},{a,c}}
comp(AF3) = { /0,{b},{a,c}}
pref(AF3) = {{b},{a,c}}
gr(AF3) = { /0}
Figure 0.1.: Different extensions of AF’s.
Note that /0 ∈ adm(AF) for any AF (hence adm(AF) 6= /0) and if a ∈ A is a self-
attacking argument (i.e., (a,a) ∈ D), then a is not contained in an admissible set. It
is not difficult to see that any admissible set is contained in a preferred extension,
which exists in any AF ; the preferred extension is unique if AF has no directed
cycle of even length (Bench-Capon, [BC03], Baroni and Giacomin, [BG03]).
The examples in the Figure 0.2 show that pref(AF) is strongly influenced by the
existence of circuits in AF and by the even or odd length of these circuits.
a b
c
AF1
pref(AF1) = { /0}
a b
AF2
pref(AF2)=
={{a}, {b}}
a b
d e
c
AF3
pref(AF3)={{e}}
a b
dn e
c
AF4
pref(AF4)={{n,b,e},
{a,d,c},{a,d,e}}
Figure 0.2.: pref(AF) vs the existence of odd and even circuits in AF .
In [Cro12], is proved that a complete extension S ∈ comp(AF) is a preferred exten-
sion if and only if S is either a stable extension or, in the argumentation framework
AF [A− (S∪S+)] the only admissible set is the empty set, as in the figure below.
a b
c
AF1
st(AF1) = /0
a b
AF2
st(AF2)=
={{a}, {b}}
a b
d e
c
AF3
st(AF3)=/0
a b
dn e
c
AF4
st(AF4)={{n,b,e},
{a,d,c},{a,d,e}}
Figure 0.3.: st(AF).
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Let us note that st(AF) can be empty. However, when in AF there are no circuits,
the following theorem holds.
Theorem 5 [Dun95] If the argumentation framework AF = (A,D) has no circuits
(it is a DAG) then
st(AF) = pref(AF) = gr(AF) 6= /0.
The grounded extension exists and it is unique in any argumentation framework.
It can be constructed by a very simple algorithm:
consider all non-attacked arguments, delete these arguments and those
attacked by them from the digraph, and repeat these two steps for the
digraph obtained until no node remains.
An equivalent way to express Dung’s extension-based semantics is using argu-
ment labellings as proposed by Caminada [Cam06a] (originally introduced in Pol-
lock [Pol95]). The idea underlying the labellings-based approach is to assign to
each argument a label from the set {I,O,U}. The label I (i.e., In) means the argu-
ment is accepted, the label O (i.e., Out) means the argument is rejected, and the label
U (i.e., Undecided) means one abstains from an opinion on whether the argument
is accepted or rejected.
Definition 6 [Cam06a] Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. An ad-
missible labelling of AF is a function Lab : A→{I,O,U} such that ∀a ∈ A:
• Lab(a) = I if and only if a− ⊆ Lab−1(O),
• Lab(a) = O if and only if a−∩Lab−1(I) 6= /0.
A complete labelling of AF is an admissible labelling Lab such that ∀a∈A: Lab(a)=
U if and only if a−∩Lab−1(I) = /0 and a−∩Lab−1(U) 6= /0. A grounded labelling
of AF is a complete labelling Lab such that there is no complete labelling Lab1
with Lab−11 (I)⊂ Lab−1(I). A preferred labelling of AF is a complete labelling Lab
such that there is no complete labelling Lab1 with Lab−1(I) ⊂ Lab−11 (I). A stable
labelling of AF is a complete labelling Lab such that Lab−1(U) = /0.
In [Cam06a] it was proved that, for any argumentation framework AF = (A,D)
and any semantics σ ∈ {adm,comp,gr,pref,stb}, a set S ⊆ A satisfies S ∈ σ(AF)
if and only if there is a σ -labelling Lab of AF such that S = Lab−1(I).
In the context of combinatorial games, Fraenkel [Fra97] considered a special type
of partitions, P,N,D -partitions, which are closely related to Caminada’s labellings.
Based on these, I observed that the above algorithm that constructs a ground ex-
tension in an AF can be used to give an intrinsic characterization of grounded la-
bellings.
Observation 7 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. A complete la-
belling Lab of AF is a grounded labelling if and only if there is a linear order < on
Lab−1(I) such that the following condition holds:
if a ∈ Lab−1(I) and b ∈ a− then there is a′ ∈ Lab−1(I)∩b− such that a′ < a.
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0.3. Complexity-theoretic Issues
Depending on the semantics σ ∈ {adm,comp,gr,pref,stb} considered, the basic
decision problems related to the acceptability of arguments in a given argumentation
framework are listed below.
VERσ (Verification)
Instance : AF = (A,D) and S⊆ A.
Question : Is S ∈ σ(AF)?
CAσ (Credulous Acceptance)
Instance : AF = (A,D) and a ∈ A.
Question : Is there S ∈ σ(AF) such that a ∈ S ?
SAσ (Skeptical Acceptance)
Instance : AF = (A,D) and a ∈ A.
Question : Is a a member of each S ∈ σ(AF)?
EXσ (Existence)
Instance : AF = (A,D).
Question : Is σ(AF) 6= /0?
NEσ (Non-Emptiness)
Instance : AF = (A,D).
Question : Is σ(AF) = { /0}?
The problem Verσ is in P for each σ ∈ {adm,gr,stb}, since all constraints defining
a member of σ(AF) can be verified in polynomial time with respect to |Arg(AF)|+
|De f (AF)|.
Despite of the fact that σ(AF) = /0 and σ(AF) = { /0} give the same answer to
an acceptance query, the problems EXσ and NEσ are different. The problem EXσ
is trivial (each istance is an yes-instance) for any σ ∈ {adm,comp,gr,pref} but
EXstb is NP-complete (this follows easily from Chva´tal [Chv73]). Clearly, all the
decision problems listed above are in P for σ = gr.
From the work of Dimopoulos and Torres [DT96] it follows that CAadm is NP-
complete and NEadm is coNP-complete. Since there is a simple polynomial time
reduction from NEadm to VERpref, it follows that VERpref is coNP-complete.
The problem SApref is difficult. This has been proved by Dunne and Bench-
Capon [DBC02], by showing that this problem is at the third-level of the polynomial-
time hierarchy. If the complexity class ΠP2 comprises those problems decidable by
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co-NP computations given (unit cost) access to an NP complete oracle, then SApref
is ΠP2-complete [DBC02].
We close this section by noting that every AF = (A,D) induces a propositional
theory (a set of propositional formula) TAF = {xa↔ ∧b∈a−¬xb|a ∈ A}, where, as
usual, ∧b∈ /0¬xb = true. Using logical equivalences this can be transformed in CNF
(by denoting A0 the set of arguments a with a− = /0):
TAF =
∧
a∈A−A0
(
(xa∨
∨
b∈a−
xb)∧
∧
b∈a−
(¬xa∨¬xb)
)∧ ∧
a∈A0
xa.
This can be written equivalently as:
TAF =
∧
a∈A0
xa∧
∧
a∈A−A0
(xa∨
∨
b∈a−
xb)∧
∧
(b,a)∈D
(¬xa∨¬xb).
It is not difficult to prove that AF has a stable extension if and only if TAF is
satisfiable. Similar approaches (with important complexity corollaries, or practical
implementations) can be found in Creignou [Cre95], Besnard and Doutre [BD04],
Walicki and Dyrkolbotn [WD12], Bezem, Grabmayer, and Walicki [BGW12].
0.4. Graph-theoretic Digression
If D = (V,E) is a digraph, a kernel in D is a stable set S⊆V (that is, E ∩S×S = /0)
with the property that for any v ∈V −S there is w ∈ S such that (v,w) ∈ E. Clearly,
S is a kernel in D if and only if S is a stable extension in AFD = (V, E˜), where
E˜ = {(v,w)|(w,v) ∈ E}.
It seems that von Neumann and Morgenstern [NM44] were the first to intro-
duce kernels when describing their concept of solution of a n-person game. Dung
[Dun95] explained that for any n-person game we can associate an argumentation
framework (having as arguments imputations of the game and attack relation given
by a suitable domination relation between imputations) such that a set of imputa-
tions is a vNM-solution in the n-person game if and only if it is a stable extension
in the associated argumentation framework.
There are digraphs without kernels, for example ~C3. On the other hand, in a sym-
metric digraph (undirected graphs; each edge is viewed as a symmetric pair of arcs)
any maximal (w.r.t. inclusion) stable set is a kernel (for argumentation frameworks
this has been discussed in Coste-Marquis et al. [CMDM05b]). It follows that the
number of kernels in a digraph with n vertices is between 0 and O(3
n
3 ) (the up-
per bound follows from the work of Moon and Moser [MM65] that determined the
maximum number of maximal stable sets in a graph with n vertices).
The following example is from Fraenkel [Fra97], where kernels are studied in
the context of combinatorial games. Let D = (V,E) be the digraph with V =
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{a0, . . . ,a2n} and E = {(a0,ai)|i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}∪ {(ai,an+i),(an+i,ai)|i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
(see Figure 0.4).
Then D has 2n kernels, namely {a0,an+1, . . . ,a2n} and A ∪ {an+1, . . . ,a2n} −
{an+i|ai ∈ A}, for each A⊆ {a1, . . . ,an}, A 6= /0.
a0
a1 a2 a3 a4
a5 a6 a7 a8
Figure 0.4.: n = 4: digraph with 2 ·n+1 vertices and 2n kernels.
Note that in the corresponding argumentation framework, AFD, any argument is
credulous stable accepted (each argument belongs to a stable extension) but no argu-
ment is sceptically stable accepted: despite of the large number of stable extensions,
each argument does not belong to at least one stable extension.
♦
An acyclic directed graph D has a unique kernel S. This has been observed and
proved firstly by von Neumann and Morgenstern [NM44] in the context of the the-
ory of combinatorial games:
Given an acyclic digraph D = (V,A) and a token in one of its vertices,
let two players move this token along the arcs of D, alternating. In each
step the token is moved from the current vertex v to some v′ ∈ v+. Since
the graph is finite and acyclic, the token eventually will arrive to a dead
end (i.e., to a vertex v for which v+ = /0). The player who’s turn would
be to move from a dead end is the looser of the game.
Let S be the unique kernel of D. It is easy to see that the player who can
start in a vertex v 6∈ S has a winning strategy. Indeed, the player who
moves from a vertex v 6∈ S can always move the token into S. His op-
ponent then either cannot move (being in a dead end, and hence loosing
the game) or is forced to leave S again, since S is a stable set.
The unique kernel S in an acyclic digraph D can be constructed efficiently, by
recursively adding all dead ends to S and deleting those vertices and their neighbors
from D. Translated into the converse digraph (the argumentation framework AFD),
this is exactly the algorithm to find the grounded extension, described after the
Theorem 5, and this is the way we made the Observation 7.
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Richardson [Ric53] proved that a digraph without odd directed cycles, has at
least one kernel which can be determined in polynomial time. The algorithm can be
described as follows:
Let D = (V,E) such a digraph. Initially K = /0. Repeat the following
until no vertex remains in D: find the strongly connected components
of D; since there are no odd directed cycles, each strongly connected
component Ci is a bipartite digraph, say Ci = (Ni1;Ni2,Ei); for each such
component Ci with no incoming edges, select j ∈ {1,2}, set K :=K∪Ni j
, and delete from the digraph D the vertices in Ni1 ∪Ni2 ∪N+i j .
Translated into the converse digraph (the argumentation framework AFD), the
above algorithm can be considered the precursor of the general SCC-recursive
schema for argumentation semantics introduced by Baroni, Giacomin, and Guida
[BGG05].
If the digraph D is strongly connected then AFD is strongly connected too, and the
above algorithm gives two stable extensions. Figure 0.5 shows a strongly connected
digraph without odd circuits (adapted from Dimopoulos, Magirou, and Papadim-
itriou [DMP97]) having another stable extension ({a1,a4,a7}) besides the two sta-
ble extensions given by the above algorithm ({a1,a3,a5,a7},{a2,a4,a6,a8}).
a1 a2
a8
a3
a7 a6
a5
a4
Figure 0.5.: A strongly connected even digraph with 3 stable extensions.
♦
A semikernel of a digraph D is any non-empty stable set S of D such that for
any z ∈ V (D)− S for which there exists an Sz-arc, there is also a zS-arc. Clearly,
in the argumentation frameworks language, a semikernel is an admissible set in
the converse digraph AFD. Duchet [Duc80] defined a kernel-perfect digraph as a
digraph D with the property that every induced subdigraph of D has a kernel. For
example the circuit with 4 vertices, ~C4, is kernel perfect. Neumann-Lara [NL71]
proved that a digraph D is kernel perfect if and only if every induced subdigraph
of D has a semikernel. Translating into the argumentation frameworks language, it
follows that an argumentation framework AF = (A,D) has the property that each
13
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induced argumentation framework AF [A1], for A1 ⊆ A, has a stable extension if and
only if adm(AF [A1]) 6= { /0}, for every A1 ⊆ A.
♦
Competition graphs were introduced by Cohen [Coh68] in connection with prob-
lems of ecology. Let D = (V,E) be a digraph. The competition graph of D is the
undirected graph C(D) with V (C(D)) = V and {u,v} ∈ E(C(D)) if and only if for
some w ∈V , arcs (u,w) and (v,w) are in E. Hence two vertices are linked in C(D)
if and only if they have a common prey in D. The common enemy graph of D is
CE(D) =C(D˜), (D˜ is the converse of D) that is, two vertices are linked in CE(D) if
and only if they have a common enemy in D.
We are interested in the partitions of the vertex set of D induced by the connected
components of the graphs C(D) and CE(D). Some interesting facts arise. We dis-
cuss them in the argumentation frameworks language.
Definition 8 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework, A0 = {a ∈ A|a− =
/0} and A f in = {a ∈ A|a+ = /0}. We say that a,b ∈ A−A0 are attacked-related if
there are an integer p ≥ 1 and arguments a0,a1, . . . ,ap ∈ A−A0 such that a0 = a,
ap = b and a−i−1 ∩ a−i 6= /0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We denote by ρ− ⊆ (A− A0)2
the binary relation ρ− = {(a,b)|a,b ∈ A−A0,a and b are attacked-related}. We
say that a,b ∈ A−A f in are attacking-related if there are an integer p ≥ 1 and
arguments a0,a1, . . . ,ap ∈ A− A f in such that a0 = a, ap = b and a+i−1 ∩ a+i 6= /0
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}. We denote by ρ+ ⊆ (A−A f in)2 the binary relation ρ+ =
{(a,b)|a,b ∈ A−A f in,a and b are attacking-related}.
It is not difficult to see that ρ− and ρ+ are equivalent relations. Let (A−A0)/ρ−=
{A1, . . . ,Ak} be the partition of A−A0 into ρ−- equivalent classes, and similarly
(A−A f in)/ρ+= {B1, . . . ,Bl} be the partition of A−A f in into ρ+- equivalent classes.
A simple way to compute these equivalent classes is to consider the undirected
graphs G− = (A−A0,E−) and G+ = (A−A f in,E+), where {a,b} ∈ E− if and only
if a− ∩ b− 6= /0 and {a,b} ∈ E+ if and only if a+ ∩ b+ 6= /0. Then, the vertex sets
of the connected components of G− (G+) are the ρ−- equivalent classes A1, . . . ,Ak
(ρ+- equivalent classes B1, . . . ,Bl).
Figure 0.6 depicts ρ- equivalent classes for a particular AF . Note that in this
example each argument is attacked and each argument is attacking, hence A−A0 =
A−A f in = A.
Proposition 9 Let AF =(A,D) be an argumentation framework with (A−A0)/ρ−=
{A1, . . . ,Ak} and (A−A f in)/ρ+ = {B1, . . . ,Bl}. Then
i) (A−i )
+ = Ai for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}.
i’) (B+i )
− = Bi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
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a b
c
d
e f
i
h
g
AF :
a b
c
d
e f
i
h
g
G−
A/ρ− = {{a},{b},{c,d,e,g},{f},{h},{i}}
a b
c
d
e f
i
h
g
G+
A/ρ+ = {{a},{b, f},{c},{d,e, i},{g},{h}}
Figure 0.6.: An argumentation framework and its ρ-equivalent classes.
ii) (A−1 , . . . ,A
−
k ) is a partition of A−A f in.
ii’) (B+1 , . . . ,B
+
l ) is a partition of A−A0.
iii) k = l and (A−A f in)/ρ+ = {A−1 , . . . ,A−k }.
iii’) k = l and (A−A0)/ρ− = {B+1 , . . . ,B+l }.
iv) If Di = {(b,a) ∈ D|a ∈ Ai}, then (D1, . . . ,Dk) is a partition of D.
iv’) If D′i = {(b,a) ∈ D|b ∈ Bi}, then (D′1, . . . ,D′k) is a partition of D.
v) (D1, . . . ,Dk) = (D′1, . . . ,D
′
k).
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Proof. We prove only i)-iv), the proof of i’)-iv’) is similar. Also, v) is an obvious
consequence of iii) and iii’).
i) If a ∈ Ai then a− 6= /0, hence a ∈ (a−)+ ⊆ (A−i )+. It follows that Ai ⊆ (A−i )+.
Conversely, if b ∈ (A−i )+ there is c ∈ A−i such that c ∈ b−. Since c ∈ A−i , there is
a ∈ Ai such that c ∈ a−. Hence c ∈ a−∩b−, that is (a,b) ∈ ρ−. Since Ai, is a ρ−-
equivalent class, it follows that b ∈ Ai. Therefore (A−i )+ ⊆ Ai.
ii) Since Ai⊆ A−A0 it follows that A−i 6= /0 for each i∈ {1, . . . ,k}. If a∈ A−A f in,
then a+ 6= /0, hence there is b ∈ A−A0 such that (a,b) ∈ D. Since (A1, . . . ,Ak)
is a partition of A− A0, there is i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that b ∈ Ai, that is a ∈ A−i .
Consequently
⋃
i=1,k A
−
i = A−A f in. Suppose that there are i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such
that i 6= j and A−i ∩ A−j 6= /0. Then there are ai ∈ Ai, a j ∈ A j and b ∈ A−i ∩ A−j
such that b ∈ a−i ∩ a−j . It follows that aiρ−a j, hence Ai = A j, contradicting the
hypothesis.
iii) From ii’) we have that (A1, . . . ,Ak) and (B+1 , . . . ,B
+
l ) are two partitions of
A−A0. Suppose that there is i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such that B+i ∩A j1 6= /0 and B+i ∩A j2 6= /0
for some j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, j1 6= j2. Let bi1 ∈ Bi ∩A−j1 and bi2 ∈ Bi ∩A−j2 . Since
bi1,bi2 ∈Bi, there are c0, . . . ,cp such that c0 = bi1 , cp = bi2 and c+i−1∩c+i 6= /0 for each
i∈ {1, . . . , p}. If for some i∈ {1, . . . , p}we have ci−1 ∈A−j1 then, since (A−j1)+=A j1
(by i)), and c+i−1∩c+i 6= /0, we obtain that ci ∈ A−j1 . Because c0 = bi1 ∈ A−j1 , it follows
that bi2 ∈ A−j1 . But then, bi2 ∈ A−j1 ∩A−j2 , contradicting ii).
Hence, we proved that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} there is j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that B+i ⊆
A j. Similarly, we can prove that for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,k} there is i ∈ {1, . . . , l} such
that A j ⊆ B+i . It follows that iii) holds.
iv) Let (b,a) ∈ D. Since (A1, . . . ,Ak) is a partition of A−A0 it follows that there
is i ∈ {1, . . . ,k} such that a ∈ Ai, therefore (b,a) ∈ Di. Hence ⋃i=1,k Di = D. Since
A−i 6= /0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, it follows that Di 6= /0 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. If
there are i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, i 6= j such that Di ∩D j 6= /0 it follows that A−i ∩A−j 6= /0
contradicting ii). 2
This is a nice and somewhat unexpected property of the connected components of
the competition and common enemy graphs associated to an argumentation frame-
work. Note that, essentially, the same decomposition is obtained by Liu and West
[LW98], where coreflexive vertex sets are considered (a coreflexive set in D= (V,E)
is either the set of sinks in D (A f in above) or a minimal nonempty set U such that
(U+)− =U (as in i ′) above ).
♦
A quasi-kernel in the digraph D = (V,E) is a stable set Q in D such that for
every v ∈ V −Q there is x ∈ Q such that (v,x) ∈ E or there is w ∈ V −Q such
that (v,w),(w,x) ∈ E, i.e. Q is non-empty, there are no edges inside Q, and every
vertex outside Q can reach Q in at most two hops. Clearly, any kernel is a quasi-
kernel. For example, if D is the path a b c, then its non-empty stable sets are
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{a},{b},{c}, and {a,c}. {a}, and {b} are neither kernels nor quasi-kernels, {c}
is a quasi-kernel but not a kernel, and {a,c} is a kernel (and also a quasi-kernel).
Note that the concept of quasi-kernel has no significance in an argumentation
framework: in AFD, a quasi-kernel is a non-empty conflict-free set of arguments Q,
such that any vertex outside Q is in Q+∪Q++. However we present here some inter-
esting properties of quasi-kernels from [Cro15b] since a quasi-kernel corresponds
to a well-known solution in Social Choice Theory (uncovered sets and ”two-step
principle”, see, e.g., Duggan [Dug12]).
Chva´tal and Lova´sz [CL74] observed that every digraph has a quasi-kernel. We
describe a simple algorithmic proof of this (by making explicit the construction of
the two kernels in the acyclic digraphs used in the proof given by Thomasse´, cf.
Bondy [Bon03]).
Let n be the cardinality of V . For an arbitrary ordering pi of V , i.e. an injective
mapping pi : [1..n]→V , and i ∈ [1..n], let
Li(pi) = {pi( j)|(pi(i),pi( j)) ∈ E and j < i}
Hi(pi) = {pi( j)|(pi(i),pi( j)) ∈ E and j > i}
be the sets of lower and higher numbered out-neighbours of the i-th vertex of V
under pi . The following algorithm constructs a quasi-kernel in D.
Function QK(D,pi)
Q := /0
Forward: for i = 1 to n do if Q∩Li(pi) = /0 then Q := Q∪{pi(i)}
Backward: for i = n to 1 do if
[
pi(i) ∈ Q and Q∩Hi(pi) 6= /0
]
then Q := Q−{pi(i)}
Return(Q)
In the forward scan, pi(1) is added to Q, and vertices which are not added to Q have
a smaller (with respect to pi) out-neighbor in Q. In the backward scan, last(Q,pi),
the last vertex (with respect to pi) of Q, remains in Q and vertices of Q having a
larger (with respect to pi) out-neighbour in Q are deleted from Q.
It follows that, after the two scans, Q is a non-empty stable set in D and V −Q
is the disjoint union of two sets R1(pi)∪˙R2(pi), where each vertex in R1(pi) has (at
least) one out-neighbour in Q and each vertex in R2(pi) has no out-neighbours in
Q. R1(pi) is the set of vertices deleted from Q in the backward scan or not added to
Q in the forward scan and having an out-neighbour in Q after the backward scan.
A vertex v is in R2(pi) if it was not added to Q in the forward scan (when it has
at least one out-neighbour, w, in the current Q) but after the backward scan all its
out-neighbours are out of Q. Clearly, the vertex w is in R1(pi) after the two scans,
hence there is x ∈ Q such that (v,w),(w,x) ∈ E. Therefore Q is a quasi-kernel in D.
Note that if R2(pi) = /0 then Q is a kernel.
A natural question is if every quasi-kernel Q in D can be constructed using the
above algorithm. The answer is no, as the following example shows: let D be the
digraph obtained from the undirected path a b c by replacing each undirected
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edge with a symmetric pair of directed edges; then {b} and {a,c} are kernels in D
and {a} and {c} are quasi-kernels; however, it is easy to check that QK(D,pi) 6=
{a} (or {c}), for every ordering pi of {a,b,c}.
We will next show that if D has no kernel then D has at least three quasi-kernels.
Assume that D has no kernel and let pi1 be an ordering of V and Q1 :=QK(D,pi1).
Since D has no kernel, R2(pi1) 6= /0.
Let pi2 be the ordering of V starting with vertices in Q1, followed by vertices in
R1(pi1), and ending with vertices in R2(pi1) (vertices in the same set are ordered
arbitrarily). Let Q2 := QK(D,pi2). In the forward scan of the construction of Q2,
all vertices in Q1 are added to Q2, vertices in R1(pi1) are not added, and the vertex
last(Q2,pi2) is from R2(pi1). Therefore last(Q2,pi2) ∈ Q2−Q1, and Q2 is a quasi-
kernel in D with the property that Q2 6= Q1. Since D has no kernel, R2(pi2) 6= /0.
Let pi3 be the ordering of V starting with vertices in Q2, followed by vertices in
R1(pi2), and ending with vertices in R2(pi2). Let Q3 := QK(D,pi3). As above, the
last vertex in Q3 does not belong to Q2 and therefore Q3 is a quasi-kernel in D with
the property that Q3 6=Q2. We have also Q3 6=Q1 since the last vertex in Q3 is from
R2(pi2) which contains only vertices from R1(pi1) hence not from Q1.
We have obtained that if D has no kernel then D has at least three quasi-kernels,
a result discovered by Jacob and Meyniel ([JM96]). The existence of four quasi-
kernels cannot be established in this way since another application of the argument
may reproduce Q1, as the Figure 0.7 shows.
a b
c
D
pi1 : a,b,c
After Forward scan: Q1 = {a,b}
After Backward scan: Q1 = {b}; R1(pi1) = {a}; R2(pi1) = {c}
pi2 : b,a,c
After Forward scan: Q2 = {b,c}
After Backward scan: Q2 = {c}; R1(pi2) = {b}; R2(pi2) = {a}
pi3 : c,b,a
After Forward scan: Q3 = {c,a}
After Backward scan: Q3 = {a}; R1(pi3) = {c}; R2(pi3) = {b}
pi4 : a,c,b
After Forward scan: Q4 = {a,b}
After Backward scan: Q4 = {b}= Q1 !!
Figure 0.7.: Applying successively the algorithm on a digraph with no kernel.
If a vertex v of the digraph D has no out-neighbour (it is a sink) then, clearly, v
belongs to every quasi-kernel of D. If v has an out-neighbour w (that is, (v,w) ∈ E)
then, considering any ordering pi starting with w, Q = QK(D,pi) is a quasi-kernel
not containing v (v is not selected in Q in the Forward scan).
However, deciding if there exists a quasi-kernel in D containing the vertex v is
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a NP-complete problem. Since the membership to NP is obvious, we prove the
hardness of this decision problem by exhibiting a polynomial time reduction from
the CNF satisfiability problem SAT.
Let F =C1∧. . .∧Cm be an arbitrary instance of SAT, where for each i∈{1, . . . ,m},
the clause Ci is a a disjunction of literals, Ci = li1 ∨ . . .∨ liki , and a literal l is either
a variable x j or its negation x j, where {x1, . . . ,xn} is the set of boolean variables
occurring in F . We construct in polynomial time the digraph DF = (VF ,EF) and
a vertex vF ∈ VF , such that F is satisfiable if and only if DF has a quasi-kernel
containing vF .
Let VF = {vF}⋃˙i=1,m{uCi,vCi}⋃˙i=1,n{vxi,vxi}, (2n+2m+1 vertices) and
EF =
⋃
i=1,m{(vF ,uCi),(vF ,vCi),(uCi,vCi)}
⋃
i=1,n{(vxi,vxi),(vxi,vxi)}
⋃⋃
i=1,n
⋃
j=1,m{(vC j ,vxi)|xi is literal in C j}
⋃⋃
i=1,n
⋃
j=1,m{(vC j ,vxi)|xi is literal in C j}, (3m+2n+3size(F) edges).
Clearly, DF can be constructed in polynomial time in the size of the instance of
SAT. An example of this construction is illustrated in Figure 0.8.
It is not difficult to see that any quasi-kernel in DF containing vF is of the form
Q = {v f }⋃S, where S selects for each variable xi exactly one of the vertices vxi or
vxi such that for each clause C j, the vertex vC j has at least one out-neighbour in S.
But this is equivalent to the fact that F is satisfiable.
vF
uC1 vC1 uC2 vC2 uC3 vC3 uC4 vC4
vx1 vx1 vx2 vx2 vx3 vx3 vx4 vx4
Figure 0.8.: The digraph D(F) associated to instance F = C1 ∧C2 ∧C3 ∧C4, where C1 =
x1∨ x2, C2 = x1∨ x2∨ x3, C3 = x2∨ x3, C4 = x2∨ x3∨ x4.
It follows that there is no polynomial time algorithm to list all quasi-kernels of a
given digraph, unless P=NP (otherwise, we can decide in polynomial time if there
is a quasi-kernel containing a specified vertex, by testing its membership to each
quasi-kernel produced).
If a digraph D = (V,E) has exactly one quasi-kernel Q, then (as noted above) Q
contains all the sinks of D and each vertex of Q is a sink. Moreover Q is a kernel,
otherwise taking the ordering pi of V starting with Q, followed by a vertex with
no out-neighbour in Q, and ending with the the remaining vertices, QK(D,pi) is
quasi-kernel having at least one vertex not in Q, so D has at least two quasi-kernels.
19
Preliminaries
Hence
a digraph has exactly one quasi-kernel if and only if its set of sinks is a
kernel.
Let D = (V,E) be a digraph with exactly two quasi-kernels Q1 and Q2. Let pi1
be the ordering of V starting with vertices in Q1−Q2, followed by the vertices in
Q1∩Q2, the vertices of Q2−Q1, and ending with vertices in V − (Q1∪Q2). Then
Q := QK(D,pi1) ∈ {Q1,Q2}. This means that each vertex v ∈V − (Q1∪Q2) has an
out-neighbour in Q (otherwise, last(Q,pi1) ∈ V − (Q1∪Q2)). Also, each vertex of
{Q1,Q2}−{Q} which is not in Q1∩Q2 has an out-neighbour in Q (since it is not
added in the forward scan or has been eliminated in the backward scan). Hence if a
digraph has exactly two quasi-kernels then at least one of them is a kernel.
If D has exactly two quasi-kernels Q1 and Q2 then Q1∩Q2 is exactly the set S of
sinks in D. Clearly, S⊆Q1∩Q2. If there is v∈ (Q1∩Q2)−S, let w an out-neighbour
of v, and consider any ordering pi of V having w and v as first two vertices. Then
Q := QK(D,pi) 6∈ {Q1,Q2} (v ∈ Q1∩Q2 is not added to Q in the forward scan).
To simplify our discussion suppose that D = (V,E) has exactly two quasi-kernels
Q1 and Q2 and has no sinks. By the above remarks, we can suppose that Q1 is a
kernel and Q1∩Q2 = /0.
Let w2 ∈ Q2 be an arbitrary vertex of Q2. Since Q1 is a kernel, w2 has an out-
neighbour v2 ∈ Q1. Then, the set of out-neighbours of each vertex in Q1−{v2}
is {w2}. Indeed, suppose that there is w1 ∈ Q1−{v2} with (w1,v1) ∈ E and v1 6=
w2. If (v2,v1) 6∈ E, then let pi be the ordering of V starting with v1,v2,w1,w2.
Clearly, Q := QK(D,pi) 6∈ {Q1,Q2} (w1 and w2 are not added to Q in the forward
scan). Similarly, if (v1,v2) 6∈ E then the ordering of V starting with v2,v1,w1,w2
will give a contradiction. Hence (v1,v2),(v2,v1) ∈ E ({v1,v2} is a 2-cycle in D).
Let D′ = (V,E ′) the digraph obtained from D by deleting (v1,v2). Then, as above,
Q′ :=QK(D′,pi) 6∈ {Q1,Q2}. However, since (v2,v1) ∈ E ′, Q′ is also a quasi-kernel
in D, a contradiction. Since the vertex w2 was arbitrary in Q2, in order that the set
of out-neighbours of each vertex in Q1−{v2} is {w2}, it is necessary that either
|Q2| = 1 or |Q1| = |Q2| = 2 and Q1 ∪Q2 induces a 4-cycle in D. In both cases
Q2 is a kernel. Indeed, if |Q1| = 2 then there is v1 ∈ Q1 (in the 4-cycle) having
an out-neighbour in Q2. If |Q1| = 1, let Q1 = {v1} and (v1,z) ∈ E (v1 is not a
sink). Then each vertex v ∈ V −{v1,z} reaches z in two hops (via v1). Hence {z}
is a quasi-kernel in D and therefore Q2 = {z} and again there is v1 ∈ Q1 having
an out-neighbour in Q2. If Q2 is not a kernel then there is v2 ∈ V −Q2 having no
out-neighbour in Q2. Let pi the ordering of V starting with vertices in Q2, followed
by v1,v2, and ending with the remaining vertices. Then Q := QK(D,pi) does not
contain v1 (hence is not Q1) and has at least a vertex not in Q2 (since v2 is added
to Q in the forward scan, it follows that last(Q,pi) 6∈ Q2). Hence Q 6∈ {Q1,Q2},
contradiction.
Since Q2 is a kernel, it follows (by repeating the argument above for Q1) that
Q1∪Q2 induces a 2-cycle or a 4-cycle in D, having no out-neighbors in V − (Q1∪
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Q2), and each vertex in V − (Q1∪Q2) has at least two adjacent out-neighbours in
Q1∪Q2. Since a strongly connected digraph has no sinks, it follows that
a strongly connected digraph D of order at least three has at least three
quasi-kernels, unless D is ~C4,
a result proved by Gutin, Koh, Tay and Yeo [GKTY04].
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Part I.
Combinatorial Aspects of
Argumentation Frameworks
23

This part presents my approaches to the combinatorial structure of argumentation
frameworks for better modeling the acceptability of arguments, for simplifying the
structure of attacks, and for introducing new argument labellings. Preliminary re-
sults in this direction have been discussed in my Master Thesis. While Chapter 1
makes only a review of a new type of acceptability of arguments on the basis of a
given argumentation framework (based on [Cro12] and [CK12]), the next two chap-
ters contain improvements and extensions of the work initiated in my Master Thesis
as these appears in [CK13] and [Cro14b].
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1. Deliberative Acceptability of
Arguments
In this chapter we introduce a new type of acceptability of an argument, in which
its attacking and defending sets of arguments are uniformly treated. We call it de-
liberative acceptance, discuss how this and the classical acceptance notions inter-
relate and analyze its computational properties. In particular, we prove that the
corresponding decision problem is ΠP2-complete, but its restrictions on bipartite or
co-chordal argumentation frameworks are in P.
1.1. Introduction
Discussions on how to select the appropriate semantics for a given application con-
text or how to compare the different semantics for argumentation frameworks, have
been the subject of several papers (see Baroni and Giacomin [BG07a], [BG07b],
Dunne and Bench-Capon [DBC01], Cayrol, Doutre, Lagasquie-Schiex, and Men-
gin [CDLSM02], Prakken and Vreeswijk [PV02], etc.). The motivation of consider-
ing different semantics (semi-stable, Caminada [Cam06b], prudent, Coste-Marquis,
Devred, and Marquis [CMDM05a], ideal, Dung, Mancarella, and Toni [DMT06],
SCC-recursive, Baroni and Giacomin. [BG03], evidence-based Oren and Norman
[ON08], etc.) is given by the need to formalize “everyday reasoning” in order to
design mechanisms expressing a “legitimate” argumentation in support of an argu-
ment.
The common principle of argument acceptance in a given argumentation frame-
work is to identify collectively acceptable arguments, that is, arguments a belonging
to a σ -extension. Each σ -extension has at least the properties of being conflict-free
(that is, they are internally logically coherent) and defend themselves from any ex-
ternal attack (that is, they survive the attacks together).
This type of argument acceptance is biased toward attacks: while the defending
extension of an argument a is internally coherent, no such requirement is imposed
on its attacking set. In many cases in the real world, when argument a is attacked
by a coherent set of arguments T , a is defended by giving a coherent set S including
a, which defends against T . Having only one defending extension for all these
attacking sets would contradict the deliberative nature of argumentation in the real
world disputes and debates, where only the coherent sets of attacks matter and the
defending sets of arguments depend on the former.
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In this chapter we follow this intuition and introduce a notion of acceptability at
the level of justification states of arguments rather than of extensions. We call it
deliberative acceptability due to the uniform treatment of both attacking and de-
fending sets in the definition of the acceptability of an argument. More precisely,
an argument a is deliberatively acceptable in a given argumentation framework if,
for each conflict-free set of arguments attacking a, there is a conflict-free set of ar-
guments containing a and defending itself against the former set. We analyze this
type of acceptability and investigate it from a complexity point of view. We prove
that if an argument is credulously grounded, preferred or stable accepted then it is
deliberatively accepted, but the converse is not true. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Credulously preferred accepted
Deliberatively accepted
Credulously grounded accepted
Credulously stable accepted
Figure 1.1.: Acceptability implications (edges implied by transitivity are omitted).
We give a sufficient condition in which a deliberatively accepted argument be-
longs to an admissible set (see Proposition 14). Also, we show that in bipartite or
symmetric argumentation frameworks the deliberative acceptability is equivalent to
credulous preferred acceptability (Proposition 15). In Proposition 16, we prove that
the problem of deciding if an argument is deliberatively accepted in a given argu-
mentation framework is ΠP2-complete but its restrictions on bipartite or co-chordal
argumentation frameworks are polynomial time solvable (Propositions 17 and 18).
We close this section by considering the following illustrative example.
Example 10 Let us consider the argumentation framework in the Figure 1.2 below.
a b
d
e
c
Figure 1.2.: Argumentation Framework in Example 10
Since each argument has at least one attacker, the grounded extension is empty. The
conflict-free sets containing the argument a are {a}, {a,c}, and {a,d}. Since a
28
1.2. Deliberative Acceptability of Arguments
cannot defend against the attacker e, {a} is not admissible. The set {a,c} cannot
defend against the attacker e, and the set {a,d} cannot defend against the attacker
c. It follows that a does not belong to a preferred extension. The unique preferred
extension is {b,d} (its attackers are defeated by b). Therefore we could accept b
and not a, because b can be extended to a maximal conflict-free set of arguments
{b,d} defending itself from all attacks.
Despite of the fact that a is not credulously preferred accepted, its “acceptabil-
ity” could be argued as follows. The conflict-free sets attacking a are: {b}, {b,d}
and {b,e}. Clearly, a defends itself against {b}. Against {b,d}, we can defend a
by considering the conflict-free set {a,c}, that is choosing a coherent sets of argu-
ments on the same idea induced by the attacking set {b,d}. The set {a,c} is not
appropriate for the attacking set {b,e} but, in this case, {a,d} does the job. Hence
we can defend a against all conflict-free sets of arguments attacking it, therefore we
can “accept” a. We will study this type of acceptability in the next section.
1.2. Deliberative Acceptability of Arguments
Definition 11 Let AF = (A,D) an argumentation framework. An argument a∈ A is
deliberative acceptable if for any conflict-free set T attacking a (i.e. T ∩a− 6= /0),
there is a conflict-free set S ⊂ A such that a ∈ S and S defends itself against T (i.e.
T ∩S− ⊆ S+).
This type of acceptability is closer to the intuition about real life debate-type ar-
gumentation. If the argument a is attacked by a conflict-free set T of arguments,
there is a conflict-free set of arguments S containing a, depending on T such that
S defends a. S also defends its arguments that are attacked by T . Figure 1.3 il-
lustrates two conflict-free sets Ti attacking a and the corresponding two answers
to these attacks, two conflict-free sets Si containing a. Each attack of a from Ti is
counterattacked by an argument from Si. If Ti attacks also this defender, then Si has
also a counterattack to this. And so on.
a
S1
T1
S2T2
Figure 1.3.: Deliberative Acceptability Example.
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Note that we assumed that there are no self-attacking arguments in the argumen-
tation framework. If a would be a self-attacking argument, then a is not contained in
any conflict-free set. Hence, if a is attacked by some other argument, then a cannot
be deliberatively accepted. Moreover, since a does not belong to any conflict-free
set, the deliberative acceptance of other arguments is not influenced. Thus, without
loss of generality, we restrict our attention to argumentation frameworks without
self-attacking arguments.
It is possible to introduce a weaker form of the deliberative acceptance by con-
sidering in the above definition only the conflict-free sets T contained in a−. This
could be too tolerant as the following example shows.
Example 12 Let us consider the argumentation framework in the Figure 1.4 below.
b
a
c
d e
Figure 1.4.: Argument a is not deliberative acceptable, despite it can be defended against
conflict-free sets contained in a−.
The grounded extension is {e,b}. It follows that the argument a is not credulously
accepted in any classical extension semantics. The conflict-free sets contained in
a− are {b} and {c} which can be defeated by the conflict-free sets containing a:
{d,a}, respectively, {e,a}. If we consider a (weak) deliberative acceptance this
will correspond to a superficial analysis. Indeed, there are also two conflict-free
sets attacking a, namely {c,d} and {b,e}. The set {e,a} defeats {c,d}, but {e,b}
is a conflict-free set attacking a, which could not be defended. It follows that the
argument a is not deliberatively accepted.
The following proposition shows that deliberative acceptance is strictly more lib-
eral than credulous acceptance with respect to the classical extension-based seman-
tics.
Proposition 13 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework and a ∈ A. If a
is σ -credulously accepted for σ ∈ { grounded, preferred, stable}, then a is delib-
eratively accepted. For each of the above semantics σ , there are argumentation
frameworks in which a deliberatively accepted argument is not σ -credulously ac-
cepted.
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Proof. If a ∈ A is σ -credulously accepted for σ ∈ {grounded, preferred, stable},
then there is an admissible set S0 containing a. It follows that for any b ∈ S−0 there
is s ∈ S0 such that (s,b) ∈ D. Let T be a conflict-free set of arguments attacking a.
Each argument b ∈ T ∩ S−0 is attacked by S0. Hence T ∩ S−0 ⊆ S+0 , and therefore a
is deliberative accepted.
In the argumentation framework in Figure 1.2 the grounded extension is /0. Hence
a is not grounded-credulous accepted. However, as we argued in the end of Sec-
tion 1.2, a is deliberative accepted. Also, a is not preferred accepted because the
unique preferred extension {b,d} does not contain a. Since any stable extension is
a preferred extension, it follows that a is also not stable-credulously accepted. 2
Depending on the combinatorial structure of the argumentation framework, the
deliberative acceptance could agree to that based on extensions. The following
proposition gives an easy sufficient condition for this.
Proposition 14 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework and a ∈ A. If
AF does not contain the induced subdigraphs F1 and F2 in Figure 1.5 (dotted di-
rected edges are optional), then, if a is deliberatively accepted, it follows that a is
credulously preferred accepted.
a
F1
a
F2
Figure 1.5.: Forbidden induced subdigraphs F1 and F2.
Proof. See [CK12].
Using similar arguments as in the above proof, it is not difficult to show that if
AF is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) or if the underlying undirected graph of AF is
bipartite, then an argument a is deliberatively accepted if and only if a is credulously
preferred accepted. However, for bipartite graphs we can do better as follows.
Let G = (A,E) be the underlying undirected graph of AF ({a,b} ∈ E if and only
if (a,b)∈D or (b,a)∈D). Since G is bipartite, then A can be partitioned A=U∪V ,
U,V 6= /0, U ∩V = /0, and if {a,b} ∈ E then |{a,b}∩V |= 1 and |{a,b}∩U |= 1.
In [Dun07], Dunne proved that the following algorithm applied to a bipartite
argumentation framework AF = (U ∪V,D) (below, [X ]AF denotes the subdigraph
induced by X ⊆ A =U ∪V in AF : [X ]AF = (X ,D∩X×X)).
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input AF = (U ∪V,D)
while ∃v ∈V −U+ s.t. v+∩U 6= /0 do
AF := [(U− v+)∪V ]AF
return U
returns a final set U , denoted U0, which satisfies: U0 is conflict-free (it is a subset
of U), and U−0 ⊆U+0 (in the given argumentation framework AF). Similarly, the
algorithm:
input AF = (U ∪V,D)
while ∃u ∈U−V+ s.t. u+∩V 6= /0 do
AF := [U ∪ (V −u+)]AF
return V
returns a final set V , denoted V0, which satisfies: V0 is conflict-free (it is a subset
of V ), and V−0 ⊆ V+0 . Moreover, a ∈ A is credulous preferred accepted if and only
if a ∈U0 or a ∈ V0 (Dunne, [Dun07]). It is not difficult to prove that the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 15 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework and a ∈ A. If the
underlying undirected graph of AF is bipartite with bipartition A =U ∪V , and U0
and V0 are the sets of arguments constructed by the Dunne’s algorithm above, then
a is deliberatively accepted if and only if a ∈U0∪V0.
Proof. See [CK12].
We note that if the argumentation framework is symmetric (that is, AF is obtained
from an undirected graph by replacing each undirected edge {a,b} by the pair (a,b)
and (b,a) of directed edges), then each argument is deliberative accepted. This is
obvious since, in this case, a set of arguments is admissible if and only if it is a
maximal conflict-free set, [CMDM05a].
1.3. Complexity
Let us consider the following decision problem:
Deliberative Acceptability
Instance: AF = (A,D) argumentation framework, a ∈ A.
Question: Is a deliberatively acceptable?
The complexity class ΠP2 comprises those problems decidable by co-NP compu-
tations given (unit cost) access to an NP complete oracle. Alternatively, ΠP2 can be
viewed as the class of languages L whose membership is certified by a polynomial-
time testable ternary relation RL ⊆W ×X×Y : there is a polynomial p such that, for
all w, w∈ L if and only if (∀x∈X : |x| ≤ p(|w|))(∃y∈Y : |y| ≤ p(|w|)) (w,x,y)∈RL.
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Theorem 16 Deliberative acceptability is ΠP2-complete.
Proof. It is easy to see that Deliberative acceptability is in ΠP2 , since it cor-
responds to the language L = {w|∀x∃yR(w,x,y)}, where w encodes an instance
(AF,a) of the problem and (w,x,y) ∈ R if and only if x encodes a conflict-free set
T attacking a, and y encodes a conflict-free set S containing a such that S defends
itself against T .
We prove ΠP2-hardness for Deliberative acceptability by a reduction from the
decision problem ∀∃SAT.
An instance of ∀∃SAT is a formula F ′=∀x1 . . .∀xn∃y1 . . .∃ynF(x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn),
where F(x1, . . . ,xn,y1, . . . ,yn) is a CNF formula over the disjoint sets of variables
X = {x1, . . . ,xn} and Y = {y1, . . . ,yn}. The instance F ′ = ∀X∃Y F(X ,Y ) is ac-
cepted if and only if for any truth assignment αX of the variables in X , there is
a truth assignment αY of the variables in Y such that (αX ,αY ) satisfies the formula
F(X ,Y ). It is well known that ∀∃SAT is Πp2-complete (Stockmeyer and Meyer
[SM73], Wrathall [Wra76]).
We will construct in polynomial time an argumentation framework AFF ′ for each
instance F ′ of ∀∃SAT. Let F ′ = ∀X∃Y F(X ,Y ) and F(X ,Y ) =C1∧ . . .∧Cm, where
each clause Ci is a disjunction of literals. A literal is a variable xi ∈ X = {x1, . . . ,xn},
yi ∈Y = {y1, . . . ,yn}, or their negations xi ∈ X = {x1, . . . ,xn}, yi ∈Y = {y1, . . . ,yn}.
The argumentation framework associated to F ′ is AFF ′ = (A,D), where:
- A = {F}∪{C1, . . . ,Cm}∪X ∪X ∪Y ∪Y , and
- D = ∪mi=1{(Ci,F)}
⋃
∪mi=1∪nj=1{(x j,Ci)|x j occurs in Ci}
⋃ ∪mi=1∪nj=1 {(x j,Ci)|x j occurs in Ci}⋃
∪mi=1∪nj=1{(y j,Ci)|y j occurs in Ci}
⋃ ∪mi=1∪nj=1 {(y j,Ci)|y j occurs in Ci}⋃
∪nj=1 {(x j,x j),(x j,x j),(y j,y j),(y j,y j)}
⋃
∪ni=1∪nj=1{(xi,y j),(xi,y j)}
⋃ ∪ni=1∪nj=1 {(yi,x j),(yi,x j)}⋃
∪ni=1∪mj=1{(C j,yi),(C j,yi)}
⋃
∪ni=1 {(F,xi),(F,xi)}.
Clearly, AFF ′ can be constructed in polynomial time from F ′. Its structure is vi-
sualized in Figure 1.6 below. Note that the only conflict-free sets of arguments
containing F are subsets of the form {F} ∪ S, where S ⊂ Y ∪Y . Also, the only
conflict-free sets of arguments meeting C are of the form C′∪T , where /0 6=C′ ⊆C
and T ⊂ X ∪X .
We prove that F ′ = ∀X∃Y F(X ,Y ) is an accepted instance of ∀∃SAT if and only
if F is deliberatively accepted in AFF ′ .
Suppose that F is deliberatively accepted in AFF ′ . Let αX be any truth assignment
for the variables in X . If all clauses from C are satisfied by αX then (αX ,αY ) is a
satisfying assignment for F(X ,Y ), for any αY . Suppose that there is a nonempty
subset C ′ ⊆ C such that no clause Ci of C ′ is satisfied by αX . This means that
for every literal l ∈ (X ∪X)∩Ci, we have α(l) = f alse. It follows that T = {l ∈
X ∪X |α(l) = true}∪C ′ is a conflict-free set in AFF ′ attacking the argument F (by
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C
F
X Y
X : x1 x1 x2 x2 · · · xn xn
Y : y1 y1 y2 y2 · · · yn yn
C : C1 C2 · · · Cm
A B : edges {(a,b)|a ∈ A,b ∈ B}
X C :
{(xi,C j)|xi∈C j}∪
{(xi,C j)|xi∈C j}
Y C :
{(yi,C j)|yi∈C j}∪
{(yi,C j)|yi∈C j}
Figure 1.6.: The argumentation framework AFF ′ associated to instance F ′ = ∀X∃Y F(X ,Y ).
all arguments in C ′). Since F is deliberatively accepted, there is a conflict-free set
of argument S such that F ∈ S and T ∩ S− ⊆ S+. It follows that T −{F} ⊆ Y ∪Y
and for each Ci ∈ C ′ there is l ∈ Y ∪Y such that (l,Ci) ∈ D, that is l ∈ Ci. If we
consider αY , the assignment with αY (l) = true for all these literals l, we obtain that
(αX ,αY ) is a satisfying assignment for F(X ,Y ). Hence F ′ is a positive instance of
∀∃SAT.
Conversely, let F ′ = ∀X∃Y F(X ,Y ) be a positive instance of ∀∃SAT. Let T be
a conflict-free set of arguments attacking F (that is, C ′ = T ∩C 6= /0). Let αX a
truth assignment for variables in X such that for each l ∈ (X ∪ X)∩ T we have
αX(l) = f alse (such assignment exists since T is conflict-free). Since F ′ is a posi-
tive instance of ∀∃SAT, there is a truth assignment αY for the variables in Y such that
for each Ci ∈C ′ there is a literal li ∈ (Y ∪Y )∩Ci such that αY (li) = true. Taking S
the set of arguments containing F and all such literals li, we obtain a conflict-free set
of arguments with the property that T ∩S− ⊆ S+. It follows that F is deliberatively
accepted in AFF ′ . 2
It is interesting to identify graph-theoretic constraints for an argumentation frame-
work under which the problem Deliberative acceptability becomes polynomial-
time solvable. A first such constraint follows from Proposition 15 and the polyno-
mial runtime of Dunne’s algorithm.
Proposition 17 If the underlying undirected graph associated to the argumentation
framework AF = (A,D) is bipartite, then Deliberative acceptability is in P.
A more interesting restriction of the Deliberative acceptability problem can be
obtained by imposing that the underlying undirected graph associated to the argu-
mentation framework to be co-chordal. A chordal (triangulated) graph is an undi-
rected graph which does not contain as an induced subgraph the cycle graph Ck, for
any k≥ 4 (equivalently, in such a graph every cycle of length at least 4 has a chord).
34
1.3. Complexity
The complement of a chordal graph is a co-chordal graph. Chordal graphs can be
recognized in O(n+m) time, where n is its number of vertices and m is its number of
edges, Rose [Ros70], Tarjan and Yannakakis, [TY84]. Also, the number of cliques
(maximal complete subgraphs) of a chordal graph is O(n) and all these cliques can
be found in O(n+m), using Maximum Cardinality Search, [TY84]. It follows that
in a co-chordal graph the number of maximal independent sets of vertices (maximal
stable sets) is O(n) and all these maximal stable sets can be found in linear time.)
Hence, for the argumentation frameworks with an underlying co-chordal graph, the
number of maximal conflict-free sets is linear.
Proposition 18 If the underlying undirected graph associated to the argumentation
framework AF = (A,D) is a co-chordal graph, then Deliberative acceptability is
in P.
Proof. Firstly, let us remark that if the condition in the definition of deliberative
acceptance of an argument a in an argumentation framework AF =(A,D) is fulfilled
only by maximal conflict-free sets of arguments, then it is fulfilled by arbitrary
conflict-free sets. Indeed, if T is a conflict-free set attacking a, let T0 be a maximal
conflict-free set containing T . Clearly, T ∩a− ⊆ T0∩a−, hence T0 attacks a. Since
T0 is maximal, there is the conflict-free S such that a ∈ S and T0∩S− ⊆ S+. Let S0
a maximal conflict-free set containing S. Clearly, a ∈ S0 and T0∩S−0 ⊆ S+0 . Hence
T ∩S− ⊆ S+0 .
Since the underlying undirected graph G of AF is co-chordal, there are only
O(|A|) maximal conflict-free sets T attacking a. The subgraph of G induced by
A− a− is co-chordal, hence there are O(|A|) maximal conflict-free sets containing
a. Each such set S can be tested in polynomial time if T ∩S− ⊆ S+. It follows that
in polynomial time we can decide if a is deliberatively accepted. 2
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2. A Normal Form for Argumentation
Frameworks
We show that any argumentation framework can be syntactically augmented into a
normal form (having a simplified attack relation), preserving the semantic properties
of original arguments.
An argumentation framework is in normal form if no argument attacks a conflicting
pair of arguments. An augmentation of an argumentation framework is obtained by
adding new arguments and changing the attack relation such that the acceptability
status of original arguments is maintained in the new framework. Furthermore, we
define join-normal semantics leading to augmentations of the joined argumentation
frameworks. Also, a rewriting technique which transforms in cubic time a given
argumentation framework into a normal form is devised.
2.1. Introduction
It is well-known that the syntactical structure of argumentation frameworks directly
influences the output (e.g., Dung [Dun95], Dunne and Bench-Capon [DBC02], or
Baroni and Giacomin [BG03]) and the complexity of algorithms for deciding ac-
ceptability questions, Dunne [Dun07]. In Prakken and Sartor [PS96], a four-layers
succession for any AI-argumentation process was proposed. First we have the log-
ical layer in which arguments are defined. Second, in the dialectical layer, the
attacks are defined. Next, in the procedural layer, are defined rules that control
the way arguments are introduced and challenged. Last layer, the heuristics layer,
contains the remaining parts of the process, including methods for deciding the jus-
tification status of arguments.
In this chapter, keeping the abstract character of arguments and attacks, we are
interested in understanding the syntactical properties of argumentation frameworks
related to the procedural layer. We prove in a formal way that a discipline policy
can be adopted in forming of an argumentation framework, without changing the
semantic properties. It follows from our result that if the output of a dispute is
obtained using an extension based reasoning engine, then it will be not influenced
if we impose the following rule: any new argument added by an agent attacks no
existing pair of conflicting arguments and, at the same time, at most one argument
from any existing pair of conflicting arguments can attack the new argument.
We formalize this by considering σ -extensions (for σ a classical semantics), and
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introducing the notion of σ -augmentation of an argumentation framework AF . An
argumentation framework AF ′ is a σ -augmentation of AF if it contains all argu-
ments of AF , and the attacks of AF ′ are such that, for any set S of arguments of
AF , S is contained in a σ -extension of AF if and only if S is contained in a σ -
extension of AF ′. We show that for suitable join-normal semantics the join of two
argumentation frameworks gives rise to a common σ -augmentation of the joined
argumentation frameworks. In the main result of this chapter, we prove that for
any argumentation framework AF there is a σ -augmentation AF ′ in normal form,
where σ is any Dung’s classical semantics. An argumentation framework is in
normal form if the set of arguments attacked by any argument contains no two at-
tacking arguments. We prove that an argumentation framework is in normal form
if and only if it can be constructed by adding its arguments one after one (the order
does not matter), such that each new argument cannot attack two attacking argu-
ments already added, and cannot be attacked by a pair of two attacking arguments
already added.
2.2. The σ -Augmentations
We introduce the following binary relation between argumentation frameworks.
Definition 19 Let AF,AF ′ ∈ AF and σ be a semantics.
We say that AF ′ is a σ -augmentation of AF , denoted AF vσ AF ′, if
• Arg(AF)⊆ Arg(AF ′),
• for any S ∈ σ(AF) there is S′ ∈ σ(AF ′) such that S⊆ S′, and
• for any S′ ∈ σ(AF ′) there is S ∈ σ(AF) such that S′∩Arg(AF)⊆ S.
The binary relationvσ between argumentation frameworks is a preorder : clearly
vσ is reflexive, and it is transitive as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 20 If AF vσ AF ′ and AF ′ vσ AF ′′, then AF vσ AF ′′.
Proof. Clearly, Arg(AF)⊆ Arg(AF ′′).
Let S ∈ σ(AF). Since AF vσ AF ′, there is S′ ∈ σ(AF ′) such that S ⊆ S′, and since
AF ′ vσ AF ′′, there is S′′ ∈ σ(AF ′′) such that S′ ⊆ S′′. Hence for any S ∈ σ(AF)
there exists S′′ ∈ σ(AF ′′) such that S⊆ S′′.
Let S′′ ∈ σ(AF ′′). Since AF ′ vσ AF ′′, there is S′ ∈ σ(AF ′) such that S′′ ∩
Arg(AF ′)⊆ S′. Since AF vσ AF ′, there is S ∈ σ(AF) such that S′∩Arg(AF)⊆ S.
Since Arg(AF) ⊆ Arg(AF ′) it follows that S′′ ∩ Arg(AF) ⊆ S′′ ∩ Arg(AF ′) ⊆ S′,
hence S′′∩Arg(AF)⊆ S′∩Arg(AF)⊆ S. 2
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It follows that if we define AF ≡σ AF ′ if and only if AF vσ AF ′ and AF ′ vσ AF
then, we obtain an equivalence relation on AF. Two ≡σ -equivalent argumentation
frameworks have the same set of arguments, but they are not isomorphic in general.
For example, AF = ({a,b},{(a,a),(a,b)}) and AF ′ = ({a,b},{(a,a),(b,b)}) are
≡adm (since adm(AF) = { /0}= adm(AF ′)), but, clearly, they are not isomorphic.
It is not necessary that the attack set of the σ -augmentation to be a superset of the
attack set of the initial argumentation framework, as the following example shows.
e a
c
d
b e
a
a′
c
d
b
AF AF ′
Figure 2.1.: AF ′ is an admissible augmentation of AF
Example 21 Let us consider the two argumentation frameworks in the Figure 2.1.
We have A′ = A∪{a′} and D′ = (D−{(a,b)})∪{(e,a′),(a′,e),(a′,b)}, hence D 6⊆
D′. However, AF vadm AF ′. Indeed, the admissible sets in AF are /0, {a}, and
{a,d} (no conflict-free set containing b defends the attack (d,b), no conflict-free set
containing c defends the attack (b,c)), which remain admissible sets in AF ′. The
admissible sets in AF ′ are /0, {a}, {a′}, {a,a′}, {a,d}, {a′,d}, and {a,a′,d} (the
“new” conflict-free sets {a,b} and {a′,c} can not be extended to admissible sets in
AF ′ due to the attacks (a′,b), respectively (a,c)), and their intersections with A are
contained in admissible sets of AF.
The next proposition follows easily from the definition.
Proposition 22
(i) If σ(AF) = /0, then we have AF vσ AF ′ if and only if Arg(AF)⊆ Arg(AF ′) and
σ(AF ′) = /0.
(ii) If σ(AF) = { /0}, then we have AF vσ AF ′ if and only if Arg(AF)⊆ Arg(AF ′),
σ(AF ′) 6= /0, and S′∩Arg(AF) = /0 for all S′ ∈ σ(AF ′).
It is easy to prove that the σ -credulous acceptability of an argument in a given
AF is not changed in a σ -augmentation AF ′ of AF . More precisely, the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 23 If AF vσ AF ′ and a ∈ Arg(AF) then a is σ -credulously accepted
in AF if and only if a is σ -credulously accepted in AF ′.
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Proof. If there is S ∈ σ(AF) such that a∈ S, then since AF vσ AF ′ it follows that
there is S′ ∈σ(AF ′) such that S⊆ S′, hence there is S′ ∈σ(AF ′) such that a∈ S′, that
is a is σ -credulously accepted in AF ′. Conversely, if there is S′ ∈ σ(AF ′) such that
a ∈ S′, then since AF vσ AF ′ and a ∈ Arg(AF), it follows that there is S ∈ σ(AF)
such that S′∩Arg(AF) ⊆ S, hence there is S ∈ σ(AF) such that a ∈ S, that is a is
σ -credulously accepted in AF . 2
The converse of Proposition 23 does not hold: if AF = ({a,b},{(a,b),(b,a)}),
AF ′ = ({a,b,a′,b′},{(a,a′),(a′,b),(b,b′),(b′,a)}), and σ = adm, then a and b are
adm-credulously accepted in AF and AF ′. However, AF 6vadm AF ′, since the ad-
missible set {a,b} in AF ′ is not contained in an admissible set in AF .
If σ is an admissibility-based semantics, the σ -sceptical acceptance is not preserved
in general by the σ -augmentations. Indeed, let the argument a be adm-sceptically
accepted in the argumentation framework AF and let AF ′ be the argumentation
framework obtained from AF by adding a new copy a′ of a, each attack (a,x) or
(x,a) giving rise to a new attack (a′,x) or (x,a′), and adding the attacks (a,a′) and
(a′,a). It is not difficult to see that adm(AF ′) = adm(AF)∪{S−{a}∪ {a′}|S ∈
adm(AF),a ∈ S}. It follows that AF vadm AF ′ but a is not adm-sceptically ac-
cepted in the argumentation framework AF ′.
A simple way of constructing σ -augmentations is given by the join of two argu-
mentation frameworks.
Definition 24 Let AF1 and AF2 be disjoint argumentation frameworks, that is
Arg(AF1)∩Arg(AF2) = /0.
• The disjoint union of AF1 and AF2 is the argumentation framework AF ′=AF1 ∪˙ AF2,
where Arg(AF ′) = Arg(AF1)∪Arg(AF2) and Def (AF ′) = Def (AF1)∪Def (AF2).
• The sum of AF1 and AF2 is the argumentation framework AF ′′=AF1+AF2, where
Arg(AF ′′)=Arg(AF1)∪Arg(AF2) and Def (AF ′′)=Def (AF1)∪Def (AF2)∪{(a1,a2),
(a2,a1)|ai ∈ Arg(AFi), i = 1,2}.
• If σ is a semantics then it is join-normal if σ(AF1 ∪˙ AF2)= {S∪S′|S∈σ(AF1),S′ ∈
σ(AF2)} and σ(AF1+AF2) = σ(AF1)∪σ(AF2).
If σ ∈ {adm, comp, pref, gr, stb} then σ is join-normal.
Indeed, S is a conflict-free set in AF1 ∪˙ AF2 if and only if Si = S∩Arg(AFi) is a
conflict-free set in AFi (i ∈ {1,2}). Also, S+ = S+1 ∪˙ S+2 .
Similarly, S is a conflict-free set in AF1 +AF2 if and only if S ∈ cf(AF1) or S ∈
cf(AF2). If S ∈ cf(AF1) then S+ = Arg(AF2)∪ S+ ∩Arg(AF1) and if S ∈ cf(AF2)
then S+ = Arg(AF1)∪S+∩Arg(AF2).
The next proposition follows easily from the definition above.
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Proposition 25 Let AF1 and AF2 be disjoint argumentation frameworks, and σ a
join-normal semantics. Then AF1,AF2 vσ AF1 ∪˙ AF2, and AF1,AF2 vσ AF1+AF2.
We close this section by noting that σ -augmentations can be defined equiva-
lently, for σ ∈ {adm, comp, pref, gr, stb}, using Caminada’s labellings. More pre-
cisely, the following proposition is easy to prove from Caminada’s characterizations
([Cam06a]) of σ -extensions, where the extension of a labelling from a subset to a
larger set is the usual function extension.
Proposition 26 Let σ ∈ {adm, comp, pref, gr, stb}. AF ′ is a σ -augmentation of
the argumentation framework AF if and only if i) Arg(AF) ⊆ Arg(AF ′), ii) any σ -
labelling of AF can be extended to a σ -labelling of AF ′, and iii) the restriction of
any σ -labelling of AF ′ to Arg(AF) can be extended to a σ -labelling of AF.
2.3. Normal Forms
In this section we confine ourselves only to σ = adm and we refer to an adm-
augmentation as an admissible augmentation.
The results obtained for admissible augmentations can be easily adapted for σ -
augmentations, where σ ∈ {comp, pref, gr, stb}.
An admissible augmentation can be viewed as adding “auxiliary” arguments in
order to simplify the combinatorial structure of the given argumentation framework
and, at the same time, maintaining all the credulous acceptability conclusions (see
Proposition 23). We consider this simplified structure a normal form as follows.
Definition 27 An argumentation framework AF = (A,D) is in normal form if for
each a ∈ A there are no b,c ∈ a+ such that b 6= c and (b,c) ∈ D. A set S ⊆ A with
the property, that (a,b) 6∈ D for a,b ∈ S and a 6= b, is referred as d-conflict-free.
Some properties of an argumentation framework in normal form are given in the
next proposition. Note that the part ii) of this proposition shows that an argumenta-
tion framework is in normal form if and only if it can be constructed by adding its
arguments one after one (the order does not matter), such that each new argument
cannot attack two attacking arguments already added, and cannot be attacked by a
pair of two attacking arguments already added.
Proposition 28
(i) Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework in normal form. Then for each
a ∈ A the set a− is d-conflict-free. Moreover, in any set of four arguments of
AF there are two non-attacking arguments.
(ii) An argumentation framework AF = (A,D) is in normal form if and only if
for any ordering A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an}, the sets ~a−i = a−i ∩{a1, . . . ,ai−1} and
~a+i = a
+
i ∩{a1, . . . ,ai−1} are d-conflict-free, for all i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}.
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Proof (i) Suppose that there is a0 ∈ A such that a−0 is not a d-conflict-free set,
that is, there are b,c ∈ a−0 such that b 6= c and (b,c) ∈ D. But then, a0,c ∈ b+ and
(c,a0) ∈ D, that is the set b+ is not d-conflict free, a contradiction.
If there are four pairwise attacking arguments {a,b,c,d} ⊆ A, then the underlying
undirected graph of AF contains a complete graph K4 as an induced subgraph, with
nodes a,b,c,d and the edge {a,b} generated by the attack (a,b) ∈ D (see Figure
2.2 below). Since a+ in AF is d-conflict-free, we are forced to have (c,a) ∈ D and
(d,a) ∈ D; but then, a− contains c and d, and since (c,d) ∈ D or (d,c) ∈ D, a− is
not d-conflict-free, a contradiction.
a b
cd
Figure 2.2.: An induced K4 in AF .
(ii) Clearly, if AF is in normal form, then for any ordering A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an},
and any i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}, a+i and a−i are d-conflict-free sets, therefore their subsets
~a+i and ~a
−
i are d-conflict-free. Conversely, let AF = (A,D) satisfying the property
stated. If AF is not in normal form, there are a,b,c∈A such that (a,b),(a,c),(b,c)∈
A. Any ordering of A with a1 := a,a2 := b,a3 := c has ~a−3 = {a,b} which is not
d-conflict-free, a contradiction. 2
The next algorithm eliminates an attack between arguments attacked by the same
argument in a given argumentation framework.
Input AF = (A,D) an argumentation framework, a,b,c ∈ A with
(a,b),(a,c),(b,c) ∈ D;
Output AF ′ = (A′,D ′);
add to A two new arguments a1,a2 giving A′;
put in D ′ all attacks in D;
delete from D ′ the attack (a,b);
add to D ′ the attacks (a,a1),(a1,a2),(a2,b);
Return AF ′
Algorithm 1: ELIM1(AF ;a,b,c)
The effect of ELIM1(AF ;a,b,c) is depicted in the Figure 2.3. The squiggly arrows
signify sets of all attacks, between arguments a,b,c and the sets of arguments in the
rectangular boxes.
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a−
a+−{b,c}
c−−{a,b} c+
b+−{c}
b−−{a}
a
c
b
a−
a+−{b,c}
c−−{a,b} c+
b+−{c}
b−−{a}
a
a1
a2
c
b
AF AF ′
Figure 2.3.: Elimination of a bad triangle.
Proposition 29 The argumentation framework AF ′= (A′,D ′), which is returned by
ELIM1(AF ;a,b,c), is an admissible augmentation of AF.
Proof. Let S ⊆ A be an admissible set in AF . We prove that S′ ⊆ A′ is an admis-
sible set in AF ′, where:
S′ =

S∪{a2} if a ∈ S,
S∪{a1} if a 6∈ S,b ∈ S,
S if a 6∈ S,b 6∈ S.
If S ⊆ A is an admissible set containing a in AF , then S′ = S∪{a2} is a conflict-
free set in AF ′. Indeed, no attack between the arguments in A is added by the
algorithm ELIM1, hence S is conflict free in AF ′. The only attacks containing a2
are (a1,a2) and (a2,b). But a1 6∈ S (because a1 6∈ A), and b 6∈ S (because a ∈ S,
(a,b) ∈D, and S is conflict-free set in AF). It follows that S∪{a2} is a conflict-free
set in AF ′. The attack (a1,a2) against S∪{a2} is defeated by (a,a1), since a ∈ S.
Any attack (x,y) with x ∈ A−S and y ∈ S is defeated by an attack (z,x) with z ∈ S,
since S is admissible set in AF . It follows that S∪{a2} is a conflict-free set in AF ′
which defends itself against any attack in AF ′, that is, S∪{a2} is an admissible set
in AF ′.
If S is an admissible set in AF such that a 6∈ S but b ∈ S, then adding a1 to S we
obtain a conflict-free set in AF ′ (since a 6∈ S and a2 6∈ S, the only attacks involving
a1 – (a,a1) and (a1,a2) – are not between arguments from S∪{a1}). The attack
(a2,b) on S∪{a1} is defeated by (a1,a2). The attack (a,a1) must be defeated by
some argument x ∈ a−∩ S, because in AF the attack (a,b) must be defeated. Any
attack (x,y) with x ∈ A−S and y ∈ S is defeated by an attack (z,x) with z ∈ S, since
S is admissible set in AF . It follows that S∪{a1} is an admissible set in AF ′.
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If S is an admissible set in AF not containing a and b, then S remains conflict-
free since no attacks between arguments in A are added. Also all attacks from an
argument in S remain in AF ′, and no new attack against S is introduced. It follows
that S continues to defend itself against any attack in AF ′, hence S is an admissible
set in AF ′.
On the other hand, let S′⊆A′ be an admissible set in AF ′. We prove that S= S′∩A
is an admissible set in AF .
If S′ is an admissible set containing a2 in AF ′, then a1,b 6∈ S′ (since S′ is conflict-free
and (a1,a2),(a2,b)∈D′). Since (a1,a2)∈D′ and S′ is admissible, it follows that a1
must be attacked by S′ in AF ′. The only attack on a1 in AF ′ is (a,a1). Hence a ∈ S′.
S′−{a2} is conflict free in AF , because b 6∈ S′. Any attack (x,y) with x ∈ A−S and
y ∈ S is defeated by an attack (z,x) with z ∈ S, since S′ is admissible set in AF ′. It
follows that S′−{a2}= S′∩A is an admissible set in AF .
If S′ is an admissible set containing a1 in AF ′, a similar proof shows that S′−
{a1}= S′∩A is an admissible set in AF .
If S′ is an admissible set in AF ′ such that a1,a2 6∈ S′, we can suppose that b 6∈ S′.
Otherwise, if b ∈ S′ then the attack (a2,b) can not be defeated by S′, since the only
attack on a2 in AF ′ is (a1,a2). Since the only additional attack involving at least one
argument in S′ can be (a,b), it follows that S′ is a conflict-free set in AF and also
defends itself against any attack in AF (because it was an admissible set in AF ′). 2
Proposition 30 The argumentation framework AF ′ = (A′,D ′) returned by calling
ELIM1( AF ;a,b,c) satisfies AF vσ AF ′ for σ ∈ {comp, pref, gr, stb}.
Proof. For σ ∈ {comp, pref} the proof follows from Proposition 29. Indeed,
if S ∈ σ(AF) then S is an admissible set in AF and, by Proposition 29, can be
extended to an admissible set in AF ′. Since any admissible set can be extended to a
complete or preferred extension, it follows that there is S′ ∈σ(AF ′) such that S⊆ S′.
Conversely, if S′ ∈σ(AF ′) then S′ is an admissible set in AF ′ and, by Proposition 29,
S′∩A can be extended to an admissible set in AF . Since any admissible set can be
extended to a complete or prefered extension, it follows that there is S ∈ σ(AF)
such that S′∩A⊆ S.
For σ = stb it is not difficult to verify that if S ∈ stb(AF) then S′ ∈ stb(AF ′),
where
S′ =
{
S∪{a2} if a ∈ S,
S∪{a1} if a 6∈ S
and, if S′ ∈ stb(AF ′) then S ∈ stb(AF), where
S =
{
S′−{a2} if a ∈ S′,
S′−{a1} if a 6∈ S′.
For σ = gr, we use Proposition 26 and Observation 7. Clearly, if each x ∈ Arg(AF)
satisfies x− 6= /0, then the same property holds in AF ′ and gr(AF) = gr(AF ′) =
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{ /0}. Suppose that gr(AF) = {S}, S 6= /0 and let Lab a gr-labelling of AF such
that S = Lab−1(I). If a ∈ S, then we extend Lab to AF ′ by taking Lab(a1) = O,
Lab(a2) = I, and the linear ordering of Lab−1(I) in AF ′ is obtained by considering
a2 the successor of a. It is not difficult to see that we obtain a gr-labelling of
AF ′. If a 6∈ S, and Lab(a) = O then a gr-labelling of AF ′ is obtained by taking
Lab(a1) = I and the linear ordering of Lab−1(I) in AF ′ is obtained by considering
a1 the successor of an attacker of a labeled I. If a 6∈ S, and Lab(a) =U then Lab
remains a gr-labelling of AF ′. A similar analysis can be used to show that the
restriction to AF of a gr-labelling of AF ′ gives rise to a gr-labelling of AF . 2
By iterating the algorithm ELIM1, we obtain:
AF ′ := AF ;
foreach a,b,c ∈ Arg(AF)s.t.(a,b),(a,c),(b,c) ∈ De f (AF) do
AF ′ := ELIM1(AF ′;a,b,c)
end
Return AF ′
Algorithm 2: ELIMALL(AF )
Proposition 31 For any argumentation framework AF = (A,D) there is an admis-
sible augmentation AF ′ = (A′,D ′) in normal form. Furthermore, AF ′ can be con-
structed from AF in O(|A|3) time.
Proof. Using Propositions 20 and 29, the above iteration of the algorithm ELIM1
returns an admissible augmentation AF ′ of the given AF . The for condition assures
that AF ′, the returned argumentation framework, is in normal form. It remains to
prove that the algorithm finishes.
We call a triangle {a,b,c}⊆A′ with (a,b),(a,c),(b,c)∈D ′, a bad triangle. Clearly,
the algorithm finishes when there is no bad triangle in the current argumentation
framework.
In each for-iteration the total number of bad triangles of the current argumenta-
tion framework AF ′ decreases by 1. Indeed, the algorithm ELIM1(AF ′;a,b,c) de-
stroys a bad triangle and creates no new bad triangle, since the two new arguments
a1 and a2 are not contained in a triangle in the new argumentation framework.
Since the number of bad triangles in AF it at most
(|A|
3
)
, and the running time of
ELIM1(AF ′;a,b,c) is O(1), the final argumentation framework AF ′ is obtained in
O(|A|3) time. 2
Summarizing the results obtained in this section, using Propositions 28ii), 30 and
31, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 32 Any argumentation framework AF = (A,D) has an admissible aug-
mentation AF ′ = (A′,D′) which can be formed by adding the arguments one after
45
2. A Normal Form for Argumentation Frameworks
one such that each argument attacks a d-conflict-free set of its predecessors and
is attacked by a d-conflict-free set of its predecessors. Furthermore AF ′ is also a
σ -augmentation of AF for any Dung’s classical semantics σ .
The Figure 2.4 below suggests the way in which the argumentation framework
AF ′ from the above theorem is formed. Any new argument anew added by an agent
in a round cannot attack an existing pair of conflicting arguments, that is anew attacks
only a coherent set of existing arguments. The agent knows that, if she wants, in a
later round can use a surrogate of anew to attack other arguments which in the actual
round are in conflict with those selected to be attacked. In the same time, from the
set of existing arguments only a coherent set can attack the new argument. The
other attacks will be simulated in future rounds by using again special surrogate
arguments. In this way, a more logical scene of dispute can be devised, which is
however (polynomially) longer as one in which our discipline policy is not followed.
~a−new ~a+new
anew
Figure 2.4.: Discipline policy in forming an AF .
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Argumentation Frameworks
Polyhedral labellings associated to an argumentation framework are introduced. A
polyhedral labelling for an argumentation framework AF = (A,D) is a polytope
PAF , that is, a bounded set of solutions x ∈ RA (xa is the label of the argument
a ∈ A), to a system of linear constraints, such that the set of integral vectors in
PAF are exactly the incidence vectors of some specific type of Dung’s extensions.
The linear constraints vary from the obvious xa = 1 for each non attacked argument
a, or xa + xb ≤ 1 for each attack (a,b) ∈ D (in order to assure Dung’s conflict-
free condition), to more deep inequalities of the form ”the sum of the label of an
argument and the labels of all its attackers is at least 1 ” or if (b,a) is an attack then
”the label of a is not greater than the sum of the labels of all attackers of b”.
3.1. Introduction
An important intuitive way to express Dung’s extension-based semantics is using
argument labellings, as proposed by Caminada [Cam06a] (originally introduced in
Pollock [Pol95]). The idea is to consider symbolic vectors1 λ ∈ {I,O,U}A, such
that if a ∈ A is an argument, then λa is the label of a, with the intuitive meaning:
λa = I (i.e. In) if and only if a is accepted, λa = O (i.e. Out) if and only if a is
rejected, and λa =U (i.e. Undecided) if and only if one abstains from an opinion
on whether the argument a is accepted or rejected.
Constraining the labels of arguments with respect to the attack relation D of the
argumentation framework, Caminada characterized the subsets of {I,O,U}A corre-
sponding to Dung’s semantics (see 0.2).
Another interesting approach to the semantics of argumentation frameworks was
introduced by Gabbay in [Gab11, Gab12a, Gab12b] under the name equational ap-
proach, and independently by Gratie and Florea in [GF11] under the name fuzzy
labellings. The idea is to consider solutions x ∈ [0,1]A of some non-linear systems
of equations associated to the argumentation framework and to relate them to Cam-
inada labellings.
1Throughout this chapter, if A is a finite set, we make no distinction between the set BA of all functions from
A to B and the set B|A| of all vectors with components from B and indexed by the elements of A. Supposing
a fixed ordering of A, there is an obvious one to one correspondence between them, and we use the notation
BA for both sets.
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Using this approach, Gabbay proposes an interesting method to avoid the seman-
tics problems caused by the odd circuits in argumentation frameworks.
In this chapter, I introduce polyhedral labellings associated to an argumentation
framework. The name suggests the use of ideas from Polyhedral Combinatorics, an
important topic in Combinatorial Optimization, mainly concerned with encoding
combinatorial problems by means of systems of linear equations and inequalities.
The interest in such representation is that it makes the corresponding combinato-
rial optimization problems accessible to linear programming techniques (see, for
example, Schrijver [Sch03]).
More precisely, if χS ∈ {0,1}A is the incidence vector of a set S⊆ A of arguments
(that is, χSa = 1 if a ∈ S and χSa = 0 if a 6∈ S), and S is a collection of sets of
arguments, then the convex hull of their incidence vectors, conv{χS|S ∈S }, is a
polytope in RA, therefore there exist a matrix C ∈ Rm×|A| and a vector b ∈ Rm such
that
conv{χS|S ∈S }= {x ∈ RA|Cx≤ b}.
If w : A→ R is a weight function on A, and we are interested in finding a mem-
ber S∗ of S of maximum weight (where the weight of S is w(S) = ∑a∈S w(a)),
sinceS is finite and the weight function can be viewed as a linear function on RA,
we could maximize over the convex hull conv{χS|S ∈ S }, that is, by the above
representation, finding
max{wT x|x ∈ RA,Cx≤ b}.
This is computationally worthwhile when S is too large to evaluate the weight
of each member S in S , but the description Cx ≤ b of the above polytope has
polynomial size. Then, we can solve in polynomial time the equivalent linear pro-
gramming problem obtained (for example, using the ellipsoid method, Khachiyan
[Kha79]). An illustration of this approach is discussed in Section 3.2, where we
describe an interesting polytope encoding the non-attacked sets of arguments in an
argumentation framework.
In several cases, the desired system of inequalities, Cx≤ b, turns out not to be a com-
plete description, but just gives an approximation of the polytope conv{χS|S ∈S }.
This can still be useful, since in that case the linear programming problem gives
a (hopefully good) upper bound for the combinatorial maximum. These bounds
are used in designing branch-and-bound algorithms for the combinatorial prob-
lem, which are implemented in state-of-the-art integer programming solvers (e.g.
CPLEX, Lowe [Low12]). In fact, exploiting integer programming encodings of the
problems is an usual modeling method in areas related to argumentation, such as
non monotonic reasoning (Bell et al. [BNS94]), satisfiability (Li, Zhou and Du
[LZD04]), or answer set programming (Liu, Janhunen and Niemela¨ [LJN12]).
Summarizing, a polyhedral labelling for an argumentation frameork AF = (A,D)
is a polytope PAF , that is, a bounded set of solutions x ∈ RA (xa is the label of the
argument a ∈ A), of a system of linear inequalities (and equations), such that the
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set of integral vectors in PAF are exactly the incidence vectors of various Dung’s
admissibility based extensions.
3.2. The non-attacked sets polytope
Definition 33 Let AF =(A,D) be an argumentation framework. A non-attacked set
of arguments is a set N ⊆ A such that N− ⊆ N. LetNAF := {N|N ⊆ A,N− ⊆ N}.
Trivial non-attacked sets are /0,A ∈NAF for any argumentation framework AF =
(A,D). The interest in such sets of arguments is given by the following proposition
(see also the ”directionality principle” in Baroni and Giacomin [BG07b]).
Proposition 34 Let a ∈ A be an argument in the argumentation framework AF =
(A,D) and X ∈NAF be a non-attacked set containing a. There is an admissible set
S in AF such that a ∈ S if and only if there is an admissible set S′ in AF ′ such that
a ∈ S′, where AF ′ is the argumentation framework induced by X in AF.
Proof. Let S an admissible set in AF such that a ∈ S. Then S is conflict-free and
S− ⊆ S+. Then, SX = S∩X is a conflict-free set in AF ′, and a ∈ SX . If SX is not an
admissible set in AF ′, then there is b ∈ S−X ∩X−S+X . Since S is an admissible set in
AF , b∈ S+. It follows that there is c∈ S−X such that (c,b)∈D, that is c∈ X−−X ,
contradicting the hypothesis that X is a non-attacking set in AF .
Conversely, if S′ ⊆ X is an admissible set in AF ′ such that a ∈ S′, then it is a
conflict-free set in AF . Since in AF we have S′− ⊆ X− ⊆ X , it follows that in AF
we have S′− ⊆ S′+, that is, S′ is an admissible set in AF . 2
We show now that NAF has an interesting polyhedral characterization. For each
X ∈NAF we consider its incidence vector χX ∈ {0,1}A, with χXa = 1 if and only if
a ∈ X .
Let NAF = {x ∈ RA|x satisfies (∗)} be the polyhedron defined by
(∗)
{
0≤ xa ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A,
xa− xb ≥ 0 ∀(a,b) ∈ D.
Hence, if x ∈ NAF then each argument a ∈ A is labeled with the real number xa ∈
[0,1] such that xa ≥ xb whenever the argument a attacks the argument b. This type
of constraints are used to model preferences (see, for example, ”value-based argu-
mentation frameworks”, Bench-Capon [BC03]).
Theorem 35 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. Then,
NAF = conv{χX |X ∈NAF}.
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Proof. For X ∈NAF , let y = χX . Since ya ∈ {0,1}, the first group of inequalities
in (∗) is satisfied. Let (a,b) ∈ D. If |{a,b}∩X | 6= 1, then ya = yb and the second
constraint in (∗) for (a,b), is satisfied with equality. If a ∈ X and b 6∈ X then 1 =
ya > yb = 0. Since X ∈NAF , we can not have a 6∈ X and b ∈ X . Hence χX ∈ NAF
for each X ∈NAF . It follows that
conv{χX |X ∈NAF} ⊆ NAF .
To prove the converse inclusion, we observe that the integer vectors in NAF are
exactly the incidence vectors of non-attacked sets. Hence it is sufficient to prove
that the vertices of NAF are integral. Let x be a vertex of NAF .
Suppose that Frac(x) = {a ∈ A|0< xa < 1} 6= /0, and let α =min{xa|a ∈ Frac(x)}.
Take ε > 0 such that α−ε > 0 and α+ε < xa for all a ∈ A such that xa > α . Then,
let x′,x′′ ∈ RA be such that:
x′a =
{
α− ε if xa = α,
xa if xa 6= α
and x′′a =
{
α+ ε if xa = α,
xa if xa 6= α.
By the choosing of ε , x′ and x′′ satisfy the first group of inequalities in (∗). Since
the order of the components in x′ and x′′ is the same as in x, and since x ∈ NAF ,
it follows that the second group of inequalities are satisfied by x′ and x′′. Hence,
x′,x′′ ∈ NAF , x′ 6= x′′, and x = 12x′+ 12x′′, contradicting the hypothesis that x is a
vertex in NAF . 2
From Proposition 34, it follows that in order to decide the σ -acceptability of a
given argument a in an argumentation framework , for σ ∈ {comp,gr,pref}, is
worthwhile to find a minimum cardinality non-attacked set containing a. This can
be obtained with a simple polynomial algorithm (similar to one used for obtaining
the grounded extension), but also using a linear programming solver, as a conse-
quence of the Theorem 35.
Indeed, if we solve the linear program min{cT x|x ∈NAF , xa0 = 1}, for c ∈RA we
obtain min{∑a∈X ca|X ∈NAF , a0 ∈ X}. In particular, for c = 1 (the vector with all
components 1), the minimum value obtained is the minimum cardinality of a non-
attacked set of arguments containing a0. If we solve (in polynomial time) the above
linear program and x0 is the optimal solution, then the set X = {a|a ∈ A,x0a > 0} is
the minimum cardinality non-attacking set containing a0.
3.3. Gabbay’s Equational Approach
An interesting approach to the semantics of argumentation frameworks was intro-
duced in Gabbay [Gab11, Gab12a, Gab12b] called the equational approach. Let
AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework, and let A0 be the set of arguments not
attacked in AF : A0 = {a ∈ A|a− = /0}. We consider for each argument a ∈ A a real
variable xa ∈ [0,1] and we are searching for real solutions of the following system
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of non-linear equations:
Eqmax(AF)
{
xa = 1, if a ∈ A0
xa = 1−max
b∈a−
xb, otherwise.
The following theorem holds.
Theorem 36 ([Gab12a]) If λ : A→{I,O,U} is a Caminada complete labellings of
AF, then taking xa = 0 if λ (a) = O, xa = 12 if λ (a) = U, and xa = 1 if λ (a) = I,
we obtain a solution to the system of equations Eqmax(AF). If x is a solution to the
system Eqmax(AF), then taking λ (a) = O if xa = 0, λ (a) = U if 0 < xa < 1, and
λ (a) = I if xa = 1 we obtain a Caminada complete labelling λ : A→{I,O,U}.
Example. For argumentation framework AF in Figure 3.1 below,
a
1
2
b
1
2
c
1
2
d
1
2
e
1
2
f
1
3
i
2
3
h
1
3
g
2
3
j
1
3 + ε
k
2
3 − ε
Figure 3.1.: Eqmax(AF) labellings. ε is a small positive number.
the Eqmax system is
Eqmax(AF)

xa = 1− xc, xb = 1− xa, xc = 1− xe, xd = 1− xb,
xe = 1− xd , x f = 1−max(xe,xi), xk = 1− x j,
xg = 1− x f , xh = 1− xg, xi = 1− xh, x j = 1−max(xh,xk)
and a set of solutions to Eqmax(AF) are suggested.
We can observe that if we translate them to Caminada labellings as in Theorem
36, the result is not so good since, in this case gr(AF) = { /0}, and there are odd
loops2. In order to avoid this, Gabbay [Gab12a] proposes the so called perturbation
method to solve a system of the form Eq(AF). Essentially, by this method, some
variables xa are forced to be 0 by extending the system Eq(AF) with these new
equations. The idea for choosing this forcing is to destroy the loops of AF . This
gives rise to interesting semantics (which are, in general, not admissibility based),
called LB-semantics in Gabbay [Gab12b].
If we make the convention that for X = /0 then maxx∈X = 0 and minx∈X = 1, then
the following proposition holds.
2In Gabbay’s terminology, a loop is a circuit (see the discussion after Theorem 46).
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Proposition 37 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. If x is a solution
in [0,1] of the system Eqmax(AF) then xa = minb∈a−maxc∈b− xc, for each a ∈ A.
Proof. Let x be a solution in [0,1] of the system Eqmax(AF). With our convention,
it follows that the second group of equations in Eqmax(AF) is satisfied for each
a ∈ A, that is xa = 1−max
b∈a−
xb. Then, we have successively,
xa = 1−max
b∈a−
xb = 1−max
b∈a−
(1−max
c∈b−
xc) =−max
b∈a−
(−max
c∈b−
xc) = min
b∈a−
max
c∈b−
xc. 2
We note that the converse of the above proposition is not true. More precisely, if
for a given argumentation framework AF = (A,D), the labelling x ∈ [0,1]A satisfies
xa = minb∈a−maxc∈b− xc for each a ∈ A, then x is not necessary a solution in [0,1]
of the system Eqmax(AF). For example, if AF = (A,D) is a circuit, taking xa = 1
for each a ∈ A, then x satisfies xa = minb∈a−maxc∈b− xc, but it is not a solution of
Eqmax(AF).
If, instead of searching the solutions of the system Eqmax(AF), we are searching
for real solutions in [0,1] of the following system of non-linear inequalities,
Ineqmax(AF)
{
xa = 1, if a ∈ A0
xa ≤ 1−max
b∈a−
xb, if a ∈ A−A0,
then, is not difficult to prove this set of solutions is convex. Moreover, we can easily
translate it as the set of solutions to
PAF

0 ≤ xa ≤ 1,∀ a ∈ A
xa = 1, if a ∈ A0
xa+ xb ≤ 1,∀(b,a) ∈ D,
that is, this set is a polytope. It is not difficult to show that the integral vectors in this
polytope are exactly the incidence vectors of the conflict-free sets in AF containing
the set A0 of non-attacked arguments, therefore loosing the nice semantics property
in Theorem 36.
In the next section, using linear constraints suggested by Proposition 37, we re-
strict the above polytope in order to obtain argumentation significance of the corre-
sponding set of integral vectors.
3.4. Labellings Polytopes
Throughout this section we consider only argumentation frameworks AF = (A,D)
without isolated arguments, that is without arguments a ∈ A such that a−∪a+ = /0.
Clearly, adding or deleting an isolated argument does not influence the acceptability
status of the other arguments.
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Definition 38 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. The admissible
sets polytope of AF is the set Padm(AF) of all vectors in RA satisfying:
(1) xa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
(2) xa+ xb ≤ 1 ∀(b,a) ∈ D,
(3) xa− ∑
c∈b−
xc ≤ 0 ∀(b,a) ∈ D.
We make the convention that if b− = /0, then the sum ∑c∈b− xc in (3) is 0.
Example 1. In Figure 3.2 we consider a simple argumentation framework AF =
(A,D) with A = {a,b}. We have two constraints of type (2), corresponding to the
two attacks in D= {(a,a),(a,b)}. Note that in any argumentation framework if a is
a self-attacking argument, then xa ∈ [0,1/2] due to the type (2) constraint xa+xa ≤
1. The are two type (3) constraints, but the type (3) constraint for a gives xa ≤ xa
which is trivially satisfied. It follows that all constraints giving Padm(AF) are those
given in the middle of Figure 3.2 and a graphic illustration of the admissible sets
polytope is at right. Its vertices are (0,0),(12 ,0), and (
1
2 ,
1
2). The only integer point
in Padm(AF) is (0,0).
a b

xa,xb ≥ 0
xa+ xa ≤ 1
xa+ xb ≤ 1
xb ≤ xa
AF Constraints Padm(AF)
xb
xa
1
2
1
2
Figure 3.2.: An argumentation framework and its admissible sets polytope.
Example 2. Let AF = (A,D) illustrated in Figure 3.3 with A = {a,b,c} and D =
{(a,b),(b,a),(b,c)}. The two mutual attacks (a,b) and (b,a) generate a single
type (2) constraint xa + xb ≤ 1. The only non-trivial type (3) constraint is xc ≤ xa.
It follows that all constraints giving Padm(AF) are those given in the middle of
Figure 3.3 and its graphic representation appears at the right. Its vertices are the
integral vectors (0,0,0)T ,(0,1,0)T ,(1,0,0)T , and (1,0,1)T (where, xT denotes the
transpose of the row vector x).
In both above examples the integral vectors in Padm(AF) are exactly the incidence
vectors of the admissible sets of the argumentation framework. We will prove next
that this holds in general and this justifies the name of the considered polytope.
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a b c

xa,xb,xc ≥ 0
xa+ xb ≤ 1
xb+ xc ≤ 1
xc ≤ xa
AF Constraints Padm(AF)
xb
xa
xc
1
1
1
Figure 3.3.: An admissible sets polytope with integer vertices.
Lemma 39 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. If x ∈ ZA satisfies the constraints (1) and (2) then x is a 0 -1 vector.
Proof. For each a ∈ A there is b ∈ A such that (a,b) ∈ D or (b,a) ∈ D. By
constraint (2), xa+xb ≤ 1 and, by constraint (1), xb ≥ 0. It follows that xa ≤ 1, and,
since xa ∈ Z, we have xa ∈ {0,1}. 2
Lemma 40 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. An integral vector x ∈ ZA satisfies the constraints (1) and (2) if and only
if x is the incidence vector of a conflict-free set in AF.
Proof. Let x ∈ ZA be an integral vector satisfying the constraints (1) and (2). By
Lemma 39, x is a 0 -1 vector, and there is X ⊆ A such that χX = x. There is no
(a,b) ∈ D with a,b ∈ X , since then xa = xb = 1 and the constraint (2) for (a,b) is
not satisfied. Hence X is a conflict-free set in AF .
Conversely, if X is a conflict-free set in AF and x = χX , then x is a 0 -1 vector,
hence constraints (1) are trivially satisfied. For any attack (a,b) ∈ D at most one of
a and b are in X , therefore xa+ xb ∈ {0,1} and the constraints (2) are satisfied. 2
Lemma 41 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. A 0 -1 vector x satisfies the constraints (3) if and only if x is the incidence
vector of a set X ⊆ A with the property that X− ⊆ X+.
Proof. Let x be a 0 -1 vector satisfying the constraints (3) and let X ⊆ A such that
χX = x. Let b ∈ X−, that is there is a ∈ X such that (b,a) ∈ D. By constraint (3),
we have 1 = xa ≤ ∑c∈b− xc. It follows that b−∩X 6= /0 and there is a ′ ∈ A such that
a′ ∈ b− and xa ′ = 1. Hence for each b ∈ X− there is a ′ ∈ X such that (a ′,b) ∈ D,
that is X− ⊆ X+.
Conversely, let X ⊆A with the property that X−⊆X+ and let x= χX . Let (b,a)∈
D. If a 6∈ X , then xa = 0, and the constraint (3) trivially holds since x is a 0 -1 vector.
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If a ∈ X then b ∈ X−, and by the hypothesis there is a ′ ∈ X such that (a ′,b) ∈ D.
It follows that ∑c∈b− xc ≥ xa ′ = 1 = xa, that is the corresponding constraint (3) is
satisfied. 2
By Lemmas 39, 40 and 41, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 42 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. The integral vectors of Padm(AF) are exactly the incidence vectors of the
admissible sets of AF.
We introduce a set of linear constraints in order to enforce the ”directionality prin-
ciple”: the non-attacked arguments must receive label 1, all argument attacked by
these must receive label 0, all arguments attacked only by 0 labeled arguments must
receive label 1, and so on.
Definition 43 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework. The stable exten-
sions polytope of AF is the set Pstab(AF) of all vectors in RA satisfying:
(1) xa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,
(2) xa+ xb ≤ 1 ∀(b,a) ∈ D,
(4) xa+ ∑
b∈a−
xb ≥ 1 ∀a ∈ A.
Example 3. In Figure 3.4 the P stab(AF) for the argumentation framework in
Example 2 is illustrated. Note that in this particular argumentation framework each
argument is attacked by exactly one argument, and constraints (2) and (4) give the
equality constraints that appears in the middle of the figure.
The polytope P stab(AF) is in this case the line segment
{λx1+(1−λ )x2|0≤ λ ≤ 1}= {(1−λ ,λ ,1−λ )T |0≤ λ ≤ 1},
where x1 = (0,1,0)T and x2 = (1,0,1)T are its vertices.
In order to relate the vectors in Pstab(AF) to complete extensions, we can use
Theorem 36 and the following observation.
Proposition 44 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated
arguments. The set of solutions in [0,1] to the system of equations Eqmax(AF) is
contained in Pstab(AF).
Proof. Let x ∈ [0,1]A be a solution to the system of equations Eqmax(AF). Con-
straints (1) are clearly satisfied. Since xa = 1−maxc∈a− xc for all a ∈ A, it follows
that if (b,a)∈D we have xa+xb≤ xa+maxc∈a− xc = 1−maxc∈a− xc+maxc∈a− xc =
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a b c

xa,xb,xc ≥ 0
xa+ xb = 1
xb+ xc = 1
AF Constraints Pstab(AF)
xb
xa
xc
1
1
1
Figure 3.4.: A stable extensions polytope with integer vertices.
1, that is constraints (2) are satisfied by x. Also constraints (4) are satisfied, since
for any a ∈ A we have xa+∑b∈a− xb ≥ xa+maxc∈a− xc = 1. 2
The integral vectors of Pstab(AF) are interesting as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 45 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. A 0 -1 vector x satisfies the constraints (4) if and only if x is the incidence
vector of a set X ⊆ A with the property that A−X ⊆ X+.
Proof. Let x be a 0 -1 vector satisfying the constraints (4) and let X ⊆ A such that
χX = x. Let a ∈ A−X , that is xa = 0. By constraint (4), we have xa+∑b∈a− xb ≥ 1,
and since xa = 0, we have ∑b∈a− xb ≥ 1. It follows that there is b ∈ a− such that
xb = 1, that is there is b ∈ X such that (b,a) ∈ D. Therefore A−X ⊆ X+.
Conversely, let X ⊆ A with the property that A−X ⊆ X+ and let x = χX . We
prove that the constraint (4) holds for every a ∈ A. If a ∈ X , then xa = 1 and, since
x is a 0 -1 vector, the constraint (4) holds trivially for a. If a 6∈ X , then xa = 0 and
since A−X ⊆ X+, there is b0 ∈ a−∩X . Since xb0 = 1 it follows that xa+∑b∈a− xb≥
0+ xb0 = 1, that is the constraint (4) holds for a. 2
By Lemmas 39, 40 and 45, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 46 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. The integral vectors of Pstab(AF) are exactly the incidence vectors of the
stable extensions of AF.
The structure of Pstab(AF) is strongly dependent on the combinatorial structure
of AF , more precisely on its family of circuits. We represent here a circuit in
AF = (A,D) as a sequence C = (a1,a2, . . . ,ak) of distinct arguments ai ∈ A such
that (ai,ai+1) ∈ D, for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k−1}, and (ak,a1) ∈ D. C is an even (odd)
circuit if k is even (odd).
If AF has no circuits, then it is well known that the grounded extension is also a
stable extension, so its incidence vector belongs to Pstab(AF), by Theorem 46.
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For x ∈ Pstab(AF) we denote by
Frac(x) = {a ∈ A|0 < xa < 1}
its set of fractional components. Observe that if a ∈ Frac(x) then, by constraint (2),
we have xb < 1 for all b∈ a−. Since, by constraint (4), we have xa+∑b∈a− xb ≥ 1, it
follows that there is b∈ Frac(x) such that (b,a)∈D. Similarly, there is c∈ Frac(x)
such that (c,b)∈D. Since Frac(x) is a finite set, continuing the above argument we
find a circuit C = (a1,a2, . . . ,ak) with all ai ∈ Frac(x). Hence, if AF has no circuits,
then all vectors in Pstab(AF) are integral. Since Pstab(AF) is non-empty (containing
the incidence vector of the grounded extension), it follows by convexity that it has
exactly one point. Hence, the following Corollary of the Theorem 46 holds.
Corollary 47 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without circuits.
Then Pstab(AF) has exactly one point, the incidence vector of grounded extension of
AF.
In order to characterize the incidence vectors of complete extensions of an argu-
mentation framework AF , let us note that, in general, these vectors are not members
of P stab(AF) as Lemma 45 shows. On the other hand, in the discussion preceding
Corollary 47, we have argued that if x ∈ P stab(AF) is such that Frac(x) 6= /0 then
each argument in Frac(x) has an attacker in the same set. Furthermore, if xa = 1
then a+∩Frac(x) = /0 and a−∩Frac(x) = /0 (by constraints (2)). These facts justify
the following definition.
Definition 48 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework and Pstab(AF) be
its stable extensions polytope. A vector x ∈ Pstab(AF) is called a complete vector if
for each a ∈ A such that xa = 0 there is b ∈ A such that (b,a) ∈ D and xb = 1.
Note that if x ∈ P stab(AF) is such that Frac(x) = A, then x is a complete vector.
The following characterization of comp(AF) holds.
Theorem 49 Let AF = (A,D) be an argumentation framework without isolated ar-
guments. The integral vectors obtained from complete vectors of Pstab(AF) by re-
placing the fractional components with 0 are exactly the incidence vectors of the
complete extensions of AF.
Proof. Let S be a complete extension of AF and y = χS. Let x ∈ RA defined by
xa =

ya if ya = 1,
0 if ya = 0 and ∃b ∈ S s.t. (b,a) ∈ D,
1
2 otherwise.
Clearly, y is obtained from x by replacing its fractional components with 0. We
show that x is a complete vector of P stab(AF). x trivially satisfies the constraints
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(1), and constraints (2) hold since S is a conflict-free set. Let a ∈ A. If xa = 1 then
constraint (4) holds trivially. If xa = 0 then a 6∈ S and there is b∈ S such that (b,a)∈
D. It follows that yb = xb = 1 and ∑c∈a− xc ≥ xb = 1, hence constraint (4) holds. If
xa = 12 it follows that a 6∈ S and there is no b ∈ S such that (b,a) ∈ D. Since S is a
complete extension, we have F(S) = S. Since a 6∈ S, there is b ∈ A− S∪ S+ such
that (b,a) ∈ D. It follows that xb = 12 . Hence xa+∑c∈a− xc ≥ xa+ xb = 12 + 12 = 1,
that is, the constraint (4) holds.
Conversely, let x ∈ P stab(AF) be a complete vector, and let y ∈ {0,1}A be the
vector obtained from x by replacing its fractional components with 0. Let S ⊆ A
such that χS = y. We show that S is a complete extension in AF . Clearly, S is a
conflict-free set because x satisfies the constraints (2). Let a ∈ S−, that is, there
is b ∈ S such that (a,b) ∈ D. Then a 6∈ S, hence ya = 0, and moreover xa = 0,
because xa + xb ≤ 1 and xb = 1. Since x is a complete vector, it follows that there
is c ∈ S with xc = 1 such that (c,a) ∈ D. Hence, we proved that S− ⊆ S+, that is S
is an admissible set. Suppose that there is a 6∈ S∪S+ such that a−− (S∪S+) = /0.
Since a 6∈ S+, we must have a ∈ Frac(x) and from the constraint (4) for a we have
xa+∑b∈a− xb = xa+0= xa ≥ 1, contradiction. Hence we have obtained that S is an
admissible set and F(S) = S, that is S is a complete extension. 2
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Part II.
Graphs and Social Choice Theory
59

On a shared reasons space, a society expresses a set of possibly shared forms of
subjectivity, whose deeper interactions enable new consistent collective judgments,
creating social inference relations. Formally, this is done by considering a novel
graph-based model for aggregating dichotomous preferences: Bipartite Digraphs
Debates. The Chapter 4, based on the papers [Cro13, Cro14a, Cro15a], can be
viewed as an attempt to integrate and exploit Dung’s argumentation semantics to
provide argumentative aggregation of individual opinions. The next chapter (based
on the paper [CM]) introduces Bipartite Choice Systems, – abstracting (many-to-
many) two-sided (labour) markets – and presents new properties of choice functions.
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4. Argumentative Aggregation of
Individual Opinions
A novel graph-based model for aggregating dichotomous preferences is introduced.
The output opinion is viewed as a consensual situation, paving the way of us-
ing graph operations to describe properties of the aggregators. The outputs are
also dichotomous preferences which could be useful in some applications. New
axiomatic characterizations of aggregators corresponding to usual majority or ap-
proval & disapproval rule are presented. Integrating and exploiting Dung’s Argu-
mentation Frameworks and their semantics into our model is another contribution
of the present chapter.
4.1. Introduction
Comparing and assessing different points of view in order to obtain fair and ra-
tional collective aggregation of them is the main research topic of Social Choice
Theory (SCT) [Arr63], having major philosophical, economic, and political signif-
icance. The most important methodological tool in SCT is the axiomatic method,
pioneered by Arrow [Arr50], which consists in formulating normatively desirable
properties of aggregation rules as postulates or axioms, in order to obtain precise
characterizations of the aggregation rules that satisfy these properties. The Artificial
Intelligence developments, especially in the area of collective decision making in
Multiagent Systems, have lead to the emergence of a new research area called Com-
putational Social Choice (CSC), mainly concerned with the design and analysis of
collective decision making mechanisms.
If in classical SCT the objects of aggregation belong to preferential knowledge
(Arrow, Sen, and Suzumura [ASS02]), recent developments apply the same method-
ology to other types of information: beliefs (Konieczny and Pe´rez [KP02]), judg-
ments (List and Puppe [LP09]), ontologies (Porello and Endriss [PE11]), graphs
(Airiau, Endriss, Grandi, Porello, and Uckelman [AEG+11], Endriss and Grandi
[EG12]), and argumentation frameworks (Coste-Marquis, Devred, Konieczny,
Lagasquie- Schiex, and Marquis [CMDK+07], Dunne, Marquis, and Wooldridge
[DMW12]).
Argumentation is a powerful mechanism for automating the decision making pro-
cess of autonomous agents. Several recent works have studied the problem of
accommodating ideas from CSC to Argumentation (Pigozzi [Pig06], Tohme, Bo-
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danza, and Simari [TBS08], Rahwan, Larson, and Tohme [RLT09], Rahwan and
Tohme [RT10], Caminada and Pigozzi [CP11], Dunne, Marquis, and Wooldridge
[DMW12]). Most of them rely on Dung’s Argumentation Frameworks and their
acceptability semantics [Dun95].
The main objective of this chapter is to borrow ideas from Abstract Argumen-
tation Frameworks to CSC, hence in the converse direction of the above line of
research on this subject. We introduce and study a new graph-based model for ag-
gregating dichotomous preferences. Although dichotomous preferences over alter-
natives may lack the expressiveness to capture intensity of the preference, they are
natural in many settings, and are studied in different approaches of decision making
systems mainly related to approval voting (see Brams and Fishburn [BF78], Laslier
and Sanver [LS10], Vorsatz [Vor07], among others) or in connection to randomized
mechanisms (Bogomolnaia and Moulin[BM04], Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong
[BMS05]).
Let us suggest a new possible application. In peer assessments systems (used
in massive open online courses, or in evaluation of grant applications, see Walsh
[Wal14], de Alfaro and Shavlovsky [AS14]) the main objective is to get a fair grade
for each agent based on the grades proposed by some other agents. Uniform grading
is an obvious desideratum for the quality of the outcome. An approach to make
uniform the individual grading is to consider each grade given by an agent as good
or bad, depending on how this grade compares to the average grade given by this
agent.
In our dichotomous setting, we consider two disjoint non-empty finite sets F and
S. F, referred as the set of facts (issues), is the set of alternatives in a decision
making system, e.g. candidates in an election process, normative judgments, goods
in purchasing systems, time slots in meeting scheduling systems, etc. Note that all
facts are ”positive”, there are no negative facts. The individuals (persons, agents)
in S, the society, expresse their opinions (dichotomous preferences) that are pairs
(L,DL) of disjoint subsets of F: L is the set of facts on which the individual has a
positive opinion while DL is the set of facts on which the individual has a negative
opinion. The remaining facts in F− (L∪DL) are indifferent or unknown to the
individual. In applications in which F and S are not disjoint, we will consider
disjoint copies of them.
Our focus is how to aggregate the individual opinions into a collective one. We
are not only interested into positive collective position (as is intensively done in
social choice theory) but also into the negative collective position (which can be
used also as an explanation of the selected positive facts).
To illustrate our new model let us consider a simple mundane choice situation.
Table 4.1 presents an example with available aliments, F = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5,
a6} ⊆ F, and the preferences on these aliments of a group of five persons, S = {p1,
p2, p3, p4, p5} ⊆ S, which want to have a common lunch.
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Liked Disliked
p1 {a1,a3} {a5,a4}
p2 {a3,a6} {a1,a4}
p3 {a3,a5} {a1,a4}
p4 {a5,a1,a2} {a3}
p5 {a5,a1} {a3,a2}
Majority {a3,a1,a5} {a4}
Table 4.1.: Common Lunch Dilemma.
As we can see, p1 likes (agrees) a1 and a3 but dislikes (disagrees) a5 and a4.
Similarly, we can read the opinions of the other members of S. Note that disliking an
aliment may mean that the individual is allergic to it. The table is entitled Common
Lunch Dilemma since if we consider the majority opinion (include each fact in one
of the two sets of liked and disliked facts using the majority rule) as output of the
debate, then this has the unpleasant property that each individual is allergic to an
aliment in the collective output ({a3,a1,a5},{a4})! Note that this happens despite
the majority rule gives (always) a consistent opinion, i.e., a disjoint pair of subsets
of F .
The set of individual opinions listed in Table 4.1 (called ”profile” in social choice
theory) can be represented using a bipartite directed graph, which we call debate,
as depicted in Figure 4.1. The two parts of a debate are the set of facts and the
set of individuals. Each individual has as out-neighbors its set of liked facts and as
in-neighbors the set of disliked facts. Since these two sets are disjoint, we have no
symmetric pair of directed edges.
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a1a3 a5a4a6 a2
Figure 4.1.: Common Lunch Dilemma – Bipartite Digraph Debate.
The main advantage of this model consists in its visual capacity and the symmet-
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ric treatment of the facts and individuals. Also well-established graph theoretical
notions (digraph isomorphism, in-degree and out-degree of a vertex, induced sub-
digraphs, digraph operations, etc.) can be used to describe normative conditions on
the aggregating rules.
The aggregate opinion (a disjoint pair of collective agreed and disagreed facts)
can also be viewed as a debate (bipartite digraph) in which each individual has the
same sets of in-neighbors and out-neighbors (called consensual debate). In this way,
axioms on the aggregating rules gain in expressivity (see Section 4.3).
To each digraph without loops we can associate a bipartite digraph, hence a de-
bate. On the other hand, to each debate we can associate two conflict digraphs.
These conflict digraphs are isomorphic to the digraph for which the debate is asso-
ciated. This relationship is exploited in Section 4.5 to describe and analyze, from
computational point of view, new (irresolute) aggregators corresponding to the di-
graphs representing Dung’s argumentation frameworks. These gives acceptable so-
lutions to the Common Lunch debate discussed above.
The basic idea of the argumentative aggregation of individual opinions is to con-
sider collective opinions by merging the opinions of non-conflicting coalitions of
individuals. A coalition is conflict-free if the individual’s opinions in the coalition
does not attack each other. Such a coalition is called an autarky if, in addition, has
the property that the collective opinion counterattacks any attack of the opinion of
an individual not in coalition. This property offers a rational justification for the
output opinion.
Our main rationality hypothesis is that each member of the society be-
lieves in the positive value of the collective output O. Therefore if f –
a particular proposal (fact) of an individual – is not selected, then the
individual understands the reason: f or other fact, that he likes, is dis-
liked by the society’s opinion. Moreover, if an individual dislikes a fact
agreed by the collective opinion O, the reason is his positive position on
a fact disliked by O.
4.2. Graph Based Framework
In this section we introduce our new model for aggregating dichotomous prefer-
ences and present graph theoretical concepts and notations used in the next sections.
Recall from the Introduction the two disjoint finite non-empty sets F and S of facts
and, respectively, individuals.
Definition 50 A Debate is a bipartite digraph D = (F,S;E), where /0 6= F ⊆ F and
/0 6= S⊆ S, and E ⊆ F×S∪S×F contains no symmetric pair of directed edges (i.e.,
at most one of the pairs ( f ,s) and (s, f ) is a directed edge in E, for every f ∈ F and
s ∈ S).
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Let G = (V,E) be a digraph and v ∈ V a vertex of G. The set of out-neighbors
of v is denoted by v+G , that is v
+
G = {u ∈ V |(v,u) ∈ E}. Similarly, the set of in-
neighbours of v is v−G = {u ∈V |(u,v) ∈ E}. These notations can be extended to set
of vertices by considering, for every S⊆V , S+G =∪v∈Sv+G and S−G =∪v∈Sv−G (clearly,
/0+G = /0
−
G = /0).
If D = (F,S;E) is a debate then, for every s ∈ S, s+D is the set of facts approved
by the individual s and s−D is the set of facts disapproved by the individual s.
The pair (s+D,s
−
D) is referred as the opinion of individual s on the facts in F . By the
above definition of a debate , s+D ∩ s−D = /0.
If f ∈ s+D then s has a ”positive” opinion on f , if f ∈ s−D then s has a ”negative”
opinion on f , and if f 6∈ s+D ∪ s−D then s has no opinion on f .
Let D= (F,S;E) be a debate. If F ′ ⊆ F , the sub-debate induced by F ′ is the sub-
digraph induced by F ′ ∪ S in D, and is denoted by DF ′ . If S′ ⊆ S, the sub-debate
induced by S′ is the sub-digraph induced by F ∪S′ in D, and is denoted by DS′ . For
s ∈ S, the sub-debate DS−{s} is denoted by D− s.
If Di = (Fi,Si;Ei) (i = 1,2) are debates with S1∩S2 = /0, then their sum is D1+
D2 = (F1∪F2,S1∪S2;E1∪E2). Clearly, E1∪E2 does not contain symmetric edges,
that is, D1+D2 is a debate. With this notation, if D = (F,S;E) is a debate such that
|S| ≥ 2 then, for every s ∈ S, we have D = DS−{s}+D{s} = (D− s)+D{s}.
Two debates D = (F,S;E) and D′ = (F ′,S′;E ′) are isomorphic if there are bijec-
tions α : F → F ′ and β : S→ S′ such that for all f ∈ F and s ∈ S ( f ,s) ∈ E if and
only if (α( f ),β (s)) ∈ E ′, and (s, f ) ∈ E if and only if (β (s),α( f )) ∈ E ′. Two iso-
morphic debates are denoted by D∼= D′ or D∼=α,β D′ (when we need to emphasize
the isomorphism).
Definition 51 A debate D=(F,S;E) is a consensual debate if there are F⊕D ,F
	
D ⊆F
such that F⊕D ∩F	D = /0 and, for every s ∈ S, we have (s+D,s−D) = (F⊕D ,F	D ).
OD = (F⊕D ,F
	
D ) is called the common opinion of D.
4.3. Aggregators
In this section we define opinions aggregation, describe our versions of the well-
known majority and approval&disapproval rules and prove their axiomatic charac-
terization.
Definition 52 Let D(F,S) be the set of all debates D = (F,S;E) with F ⊆ F and
S⊆ S. An aggregator is a function A :D(F,S)→D(F,S) such that
• A(D) is a consensual debate for every D ∈D(F,S), and
• if D1 ∼= D2 then A(D1)∼= A(D2).
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In words, an aggregator is a functional A that maps each debate D into a consen-
sual output debate A(D), in which every individual has the same opinion OA(D) =
(F⊕A(D),F
	
A(D)). Hence, we can represent A(D) by specifying this common opinion
(F⊕A(D),F
	
A(D)). Also, A satisfies the usual social choice theory conditions of neu-
trality and anonymity (renaming the facts or the individuals does not change the
output modulo this renaming).
We give now two examples of aggregators, corresponding to well-known social
choice theory rules. In both examples, the first condition in the above definition
is satisfied by construction and the second condition is satisfied since the output
consensual debate depends only on the in-degree and out-degree of the fact vertices,
and these are invariant under debate isomorphisms. After defining each of these
aggregators we consider normative properties of them and prove that these offer
novel interesting characterizations.
Majority rule. AM :D(F,S)→D(F,S) such that ∀D ∈D(F,S),
OAM(D) = (F
⊕
AM(D),F
	
AM(D)), where
F⊕AM(D) = { f ∈ F | | f
−
D | ≥
|S|
2
},
F	AM(D) = { f ∈ F | | f
+
D |>
|S|
2
}.
Note that, by definition, a fact f is approved (disapproved) by the collective opinion
if the number of individuals that like (dislike) f is at least (greater than) half of the
total number of individuals. It is not difficult to see that F⊕AM(D)∩F
	
AM(D) = /0.
Also, for every f ∈ F we have AM(D){ f} = AM(D{ f}), that is, the aggregate
opinion on f depends only on the opinions of the individuals in the society on f :
to find the aggregate opinion on f , we apply the aggregator on the debate D{ f}
obtained by considering the restriction of D to { f} only. This is the usual social
choice theory Independence (I) condition, that is, the aggregation is done fact-
wise:
I For every debate D = (F,S;E) and for every f ∈ F A(D){ f} = A(D{ f}).
In order to characterize the majority rule, we consider also the following condi-
tions Unanimity (U), Cancellation (C), and Faithfulness (F):
U If D is a consensual debate then A(D) = D.
C For every debate D = ({ f},S;E) with |S| ≥ 3, if s, p ∈ S are such that f ∈
s+D ∩ p−D ∪ s−D ∩ p+D , then A(D) = A(DS−{s,p}).
F If D= ({ f},{s, p};E) is a debate such that f ∈ s+D∩ p−D∪s−D∩ p+D , then OA(D) =
(F⊕A(D),F
	
A(D)) = ({ f}, /0).
68
4.3. Aggregators
In words, Cancellation says that in any debate over a single fact, if there are at
least three individuals and two of them have contradictory opinions on this fact,
then the output opinion is decided by the remaining individuals. Faithfulness says
that the output opinion of a debate over a single fact with exactly two individuals
with contradictory opinions has a positive position on this fact.
Theorem 53 The Majority rule, AM, is the only aggregator A satisfying conditions
U, I, C, and F.
Proof. Obviously, AM satisfies U, I, and F. To prove that AM fulfills C, let D =
({ f},S;E) be a debate with |S| ≥ 3, and s, p ∈ S such that f ∈ s+D ∩ p−D (the proof
is similar for f ∈ s−D ∩ p+D). Since f−DS−{p,s} = f
−
D −{s}, it follows that | f−DS−{p,s} | ≥
|S|−2
2 if and only if | f−D | ≥ |S|2 . Similarly, since f+DS−{p,s} = f
+
D −{p}, it follows that
| f+DS−{p,s}|>
|S|−2
2 if and only if | f+D |> |S|2 . Hence AM(D) = AM(DS−{s,p}).
Conversely, letA be an aggregator satisfying U, I, C, and F. We prove thatA(D)=
AM(D) for every debate D = (F,S;E), by induction on |S|.
If |S| = 1, then D is consensual and by U we have A(D) = D and, since AM
satisfies U, A(D) = AM(D). Also, for |S| = 2, for every f ∈ S, D{ f} is either con-
sensual and A(D){ f} = AM(D{ f}) by U, or satisfies the hypothesis of F and again
A(D){ f} = AM(D{ f}). By I, we have A(D) = AM(D).
In the inductive step, let D = (F,S;E) be a debate with |S| ≥ 3.
By I, in order to prove that A(D) =AM(D) it is sufficiently to prove that A(D){ f} =
AM(D{ f}) for each f ∈ F . This follows either by U or by applying C and the
induction hypothesis. 2
Note that the above new axiomatization of the majority rule (a subject started
by May [May52] and followed by several papers, e.g. Maskin [Mas95], Woeginger
[Woe03], Miroiu [Mir04], etc.) benefits by the capacity of our framework to express
properties of aggregators in terms of simple graph operations.
Approval&Disapproval rule. AA&D :D(F,S)→D(F,S) such that ∀D∈D(F,S),
OAA&D(D) = (F
⊕
A&D,F
	
A&D), where
F⊕A&D = { f ∈ F | | f−D |− | f+D | ≥ |g−D|− |g+D|,∀g ∈ F},
F	A&D = { f ∈ F−F⊕A&D| | f+D |− | f−D | ≥ |g+D|− |g−D|,∀g ∈ F−F⊕A&D}.
Let us consider the score of f ∈ F as scoreD( f ) = | f−D |−| f+D |, that is the difference
between the number of individuals, | f−D |, having a positive position on f , and the
number of individuals, | f+D |, having a negative position on f . Hence, the facts max-
imizing this score are selected in the positive part of the aggregator’s opinion. From
the remaining facts, those having the minimum score are included in the negative
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part of the aggregator’s opinion. Clearly, in this case, the aggregation is not fact-
wise: despite computing the scores is done fact-wise, the decision of the aggregator
on a fact depends on the scores obtained by the other facts.
A characterization of Approval&Disapproval rule can be obtained by considering
the above Unanimity (U) condition and the following two new conditions: Sum-
mation (S) and Additivity (A).
S For every consensual debate D1 = (F1,S1;E1) with OD1 = (F
⊕
1 ,F
	
1 ) and for
every debate D2 =(F2,{s};E2)with s 6∈ S1 and OD2 =(F⊕2 ,F	2 ), the aggregate
debate of their sum, A(D1+D2), is such that OA(D1+D2) = (F
⊕,F	), where
F⊕ =

F⊕1 ∩F⊕2 if F⊕1 ∩F⊕2 6= /0,
F⊕1 if F
⊕
1 ∩ (F⊕2 ∪F	2 ) = /0 and |S1|> 1,
F⊕1 ∪F⊕2 if F⊕1 ∩ (F⊕2 ∪F	2 ) = /0 and |S1|= 1,
and
F	 =

F	1 ∩F	2 if F	1 ∩F	2 6= /0,
F	1 if F
	
1 ∩ (F⊕2 ∪F	2 ) = /0 and |S1|> 1,
F	1 ∪F	2 if F	1 ∩ (F⊕2 ∪F	2 ) = /0 and |S1|= 1.
A For every debate D = (F,S;E) with |S| ≥ 2,
A(D) = A
(
A(D− s)+A(D{s})
)
, for every s ∈ S.
In words, Additivity says that in any debate with at least two individuals the output
consensual debate is the aggregate debate of the sum of the (consensual) sub-debate
induced by any individual and the consensual aggregate debate of the debate ob-
tained by deleting this individual. Summation shows how to obtain the aggregate
debate of the sum between a consensual debate and a debate with a single individ-
ual.
Theorem 54 The Approval&Disapproval rule, AA&D, is the only aggregator A sat-
isfying conditions U, S, and A.
Proof. We show first that AA&D satisfies U, S, and A.
U If D = (F,S;E) is a consensual debate with OD = (F⊕,F	), then
scoreD( f ) =

|S| if f ∈ F⊕,
−|S| if f ∈ F	,
0 if f ∈ F− (F⊕∪F	).
Since |S| ≥ 1, it follows that F⊕A&D = F⊕ and F	A&D = F	, that is, AA&D(D) =
D.
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S Let D1 = (F1,S1;E1) be a consensual debate with OD1 = (F
⊕
1 ,F
	
1 ), and D2 =
(F2,{s};E2) be a debate with s 6∈ S1 and OD2 = (F⊕2 ,F	2 ). Then, in the debate
D = D1+D2, the scoreD( f ), for f ∈ F1∪F2, is:
scoreD( f ) =

|S1|+1 if f ∈ F⊕1 ∩F⊕2
|S1|−1 if f ∈ F⊕1 ∩F	2
|S1| if f ∈ F⊕1 − (F⊕2 ∪F	2 )
−|S1|+1 if f ∈ F	1 ∩F⊕2
−|S1|−1 if f ∈ F	1 ∩F	2
−|S1| if f ∈ F	1 − (F⊕2 ∪F	2 )
1 if f ∈ (F1− (F⊕1 ∪F	1 ))∩F⊕2
−1 if f ∈ (F1− (F⊕1 ∪F	1 ))∩F	2
0 if f 6∈ F⊕1 ∪F	1 ∪F⊕2 ∪F	2 .
Now, it is easy to see that if OAA&D(D) = (F
⊕
A&D,F
	
A&D), then F
⊕
A&D = F
⊕ and
F	A&D = F
	, where F⊕ and F	 are defined in condition S.
A Let D = (F,S;E) be a debate with |S| ≥ 2.
For every s ∈ S we have D = (D− s)+D{s}. Using U and S it is not difficult
to verify that AA&D(D) = AA&D
(
AA&D(D− s)+AA&D(D{s})
)
.
Conversely, let A be an aggregator satisfying U, S, and A. We prove that A(D) =
AA&D(D) for every debate D = (F,S;E), by induction on |S|.
If |S| = 1, then D is consensual and by U we have A(D) = D and, since AA&D
satisfies U, A(D) = AA&D(D). In the inductive step, by A, A(D) = A
(
A(D−
s) +A(D{s})
)
for s ∈ S. By the induction hypothesis and since D{s} is consen-
sual we have A
(
A(D− s) +A(D{s})
)
= A
(
AA&D(D− s) +AA&D(D{s})
)
. Since
AA&D satisfies S, AA&D(D− s)+AA&D(D{s}) = AA&D(D) and since A satisfies U
and AA&D(D) is consensual, we obtain A(D) = AA&D(D). 2
Again, note that the above new axiomatization of the Approval&Disapproval rule
(a subject starting with Brams and Fishburn [BF78], followed by several papers, see
Xu [Xu10]) is different from that given in Alcantud and Laruelle [AL13] due to the
capacity of our framework to express properties of aggregators in terms of simple
graph operations.
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In order to introduce new principles in doing debate aggregation, we consider ag-
gregation correspondences, which map every debate into a set of consensual de-
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bates, such that by specifying a rule of selecting a member of this set we obtain an
aggregator.
If F ⊆ F, then we denote by O(F) the set of all F-opinions, that is,
O(F) = {(F⊕,F	)|F⊕,F	 ⊆ F and F⊕∩F	 = /0}.
Definition 55 An aggregation correspondence is a function AC which maps every
debate D ∈D(F,S), into a set of F-opinions AC(D)⊆ O(F) such that if D1,D2 ∈
D(F,S) are isomorphic debates , D1 ∼=α,β D2, then AC(D2) = α(AC(D1)).
Clearly, each O = (F⊕,F	) ∈ AC(D) determines a consensual debate DO in
which each individual opinion is O. Hence, an aggregation correspondence maps
every debate into a set of consensual debates, and if we devise a rule to select one
from this set, we obtain an aggregator. This qualitative way of aggregation will be
exploited in the next section for argumentative aggregation. Here we consider two
new possible aggregation correspondences which are interesting in themselves.
SAT Aggregation. ACSAT :D(F,S)→ 2O(F), defined by
ACSAT (D) = {(F⊕,F	) ∈ O(F) |F⊕∩ s+D ∪F	∩ s−D 6= /0,∀s ∈ S}.
In words, an opinion (F⊕,F	) belongs toACSAT (D) if it gets satisfaction to each
person s in the society: (F⊕,F	) agrees with (s+D,s
−
D) on at least one fact. This
seems a very permissive and simple semantics, but the following example shows
that it is not the case. Let Φ =C1∧ . . .∧Cm a boolean CNF formula, on the set V
of variables, where each clause Ci is a disjunction of positive or negative literals.
We can associate to Φ a debate DΦ = (FΦ,SΦ;EΦ), where for each v ∈ V we have
a fact fv ∈ FΦ, and for each clause Ci ∈ Φ we have an individual sCi ∈ SΦ with
(sCi)
+
DΦ = the set of facts associated to its positive literals, and (sCi)
−
DΦ = the set of
facts associated to its negative literals. An example of this construction is given in
Figure 4.2 below.
sC1
sC2
sC3
sC4
fx1
fx2
fx3
fx4
Figure 4.2.: Debate DΦ associated to Φ=C1∧C2∧C3∧C4, where C1 = x1∨ x2, C2 = x1∨
x2∨ x3, C3 = x2∨ x3, C4 = x2∨ x3∨ x4.
It is not difficult to prove the following proposition.
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Proposition 56 Let Φ be a boolean CNF formula on a set V of variables, and
let DΦ = (FΦ,SΦ;EΦ) its associated debate. If α is a satisfying assignment for
Φ, then Oα = (F⊕α ,F	α ) is an FΦ-opinion belonging to ACSAT (DΦ), where F⊕α =
{ fx|α(x) = true} and F	α = { fx|α(x) = f alse}. Conversely, if O = (F⊕,F	) ∈
ACSAT (DΦ), then the assignment αO, defined by
αO(x) =
{
true if fx ∈ F⊕
f alse if fx ∈ F	
,
is a satisfying assignment for Φ.
Proof. The proof follows from the construction of DΦ and the definition of the
aggregation correspondence ACSAT . 2
It follows that the well known SAT problem is (polynomial) equivalent to the
problem of deciding if a given abstract debate has at least one sat-opinion.
Conceptual Aggregation
The second aggregation correspondence considered in this section is based on the
ideas in Formal Concept Analysis (FCA), introduced by Wille in [Wil82].
Definition 57 A formal context is an undirected bipartite graph G = (O,A;E).
Members o ∈ O are called objects and the elements a ∈ A are (unary) attributes. A
formal concept for the context G = (O,A;E) is a pair C = (Oe,Ai) where Oe ⊆ O
and Ai ⊆ A such that
(i) ∀o ∈ Oe and ∀a ∈ Ai: {o,a} ∈ E,
(ii) ∀o ∈ O−Oe ∃a ∈ Ai such that {o,a} 6∈ E, and
(iii) ∀a ∈ A−Ai ∃o ∈ Oe such that {o,a} 6∈ E.
Oe is called the extent of the concept C and Ai is the intent of the concept C.
In words, the pair C = (Oe,Ai) is a formal concept in the formal context G =
(O,A;E) if Oe ⊆O, Ai ⊆ A, and Oe∪Ai induces a complete bipartite subgraph of G
that is maximal with this property.
If D = (F,S;E) is a debate, then we can consider the following two formal con-
texts:
• The formal context corresponding to the like relation: D⊕ = (F,S;E⊕), the
undirected bipartite graph obtained from D by deleting all arcs from F to S and
replacing each arc (s, f ) ∈ E by the undirected edge {s, f}, and
• The formal context corresponding to the dislike relation: D	 = (F,S;E	), the
undirected bipartite graph obtained from D by deleting all arcs from S to F and
replacing each arc ( f ,s) ∈ E by the undirected edge { f ,s}.
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Hence, we replace the attributes in usual Formal Concept Analysis by subjective
like/dislike opinions of the members of society. Corresponding to the two formal
contexts, we obtain liked/disliked concepts.
Let us denote by C⊕ the set of all liked concepts for the context D⊕, and by
C	 the set of all disliked concepts for the context D	. The extents of these formal
concepts form the setsF⊕e , respectivelyF	e .
For example, in Figure 4.3 below, a debate D and its corresponding formal con-
texts D⊕ and D	 are depicted.
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
fa
fb
fc
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
fa
fb
fc
s1
s2
s3
s4
s5
fa
fb
fc
D D⊕ D	
Figure 4.3.: Liked and disliked formal contexts associated to a debate D.
It is not difficult to see that
C⊕ =
{
({ fa},{s1,s2}),({ fa, fb},{s2}),({ fb},{s2,s3}),({ fc},{s4,s5})
}
,
henceF⊕e =
{{ fa},{ fb},{ fc},{ fa, fb}}. Similarly,
C	 =
{
({ fa},{s4,s5}),({ fb},{s1}),({ fc},{s3})
}
and F	e =
{{ fa},{ fb},{ fc}}.
Definition 58 The conceptual aggregation correspondence is the map
ACCon :D(F,S)→ 2O(F), defined by
ACCon(D) = {(F⊕,F	) ∈ O(F) |F⊕ ∈F⊕e −F	e ,F	 ∈F	e −F⊕e }.
In words, an opinion belongs to the conceptual aggregation correspondence im-
age of a debate if and only if it is a pair of disjoint extents of a liked (which is not
disliked) and a disliked (which is not liked) formal concepts. For the above exam-
ple, this gives ACCon(D) = {({ fa, fb}, /0)}. Note, that the conceptual aggregation
correspondence could be defined in a more permissive way by using some obvious
statistics (similar to those used by the Approval&Disapproval rule).
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4.5. Argumentative Aggregation
We can associate to each argumentation framework (without self-attacking argu-
ments) an abstract debate, supporting the idea of collective rationality expressed by
the admissibility based extensions.
Definition 59 Let AF be an argumentation framework such that (a,a) 6∈De f (AF),
∀a ∈ Arg(AF). The debate associated to AF is DAF = (FAF ,SAF ;EAF), where
• FAF = { fa|a ∈ Arg(AF)},
• SAF = {sa|a ∈ Arg(AF)}, and
• EAF = {(sa, fa)|a ∈ Arg(AF)}∪{( fa,sb)|(b,a) ∈ De f (AF)}.
DAF is a very particular debate: each fact fa is liked (approved) by exactly one
individual sa, and each individual’s opinions are single minded (s+a = { fa}). In
words, the individual sa agrees fa in DAF and disagrees all fb for the arguments b
attacked by a. An example is illustrated in Figure 4.4 below.
e a
c
d
b
sa
sb
sc
sd
se
fa
fb
fc
fd
fe
(i) (ii)
Figure 4.4.: (i) An AF . (ii) The debate DAF associated to AF .
The conflicts between individual opinions in a debate can be naturally viewed
as argumentation frameworks in order to use the collective acceptance of Dung’s
semantics in aggregation.
Definition 60 If D = (F,S;E) is a debate, then
the facts argumentation framework associated to D is f-AFD =(F,C), where
C ⊆ F×F and ( f ,g) ∈C if and only if f−D ∩g+D 6= /0, and
the opinions argumentation framework associated to D is o-AFD =(S,C ′),
where C ′ ⊆ S×S and (s, t) ∈C ′ if and only if s−D ∩ t+D 6= /0.
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In words: ( f ,g) is an attack in f-AFD = (F,C) if there is an individual s which
approves f and disapproves g; (s, t) is an attack in o-AFD = (S,C ′) if s disapproves
a fact approved by t.
Note that ( f ,g) ∈ F×F is an attack in f-AFD = (F,C) if and only if the digraph
D+( f ,g), obtained by adding the edge ( f ,g) to D, contains at least one ~C3. Simi-
larly, (s, t)∈ S×S is an attack in o-AFD = (S,C ′) if and only if the digraph D+(s, t),
obtained by adding the edge (s, t) to D, contains at least one ~C3.
These constructions are exemplified in Figure 4.5.
a b c
AF
sc
sb
sa
fc
fb
fa
fcfbfa scsbsa
f-AFDAF ∼= AF DAF o-AFDAF ∼= AF
Figure 4.5.: An argumentation framework AF , its associated debate DAF , with both (facts
and opinions) associated argumentation frameworks isomorphic to AF .
The above isomorphisms are not incidentally as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 61 Let AF be an argumentation framework without loops and DAF the
debate associated to AF. Then the facts and opinions argumentation frameworks
associated to the debate DAF are isomorphic to AF: f-AFDAF ∼= AF ∼= o-AFDAF .
Proof. Let A = Arg(AF) and DAF = (FA,SA;EAF) be the debate associated to AF .
To prove that f-AFDAF ∼=AF , consider bijection ϕ : FA→ A given by ϕ( fa) = a for
every a ∈ A. Then, ( fa, fb) ∈ De f (f-AFDAF ) if and only if there is s ∈ SA such that
(s, fa, fb) is an induced ~C3 in DAF +( fa, fb). By the definition of the debate DAF
it follows that s = sa, and, since ( fb,sa) is an edge in DAF , it follows that (a,b) ∈
De f (AF). Conversely, if (a,b) ∈ De f (AF) then, by the definition of the debate
DAF , we have (sa, fa) ∈ E(DAF) and ( fb,sa) ∈ E(DAF). Hence adding ( fa, fb) to
DAF we obtain an induced ~C3, (sa, fa, fb), in DAF +( fa, fb). But this means that
( fa, fb) is an attack in f-AFDAF .
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To prove that AF ∼= o-AFDAF , consider bijection ψ : SA→ A given by ψ(sa) = a
for every a ∈ A. Then, (sa,sb) ∈ De f (o-AFDAF ) if and only if there is f ∈ FA such
that ( f ,sa,sb) is an induced ~C3 in DAF +(sa,sb). By the definition of the debate
DAF it follows that f = fb, and, since ( fb,sa) is an edge in D(AF), it follows that
(a,b) ∈ De f (AF). Conversely, if (a,b) ∈ De f (AF) then, by the definition of the
debate DAF , it follows that (sb, fb) ∈ E(DAF) and ( fb,sa) ∈ E(DAF). Hence adding
(sa,sb) to DAF we obtain an induced ~C3, ( fb,sa,sb), in DAF + (sa,sb). But this
means that (sa,sb) is an attack in o-AFDAF . 2
The opinions argumentation framework associated to a debate D, o-AFD, can be
used to consider particular sets of compatible (opinions of the) individuals.
Definition 62 Let D = (F,S;E) ∈ D(F,S) be a debate. A coalition is any subset
C ⊆ S. A coalition C is legal if
OC = (C+D ,C
−
D ) ∈ O(F).
OC is the collective opinion of the coalition C .
Note that a coalition C is legal if and only if
(⋃
s∈C s+D
)⋂(⋃
s∈C s−D
)
= /0. Also,
the empty coalition and the singletons coalitions are trivially legal coalitions.
For the Common Lunch Dilemma debate in Section 4.1, the following figure de-
picts a coalition ({p1, p4}) which is not legal. The conflicting directed edges enter-
ing or leaving their members are also emphasized. We can also see that {p2, p3} is
a legal coalition.
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a1a3 a5a4a6 a2
Not a legal
coalition!
Figure 4.6.: A coalition which is not legal in the Common Lunch Dilemma Debate.
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Proposition 63 C ⊆ S is a legal coalition in the debate D = (F,S;E) if and only if
C is a conflict-free set in o-AFD.
Proof. Let C ⊆ S be a legal coalition in the debate D = (F,S;E). If C is not
a conflict-free set in o-AFD, then there are s, t ∈ C such that (s, t) ∈ De f (o-AFD),
that is, s−D ∩ t+D 6= /0. But then,
(⋃
s∈C s+D
)⋂(⋃
s∈C s−D
) 6= /0. Hence C is not a legal
coalition, contradicting the hypothesis.
Conversely, let C ⊆ S be a conflict free set in o-AFD. Then, for every s, t ∈ C ,
we have s−D ∩ t+D = /0. Therefore
(⋃
s∈C s+D
)⋂(⋃
s∈C s−D
)
= /0, that is C is a legal
coalition in the debate D = (F,S;E). 2
Definition 64 A coalition C is an autarky in the debate D = (F,S;E) if it is an
admissible set in the argumentation framework o-AFD.
Hence, if C is an autarky then, for every individual p 6∈ C , if there is f ∈ p−D ∩ s+D
for some s ∈ C , then there are f ′ ∈ F and s ′ ∈ C such that f ′ ∈ s ′−D ∩ p+D . Note that
the empty coalition is a trivial autarky.
Definition 65 A coalition C is a strong autarky in the debate D = (F,S;E) if it is
a complete extension in the argumentation framework o-AFD. A minimal strong
autarky (maximal strong autarky) is a grounded extension (preferred extension) in
the argumentation framework o-AFD.
In words, C is a strong autarky in the debate D = (F,S;E) if it is an autarky and,
for each p 6∈ C such that p is not attacked by C in o-AFD, there is s 6∈ C such that s
attacks p and C does not attack s in o-AFD.
Definition 66 An oligarchy in the debate D = (F,S;E) is a coalition C which is a
stable extension in the argumentation framework o-AFD.
Clearly, any oligarchy is a maximal strong autarky.
Example. Let D be the debate represented in the Figure 4.7 below.
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7
Figure 4.7.: A debate.
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C1 = {s5,s7} is an autarky: OC1 = ({ f4, f6},{ f5, f7}), Os4 = ({ f5},{ f4}) attacks
OC1 but this counterattacks Os4; Os6 = ({ f7},{ f6}) attacks OC1 but this counterat-
tacks Os6; no other Osi attacks OC1 , for i ∈ {1,2,3}. C1 is also a strong autarky
(since each opinion of an individual from the set {s1,s2,s3} is attacked by the opin-
ion of an individual in the same set, and the opinions of s4 and s6 are attacked by
OC1), but it is not a maximal strong autarky since C2 = {s1,s3,s5,s7} is also a strong
autarky as we can easily verify. Note that C2 is also a stable coalition.
The above type of coalitions can be equivalently defined directly on the debate in
which they are considered as follows.
Definition 67 Let D= (F,S;E)∈D(F,S) be a debate. An individual s∈ S is called
a strong eristic if s−D ∩ t+D 6= /0 for every t ∈ S−{s}. An individual s ∈ S is called a
weak eristic if s−D ∩ t+D 6= /0 for every t ∈ S−{s} such that t−D ∩ s+D 6= /0.
In words, an individual s is a strong eristic if it has a negative position on at least one
of the facts agreed by every other individual t; s is a weak eristic if it has a negative
position on at least one of the facts agreed by every other individual t which has a
negative position on a fact agreed by s.
We can verify that p4 is a strong eristic in the subdebate of the in Figure 4.1
obtained by deleting p5; also sb is a strong eristic in the debate D(AF) in Figure
4.5; in this last debate, sa is a weak eristic.
Let C ⊆ S be a non-empty coalition in the debate D = (F,S;E). The digraph
obtained from D by contracting C is D|C = (F,(S−C )∪{sC };E ′), where sC is a
new ”individual” (sC ∈ S−S) and ( f ,s) ∈ E ′ ((s, f ) ∈ E ′) if and only if ( f ,s) ∈ E
((s, f ) ∈ E) and s 6∈ C or s = sC and there is t ∈ C such that ( f , t) ∈ E ((t, f ) ∈ E).
Note that (sC )+D|C = ∪s∈C s+D and (sC )−D|C = ∪s∈C s−D . It follows that D|C has no
symmetric pairs of edges if and only if C is a legal coalition. Hence the following
lemma holds.
Lemma 68 A non-empty coalition C ⊆ S in the debate D = (F,S;E) is a legal
coalition if and only if D|C is a debate.
Using this lemma and Definitions 64, 65, and 66, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 69 Let C ⊆ S be a non-empty coalition in the debate D = (F,S;E) such
that D|C is a debate. Then,
i) C is an autarky if and only if sC is a weak eristic in D|C ;
ii) C is a strong autarky if and only if sC is a weak eristic in D|C and for every
t ∈ S−C such that t−D|C ∩ (sC )+D|C = /0 there is u ∈ S−C , u 6= t such that
u−D|C ∩ t+D|C 6= /0 and u+D|C ∩ (sC )−D|C = /0;
iii) C is an oligarchy if and only if sC is a strong eristic in D|C .
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Proof.
(i) If C is an autarky then it is an admissible set in the argumentation framework
o-AFD. Suppose that sC is not a weak eristic in D|C . Then, there is t ∈ S−C such
that t−D|C ∩ (sC )+D|C 6= /0 and (sC )−D|C ∩ t+D|C = /0. Hence there is p ∈ C such that
t−D ∩ p+D 6= /0. This means that, in o-AFD, t attacks p ∈ C . Because (sC )−D ∩ t+D = /0,
it follows that, in o-AFD, C does not defend the attack on p ∈ C . This contradicts
the hypothesis that C is an autarky in D.
Conversely, suppose that sC is a weak eristic in D|C . If C is not an autarky in D,
then it is not an admissible set in o-AFD. This means that there is t ∈ S−C such
that t attacks some p ∈ C in o-AFD and C does not counter-attack p. But then, in
D|C , p attacks sC and this does not counter-attack p, contradicting the hypothesis
that sC is a weak eristic.
(ii) By (i), C is a strong autarky if and only if sC is a weak eristic in D|C (that is,
C is an admissible set in o-AFD) and for each t 6∈ C such that t is not attacked by C
in o-AFD, there is u 6∈C such that u attacks t and C does not attack u in o-AFD. This
additional property can be stated in D|C as enounced in (ii): for every t ∈ S−C
such that t−D|C ∩ (sC )+D|C = /0 there is u ∈ S−C , u 6= t such that u−D|C ∩ t+D|C 6= /0 and
u+D|C ∩ (sC )−D|C = /0.
(iii) C is an oligarchy in D if and only if C is a stable extension in o-AFD, and
since C is legal, this means that sC is a strong eristic in D|C .
2
By Theorem 61, for the debate DAF associated to an argumentation framework
AF , the above different type of coalitions translate to the corresponding admissible
based extensions in AF .
It follows that the decision problems on argumentation frameworks can be poly-
nomially transformed (in fact, in linear time) into instances of the corresponding
problems on debates. For example, let us consider the following two such problems
(see Subsection 0.3).
CApref (Credulous Preferred Acceptance)
Instance : AF = (A,D) and a ∈ A.
Question : Is there S ∈ pref(AF) such that a ∈ S ?
SApref (Skeptical Preferred Acceptance)
Instance : AF = (A,D) and a ∈ A.
Question : Is a a member of each S ∈ pref(AF)?
The corresponding problems for abstract debates are stated below.
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CAmsa (Credulous Maximal Strong Autarky)
Instance : D = (F,S;E) a debate, and a fact f ∈ F .
Question : Is there C ⊆ S a maximal strong autarky in D such that f ∈ O+C ?
SAmsa (Skeptical Maximal Strong Autarky)
Instance : D = (F,S;E) a debate, and a fact f ∈ F .
Question : Is f a member of O+C , for each maximal strong autarky C in D?
Using the time complexity results on the first two decision problems (Dunne and
Bench-Capon [DBC02]), we obtain the following corollary of the Theorem 61.
Corollary 70 CAmsa is an NP-complete problem and SAmsa is a ΠP2 -complete
problem.
Coalitions are very restrictive in some debates. For example, if D = (F,S;E)
is a debate with the property that s+D
⋃
s−D = F for each s ∈ S, then the only legal
non-empty coalitions are trivial: singletons and sets of individuals having the same
opinion. Indeed, if s and t are distinct individuals with different opinions, then (s, t)
or (t,s) is an attack in o-AFD. Clearly, if (s+D,s
−
D) 6= (t+D , t−D ), then since these opin-
ions are distinct partitions of F , there is f ∈ t+D ∩ s−D (hence s attacks t in o-AFD) or
there is f ∈ s+D ∩ t−D (hence t attacks s in o-AFD). If the two individuals strategically
desire to be part of a coalition, it is necessary that s renounces at its liked facts in
s+D ∩ t−D and t renounces at its liked facts in t+D ∩ s−D . This tolerant way of coalition
formation, inspired by political practice, is captured in the following definitions.
Definition 71 Let D = (F,S;E) ∈ D(F,S) be a debate and C ⊆ S a coalition in
D. A C -compromise is the pair (C ,E ′), where E ′ ⊂ E is a set of edges (s, f ) with
s ∈ C such that in the debate D ′ = D−E ′ (obtained from D by removing the edges
from E ′) s+D ′ 6= /0 and C is a legal coalition.
In words, some members of a coalition renounce at some liked (approved) facts
in order to make the coalition legal. In this way the coalition has the same negative
part of its merged opinion (which is used to ”attack” opinions of individuals not in
coalition) despite of weakening the positive part.
Definition 72 A C -compromise (C ,E ′) in the debate D = (F,S;E) is called a σ -
compromise if the coalition C is σ in the debate D ′ = D−E ′, for σ ∈ { autarky,
strong autarky, minimal strong autarky, maximal strong autarky, oligarchy}. If
(C ,E ′) is a σ -compromise in D = (F,S;E), then D(C ,E ′) is the consensual debate
in which each individual opinion is the union of opinions of the members of C in
D−E ′.
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Note that in debates D with s+D 6= /0,∀s ∈ S, if the coalition C is σ then (C , /0)
is also a σ -compromise. Also, in the debates D with |s+D| = 1,∀s ∈ S, (C ,E ′) is a
σ -compromise if and only if E ′ = /0 (otherwise s+D ′ = /0, for some s ∈ C ), that is
if and only if C is σ ; such debates are called single minded and hence in single
minded debates there is no proper compromises.
We define now our argumentative aggregation correspondences.
Definition 73 An argumentative aggregation correspondence is a function ACσ ,
which maps every debate D ∈D(F,S) into the following set of consensual debates
ACσ (D) = {D(C ,E ′)|(C ,E ′) is a σ -compromise},
for σ ∈ { autarky, strong autarky, minimal strong autarky, maximal strong autarky,
oligarchy}.
Example. Let us consider again the debate in Figure 4.6 and σ = oligarchy. We
observed that C = {p1, p4} is not legal. But, (C ,E ′) with E ′ = {(p1,a3),(p4,a5)}
is an oligarchy-compromise with F+D(C ,E′) = {a1,a2} and F
−
D(C ,E′)
= {a5,a4,a3}, as
suggested in figure below.
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a1a3 a5a4a6 a2
Output Opinion: ({a1,a2},{a3,a4,a5})
Oligarchy-Compromise!
Figure 4.8.: Common Lunch Dilemma Debate: Oligarchy-Compromise.
The output opinion, ({a1,a2},{a3,a4,a5}), has the property that each person in-
volved in the Common Lunch can eat a1 or a2.
Note that if we choose as output the merged opinion of an oligarchy (or oligarchy-
compromise), each individual outside this coalition likes a fact which is disliked by
some member of the oligarchy. Similar (argumentative) explanations can be made
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for other choices of σ , depending on the application for which the aggregation is
considered.
Each argumentative aggregation correspondence ACσ gives rise to an argumen-
tative aggregator Aσ , by specifying a rule to select one of the consensual debates
in ACσ (D). Aσ satisfies the second condition in Definition 52, by Theorem 61 and
the invariance of the admissibility based semantics to the AFs isomorphism.
Since each consensual debate DC ;E ′ ∈ ACσ (D) is determined by the collective
opinion of a σ -compromise (C ,E ′), it follows that each liked fact f ∈ O+DC ;E′ has
a non-empty set of supporters S( f ) ⊆ C . If we define the support of DC ;E ′ as
supp(DC ;E ′) = ∑ f∈O+
C ;E′
|S( f )|, then we can keep in ACσ (D) only the maximum
support consensual debates. Other strategy of reducing the set ACσ (D) is to retain
only the debates with the (common) opinion at minimum distance to the entire set
of individuals opinion (after defining rational distance functions).
Since the operators Aσ are not ”fact wise” and are strongly dependent on the
context of the debate to which they are applied, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 74 Argumentative aggregation operatorsAσ do not satisfy independence.
Proof. Remember that an aggregator A satisfies independence if, for every debate
D = (F,S;E) and for every f ∈ F , we have A(D){ f} = A(D{ f}).
Consider the debates D and D{ f} in Figure 4.9 below.
s3
s2
s1
g
f
s1 s2
s3
D o-AFD
s3
s2
s1f
s1 s2
s3
D{ f} o-AFD{ f}
Figure 4.9.: Debates D and D{ f} and their associated opinion AFs.
Since |(si)+D| ≤ 1, a coalition C in these debates is σ -compromise if and only if it
is σ . The only autarky in D is {s1,s3} hence each individual opinion in Aσ (D) is
({ f},{g}). The only autarky in D{ f} is {s2,s3} hence each individual opinion in
Aσ (D{ f}) is ( /0,{ f}). Therefore Aσ (D){ f} 6= A(D{ f}). 2
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5. Bipartite Choice Systems
A functional framework abstracting many-to-many two-sided markets is introduced.
Sufficient conditions for the existence of stable many-to-many matchings are ob-
tained as particular instances of determining stable common fixed points of two
choice functions, by using a generalization of the deferred acceptance Gale-Shapley
algorithm, called Immediate Rejection. A systematic study of choice functions con-
ditions related to this subject is done, obtaining a new characterization of path in-
dependence choice functions. This can be viewed as a formal explanation for the
role of the substitutability and independence of irrelevant alternatives in the many-
to-many matchings applications.
5.1. Introduction
The seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [GS62] introduced the ”two-sided matching
model” which turned out to give rise to an entire research area in two-sided (labour)
market design. In their original model, the agents are placed in the vertices of the
complete bipartite graph Kn,n, each agent can be matched only with an agent from
the other side and it is assumed that each agent has a strict ordering on the set of all
its neighbors. A matching is stable if it left no pair of agents on opposite sides of the
market who were not matched to each other but would both prefer to be. Gale and
Shapley proved that stable matchings always exist by giving a deferred acceptance
algorithm to construct it.
In the Economics literature, broad generalizations of this model were considered
by allowing centralized matching schemes where there could be multiple partners
on both sides (many-to-many) of the market (Roth [Rot84], Blair [Bla88], Hat-
field and Milgrom [HM05]). Moreover, agent’s preferences were given by choice
functions on the set of its neighbors that do not necessarily respect an ordering of
individuals. More precisely, the choice function of each agent specifies for any set
of its neighbors a subset of (most preferred) individuals. New stability concepts for
these multi-partner matchings are defined and, in order to obtain a nonempty set
of stable matchings, appropriate choice’s rule conditions from the Arrovian Social
Choice literature are considered: substitutability and independence of irrelevant al-
ternatives (Roth [Rot84], Blair [Bla88], Roth and Sotomayor [RS90]).
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Substitutability was introduced, and applied to matching markets, by Kelso and
Crawford [KC82]. The importance of independence of irrelevant alternatives con-
dition for the existence of a stable output in these models (Hatfield and Milgrom
[HM05]) has been emphasized by Aygu¨n and So¨nmez [AS12]. Note that Brandt
and Harrenstein [BH11] showed that this condition is equivalent to a very natural
set-rationability condition of the agent’s choice functions.
In this chapter, we introduce a simple framework Bipartite Choice System (BCS),
as an abstract functional model for the above many-to-many matchings applications.
A BCS is a collection of choice functions indexed by the vertices of a bipartite
(multi)graph, such that, for any set A of edges of the bipartite (multi)graph, the
choice function in each vertex v selects the most ”preferred” subset of edges in A
incident to v. Since each edge is incident to exactly two vertices from different sides
of the bipartite multigraph, a set of edges chosen by the two sides can be viewed as
a choice matching.
In many-to-many two-sided markets, the edges are referred as contracts and the
choice functions Cv are defined on the set of neighbors of the vertex v. We prefer
to define the choice functions on the set of edges incident to each vertex, which
simplifies the notations and highlights the agreement intuition behind the problems
considered. Stable choice matchings can be formally defined along the lines in-
troduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [NM44] as described by Brandt and
Harrenstein [BH11].
The existence of stable choice matching in a given BCS is studied by associating
to each BCS its unilateral choice functions (which are the direct sum of the choice
functions of the vertices in each part) and interpreting stable choice matchings as
stable common fixed points of these two functions. We consider an appropri-
ate generalization of the deferred acceptance Gale-Shapley algorithm – Immedi-
ate Rejection – and, imposing conditions on the two choice functions, we prove
a sufficient condition for the correctness of the algorithm. By relating this condi-
tion to well-known existing sufficient conditions in the many-to-many matchings
applications, we can view our contribution as an explanation for the role of the
substitutability and independence of irrelevant alternatives.
5.2. Stable Choice Matchings
A choice function on a finite set U (of alternatives) is a function f : 2U → 2U such
that f (A)⊆ A, ∀A⊆U. As the name suggests, a choice function can be interpreted
as a representation of the agents’ (strict) preferences over sets of alternatives in U :
f (A) is the most preferred subset of A, the alternatives in f (A) are chosen (selected)
and those in A− f (A) are rejected.
A Bipartite Choice System (BCS) is a collection of choice functions indexed
by the vertices of a bipartite (multi)graph such that, for any set A of edges of the
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bipartite (multi)graph, the choice function in each vertex v selects the most ”pre-
ferred” subset of edges in A incident to v. The following definition makes clear the
notations and terminology.
Definition 75 A Bipartite Choice System (BCS) is a a couple (G,C ), where
• G = (S∪T ;E) is a bipartite (multi)graph: the set of vertices of G is the union of
two disjoint finite non-empty sets S and T and each edge e ∈ E has associated a
2-set {s(e), t(e)}, with s(e) ∈ S and t(e) ∈ T ; we say that e is incident to s(e) and
t(e). If A⊆ E and v ∈ S∪T , then Av denotes the set of edges in A incident to v.
• C = {Cv|v ∈ S∪T} specifies, for each vertex v, a choice function Cv : 2Ev → 2Ev .
Note that if v and v′ are two distinct vertices in the same part (S or T ) of the
bipartite graph then Ev∩Ev′ = /0.
For a BCS (G = (S,T ;E),C ) we can consider the following collective choice
functions:
unilateral choice functions CS,CT : 2E → 2E , defined by
CS(A) =
⋃
s∈S
Cs(As), CT (A) =
⋃
t∈T
Ct(At), ∀A⊆ E;
bilateral choice function C : 2E → 2E , defined by
C(A) =CS(A)
⋂
CT (A), ∀A⊆ E.
In words, the unilateral choice functions CS(A), CT (A) select from a set A ⊆ E
those edges selected by at least one vertex in a specified part (S or T ) of the bipartite
graph; the bilateral choice C(A) of a set A ⊆ E is the set of edges in A selected by
both parts of the bipartite graph: e∈ A belongs to C(A) if and only if e∈Cs(e)(As(e))
and e ∈Ct(e)(At(e)).
Definition 76 A choice matching in the BCS (G = (S,T ;E),C ) is any set M ⊆ E
of edges such that
C(M) = M.
If the choices functions satisfy |Cv(Av)| ≤ 1 for each A ⊆ E and v ∈ S∪T , then
a choice matching is an usual matching in G: since C(M) = M if and only if ∀v ∈
S∪T , Cv(Mv) = Mv, we have |Mv| = |Cv(Mv)| ≤ 1, for all v ∈ V , that is M is a set
of non-adjacent edges in G. Also, if |Cv(Av)| ≤ 1 for each A ⊆ E and v ∈ S∪ T ,
then if M is a choice matching then M′ is a choice matching for every M′ ⊆M. This
property is not fulfilled in general for arbitrary choice functions Cv.
Definition 77 M ⊆ E is a stable choice matching in the BCS (G = (S,T ;E),C ) if
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•C(M) = M (internal stability) and
• e 6∈C(M∪{e}),∀e ∈ E−M (external stability).
Let e = {s, t} ∈ E−M be the edge in the external stability condition of M. Since
each edge in Cs(Ms∪{e}) is incident to s, and each edge in Ct(Mt ∪{e}) is incident
to t, then e 6∈C(M∪{e}) if and only if e 6∈Cs(Ms∪{e})∩Ct(Mt ∪{e}). Hence, if
M is a stable choice matching and e ∈ E−M, then the external stability condition
requires that at least one of the vertices s(e) and t(e) does not choose e if this is
added to the set of edges in the choice matching M. It follows that, for a BCS
(G = (S,T ;E),C ), were the choice functions satisfy |Cv(Av)| ≤ 1 for each A ⊆ E
and v ∈ S∪T , a stable choice matching is a usual stable matching.
Note that the above two conditions in the definition of a stable choice matching
can be equivalently (see Brandt and Harrenstein [BH11]) stated as
M = {e ∈ E|e ∈C(M∪{e})}.
Examples. Let G = (S,T ;E) be the bipartite multigraph in the figure below,
where S = {s1,s2}, T = {t}, E = {1,2,3}, Es1 = {1,2}, Es2 = {3}, and Et =
{1,2,3}.
t
s1
s2
2
2
1
1
3
3
Figure 5.1.: A bipartite multigraph.
1. Let the BCS be (G,C 1), where
A(⊆ Es1) /0 {1} {2} {1,2}
C1s1(A) /0 {1} {2} {1}
A(⊆ Es2) /0 {3}
C1s2(A) /0 {3}
A(⊆ Et) /0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
C1t (A) /0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1} {2} {1} ·
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The choice matchings in this BCS are M1 = /0, M2 = {1}, M3 = {2}, M4 = {3}.
Indeed, it is simply to see that C1(Mi) = Mi, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,4}); if A ⊆ {1,2,3} is
such that |A| ≥ 2, then |C1(A)|< 2 and therefore C1(A) 6= A.
M1 = /0 is not a stable choice matching since x ∈C1(M1∪{x}), for x ∈ {1,2,3}−
M1. M3 = {2} and M4 = {3} are not stable choice matchings: 1 6∈ M3 but 1 ∈
C1(M3∪{1}); 2 6∈M4 but 2 ∈C1(M4∪{2}.
M2 = {1} is a stable choice matching: 2 6∈C1(M2∪{2}), 3 6∈C1(M2∪{3}).
Hence in the BCS (G,C 1) there is exactly one stable choice matching.
2. Let the BCS be (G,C 2), where
A(⊆ Es1) /0 {1} {2} {1,2}
C 2s1(A) /0 {1} {2} {1}
A(⊆ Es2) /0 {3}
C 2s2(A) /0 {3}
A(⊆ Et) /0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
C 2t (A) /0 {1} {2} {3} {1} {3} {2} /0 ·
The choice matchings in this BCS are M1 = /0, M2 = {1}, M3 = {2}, M4 = {3}.
Indeed, since |C2t (A)| ≤ 1 there is no choice matching with at least 2 edges, and all
Mi above satisfy C2(Mi) = Mi.
No one is a stable choice matching: 3 ∈ C2(M1 ∪ {3}), 3 ∈ C2(M2 ∪ {3}), 1 ∈
C2(M3∪{1}), 2 ∈C2(M4∪{2}).
Hence in the BCS (G,C 2) there is no stable choice matching.
3. Let the BCS be (G,C 3), obtained from (G,C 1) by taking the choice functions
C3s2 =C
1
s2 , C
3
t =C
1
t , and C
3
s1 given by
A(⊆ Es1) /0 {1} {2} {1,2}
C3s1(A) /0 {1} {2} {1,2} ·
As above, we can check that the choice matchings in the BCS (G,C 3) are M1 = /0,
M2 = {1}, M3 = {2}, M4 = {3}, and M5 = {1,2}. From these, the only stable
choice matching is M5. The difference between this example and Example 1 will
be discussed in the Section 5.4.
If (G = (S,T ;E),C ) is a BCS, then we can replace the part S by a super-node vS,
the part T by a super-node vT and for each edge e∈E, we replace s(e) by vS and t(e)
by vT . The contracted bipartite graph obtained, G′ = (S′,T ′;E) = ({vS},{vT};E),
has only two nodes connected by the set E of multi-edges. If we consider C ′ =
{CvS ,CvT }, where CvS ,CvT are the choice functions on E defined by CvS = CS and
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CvT = CT , then the contracted BCS (G
′,C ′) has the property that M ⊆ E is a
choice matching in (G = (S,T ;E),C ) if and only if it is a choice matching in
(G′= (S′,T ′;E),C ′). Also, M⊆E is a stable choice matching in (G= (S,T ;E),C )
if and only if it is a stable choice matching in (G′ = (S′,T ′;E),C ′).
It follows that we can approach the existence of a stable choice matching in a
BCS as the existence of a particular common fixed point of two choice functions
(CS, and CT ) on the edge set of the BCS as described below.
Definition 78 Let f be a choice function on U.
• A fixed point of f is any set P⊆U such that f (P) = P.
• A stable fixed point of f is is any set P⊆ A such that
P = {x ∈ A |x ∈ f (P∪{x}) }.
A choice function has at least one fixed point, namely the empty set.
If P is a stable fixed point and x ∈ P, then P∪ {x} = P, and by definition x ∈
f (P∪{x}) = f (P). It follows P ⊆ f (P), that is (since f is a choice function) P is
a fixed point of f . If x ∈U −P, then x 6∈ f (P∪{x}). It follows that an equivalent
definition of a stable fixed point is{
P is a fixed point of f (internal stability),
if x ∈U−P then x 6∈ f (P∪{x}) (external stability).
Definition 79 Let f ,g : 2U → 2U be choice functions on U. A stable common fixed
point of f and g is a stable fixed point of the choice function f ∧ g : 2U → 2U given
by f ∧ g(X) = f (X)∩g(X), for all X ⊆U.
Note that if P is a stable common fixed point of f ∧ g, then (by the internal stability
condition) we have f (P) = g(P) = P (that is, P is a common fixed point), and (by
the external stability condition) x 6∈ f (P∪{x}) or x 6∈ g(P∪{x}), for all x ∈U−P.
Clearly, a stable choice matching in a BCS (G= (S,T ;E),C ) is a stable common
fixed point of the unilateral choice function CS and CT on E. This motivates the
study of the existence of stable common fixed points of two choice functions on the
same universe U .
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5.3. Choice Functions Conditions
Throughout this section, f : 2U → 2U is a fixed choice function. We are discussing
conditions to be fulfilled by two choice functions to guarantee the existence of a
stable common fixed point. Starting from well known conditions in the matching
research area, we consider new conditions motivated by the proof of correctness of
the algorithm presented in Section 5.4.
5.3.1. Substitutability
An essential condition for the existence of a stable matching is Substitutability
(SUB). It was introduced to the matching literature by Kelso and Crawford [KC82],
emphasized by Roth [Rot84], Blair [Bla88], Roth and Sotomayor [RS90] and ex-
pressed by Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] in a form already known in the Arrovian
social choice literature as Chernoff (see Moulin [Mou85]) or Sen’s condition α
([Sen71]):
SUB if X ⊆ Y then f (Y )∩X ⊆ f (X), for all X ,Y ⊆U.
Hatfield and Milgrom [HM05] observed that SUB is equivalent to the following
Monotony of rejection (Mon) condition:
Mon if X ⊆ Y then X− f (X)⊆ Y − f (Y ),∀X ,Y ⊆U.
The next proposition shows some properties of the fixed points of substitutable
choice functions.
Proposition 80 Let f : 2U → 2U be a choice function that satisfies SUB. Then
i) If P is a fixed point of f then P′ is a fixed point of f , for all P′ ⊆ P.
ii) For every A⊆U we have
{P |P⊆ f (A) and P is a fixed point of f}= 2 f (A).
iii) Let P be a fixed point of f . If there is A ⊆U −P such that A ⊆ f (P∪A) then
a ∈ f (P∪{a}) for every a ∈ A. Furthermore A is a fixed point of f .
Proof. i) Taking X := P′ and Y := P in the SUB condition we obtain P′ = Y ∩X =
f (Y )∩X ⊆ f (X) = f (P′).
ii) By i) it suffices to prove that SUB implies idempotency f ( f (A)) = f (A), for
every A ⊆ U . But this is immediate: taking X := f (A) and Y := A in the SUB
condition we obtain f (A)∩A⊆ f ( f (A)), that is, f (A)⊆ f ( f (A)).
iii) Taking X := P∪{a} and Y := P∪A in the SUB condition, we obtain
f (P∪A)∩ (P∪{a}) ⊆ f (P∪{a}). Since A ⊆ f (P∪A) and a ∈ A, we have a ∈
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f (P∪ {a}). Moreover, taking X := A and Y := P∪A in the SUB condition, we
obtain f (P∪A)∩A⊆ f (A). Since A⊆ f (P∪A), we have A⊆ f (A). 2
The property ii) justifies the term internal stability in the definition of a stable
fixed point for a choice function satisfying SUB.
Note that iii) above shows that, in presence of substitutability, a stronger ”set-
wise” external stability (there is no A ⊆U −P, A 6= /0, such that A ⊆ f (P∪A)) is
equivalently to the ”pair-wise” one given in the definition of a stable fixed point.
We close this subsection by presenting another equivalent form of SUB, Conser-
vative Choice (CC), which will be used in the next subsection.
CC f (A)−B⊆ f (A−B), for all A,B⊆U.
In words, if the alternatives from the set B become unavailable, then the remaining
alternatives chosen by f from A are from those selected by f from A−B.
Lemma 81 A choice function f satisfies CC if and only if it satisfies SUB.
Proof. CC⇒ SUB. Let X ⊆ Y . We take in CC A := Y and B := Y −X . Then
f (A)−B = f (Y )− (Y −X) = f (Y )∩X and f (A−B) = f (Y − (Y −X)) = f (X).
By CC, we have f (Y )∩X = f (A)−B⊆ f (A−B) = f (X).
SUB⇒ CC. We take in SUB X := A−B and Y := A. Then X ⊆ Y , f (Y )∩X =
f (A)∩(A−B) = f (A)−B, and f (X) = f (A−B). By SUB, f (A)−B= f (Y )∩X ⊆
f (X) = f (A−B). 2
Note that the condition CC with set B of cardinality 1 was used by Blair [Bla88].
It is not difficult to prove by induction on the cardinality of B that Blair’s weaker
condition implies CC.
An interesting application of this lemma is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 82 Let f be a choice function satisfying SUB and X ,Y ∈ 2U such that
f (X)⊆ Y ⊆ X. Then f (X)⊆ f (Y ).
Proof. By Lemma 81 f satisfies CC. Let us take A := X and B := X −Y in CC.
Then f (A)−B = f (X)− (X −Y ) = f (X) and A−B = X − (X −Y ) = Y . By CC,
we have f (X)⊆ f (Y ).
2
5.3.2. Conservative Rejection
We consider a new condition, called Conservative Rejection (CR), which is stronger
than substitutability by making the hypothesis in SUB less strict:
CR If f (X)⊆ Y then f (Y )∩X ⊆ f (X), for all X ,Y ⊆U.
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The reason for its name is given by the following equivalent form
CR∗ x ∈ X− f (X)⇒ x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}),∀X ,Y ⊆U, such that f (X)⊆ Y,
requiring that if an alternative x is rejected from X , then x is rejected from any
superset of f (X)∪ {x}. We can refer to both CR and CR∗ as the Conservative
Rejection, as the following lemma confirms.
Lemma 83 A choice function f satisfies CR if and only if it satisfies CR∗.
Proof. CR⇒ CR∗. Let X ,Y ⊆ U such that f (X) ⊆ Y and x ∈ X − f (X). Then
f (X)⊂Y ∪{x}. By CR we have f (Y ∪{x})∩X ⊆ f (X). It follows x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}),
that is CR∗ holds.
CR∗⇒ CR. Let X ,Y ⊆U such that f (X)⊆ Y . Suppose that CR does not hold. It
follows that there is x ∈ f (Y )∩X such that x 6∈ f (X). Hence x ∈ X − f (X). Since
x ∈ f (Y )⊆ Y it follows that x ∈ f (Y ∪{x}), that is CR∗ does not hold. 2
The following example shows that Conservative Rejection is strictly stronger than
substitutability. Let U = {1,2,3} and the choice function f on U given by
A /0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3}
f (A) /0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1} {2} {1} ·
It is easy to check that f satisfies SUB. However, for X := {1,2,3}, x := 2, and Y :=
f (X) we have 2 = x ∈ X − f (X) = {1,2,3}−{1} = {2,3}, but 2 = x ∈ f ( f (X)∪
{x}) = f ({1}∪{2}) = f ({1,2}) = {1,2}, that is f does not satisfies CR∗.
A relaxation of the CR∗ condition, Locally Conservative Rejection (LCR),
LCR if a ∈ A− f (A) then a 6∈ f ( f (A)∪{a}), ∀A⊆U,
can be used to express its relationship with substitutability.
Proposition 84 A choice function f satisfies CR if and only if f satisfies SUB and
LCR.
Proof. We use Lemmas 81 and 83.
CR∗⇒ SUB ∧ LCR : By taking X := A, x := a and Y := f (A) in CR∗, we obtain
LCR. Since SUB is equivalent to Mon, we prove that CR∗⇒ Mon . Let X ⊆ X ′.
We prove that X − f (X)⊆ X ′− f (X ′). Let Y := X ′ and x ∈ X − f (X). Then, since
X ⊆ X ′, we have x ∈ X ′ and Y ∪{x} = X ′. By CR∗, we have x 6∈ f (X ′), and hence
x ∈ X ′− f (X ′).
SUB ∧ LCR ⇒ CR∗ : Let x∈X− f (X). Then, using LCR, we have x 6∈ f ( f (X)∪
{x}). Applying Mon (which is equivalent to SUB), we obtain x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}), for
Y ⊆U with f (X)⊆ Y . 2
In the presence of CR the fixed points of a choice function have the following
important property.
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Proposition 85 If the choice function f satisfies CR then f (X) is a maximal (w.r.t.
set inclusion) fixed point contained in X, for all X ⊆U.
Proof. By Proposition 84, f satisfies SUB and, by Proposition 80 (ii), f (X) is a
fixed point of f contained in X . Let P be a fixed point of f such that f (X)⊆ P⊆ X .
By CR we have f (P)∩X ⊆ f (X), that is, P∩X ⊆ f (X), giving P⊆ f (X). 2
Let us consider an established condition of choice functions known as Outcast
(see Aizerman and Aleskerov [AA95])
Outcast if f (X)⊆ Y ⊆ X then f (Y ) = f (X), for all X ,Y ⊆U.
The importance of this condition in matching area (used by Blair [Bla88], and
Roth [Rot84]) is well-known and it is equivalent to the following Independence of
Rejected Contracts (IRC) emphasized by Aygu¨n and So¨nmez in [AS12]:
IRC if x 6∈ f (X ∪{x}) then f (X ∪{x}) = f (X), for all X ⊆U, and x ∈U.
For the sake of completeness we give the proof here:
Lemma 86 The choice function f satisfies Outcast if and only if f satisfies IRC.
Proof. Outcast ⇒ IRC . If x 6∈ f (X ∪{x}) then f (X ∪{x}) ⊆ X ⊆ X ∪{x}. By
Outcast we have f (X ∪{x}) = f (X), hence IRC holds.
IRC ⇒ Outcast . We prove Outcast by induction on |X−Y |.
If |X −Y | = 1 then X = Y ∪{x}; the hypothesis of Outcast is f (Y ∪{x}) ⊆ Y ⊆
Y ∪{x}; the first inclusion implies x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}), and by IRC we have f (Y ∪{x})=
f (Y ), that is f (Y ) = f (X).
In the inductive step, assume Y = (X −Y ′)− {x}, where Y ′ ⊆ f (X)− X and
x ∈ X −Y ′. The hypothesis of Outcast is f (X) ⊆ (X −Y ′)−{x} ⊆ X . It follows
f (X) ⊆ (X −Y ′) ⊆ X and, by induction hypothesis, f (X −Y ′) = f (X). Hence
f (X−Y ′)⊆ (X−Y ′)−{x}⊆X−Y ′, and (by the induction basis) f (X−Y ′−{x})=
f (X−Y ′) = f (X). 2
The main result of this subsection is the following characterization of choice func-
tions satisfying CR.
Theorem 87 The choice function f satisfies CR if and only if f satisfies SUB and
Outcast.
Proof. CR ⇒ SUB ∧Outcast. By Propositions 84 we have CR ⇒ SUB . We
prove that CR ⇒ Outcast. Let f (X) ⊆ Y ⊆ X . If CR holds, then, by Proposition
84 and Lemma 81, CC holds, and by Proposition 82 we have f (X) ⊆ f (Y ). If
f (Y ) = f (X) then Outcast holds. Otherwise, there is x ∈ f (Y )− f (X). Since
f (X)⊆ Y ⊆ X we have x ∈ X − f (X). By CR∗, we obtain x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}) = f (Y ),
a contradiction.
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SUB ∧ Outcast ⇒ CR . By Proposition 84 it is sufficient to prove Outcast ⇒
LCR . Let a ∈ A− f (A). Then f (A) ⊆ f (A)∪{a} ⊆ A. Using Outcast we have
further f ( f (A)∪{a}) = f (A), therefore a 6∈ f ( f (A)∪{a}). Hence LCR holds.
2
Remarks.
1. Aizerman and Malishevski [AM81] have shown that the conjunction of SUB
and Outcast is equivalent to an influential and natural consistency condition for
choice functions introduced by Plott [Plo73]
Path Independence f (A∪B) = f ( f (A)∪B), for all A,B⊆U.
In words, Path Independence says that in order to evaluate f (X) (for some X ⊆
U) we can decompose X in an arbitrary (finite) path of smaller parts Xi and replace
them recursively by f (Xi).
Hence Theorem 87 gives a new characterization of choice functions satisfying
Path Independence.
2. Another important characterization of the conjunction of SUB and Outcast was
established also by Aizerman and Malishevski [AM81]: A choice function f
satisfies SUB and Outcast if and only if
∃n ∈ N and functions fi : U → N, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} such that ∀X ⊆U
f (X) =
n⋃
i=1
{x ∈ X | fi(x)≥ fi(y),∀y ∈ X}
A seemingly stronger form of the CR condition is the following Strongly Conser-
vative Rejection (SCR) (which will be used in the next section):
SCR ∀x∈U, if x 6∈ f (X∪{x}) then x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}),∀X ,Y ⊆U such that f (X)⊆Y.
If, in SCR, we consider x ∈ X then the hypothesis x 6∈ f (X ∪{x}) means x ∈ X −
f (X) and therefore SCR implies CR∗. Interestingly, the converse implication holds.
Proposition 88 The choice function f satisfies CR if and only if f satisfies SCR.
Proof. Using Lemma 83 and the above observation, it suffices to prove that if CR
holds then
x 6∈ X ∪ f (X ∪{x})⇒ x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}),∀Y ⊆U, such that f (X)⊆ Y.
Let x ∈U−X and x 6∈ f (X ∪{x}). Since f satisfies CR∗, by Theorem 87, it follows
that f satisfies Outcast and its equivalent form ICR. Therefore we have f (X ∪
{x}) = f (X). Let X ′ := X ∪{x}. We have x ∈ X ′− f (X ′). Since f satisfies CR∗,
we obtain x 6∈ f (Y ∪{x}),∀Y ⊆U such that f (X ′)⊆ Y . Since f (X ′) = f (X), SCR
holds. 2
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5.4. Stable common fixed points of two choice functions
Let f ,g : 2U → 2U be two choice functions. In this section we show that if the two
functions satisfy CR condition, then a stable common fixed point of them can be
found using the following Immediate Rejection algorithm, a generalization of the
well-known Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance [GS62] algorithm.
Immediate Rejection Algorithm
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Input : f ,g : 2U → 2U choice func t i ons
Output : M ⊆U a s tab le common f i x ed po in t o f f and g
N←U ;
while g( f (N)) 6= f (N) do
N← N− ( f (N)−g( f (N))) ;
M← f (N) ;
return M
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
In words: in each while-iteration, the elements rejected by g from those selected
by f are removed from a current set N. When there are no rejected elements any-
more, the set M = f (N) is a stable common fixed point of f and g.
Let us apply this algorithm for the examples of Bipartite Choice Systems (G =
(S,T ;E),C i) (i = 1,2,3) considered in Section 5.2. Hence, U := E = {1,2,3},
f := CiS, and g := C
i
T . We also denote by N
0,N1, . . . the successive values of N
during the algorithm.
1. N0 = {1,2,3}, f (N0)= {1,3}; g( f (N0))= g({1,3})= {1}; N1 =N0−( f (N0)−
g( f (N0)) = {1,2,3} − ({1,3} − {1}) = {1,2}; f (N1) = {1}; g( f (N1)) =
g({1}) = {1}; M = f (N1) = f ({1,2}) = {1}. M is a stable common fixed
point of f and g (in the terminology of Section 5.2, M is a stable choice match-
ing in (G = (S,T ;E),C 1), and we already verified this). Therefore, the Im-
mediate Rejection Algorithm returns a stable common fixed point of f and
g. Note that g :=C1T does not satisfies CR condition: 2 6∈ g({1,2,3}∪{2}) =
{1}, but 2 ∈ g(g({1,2,3})∪{2}) = g({1}∪{2}) = g({1,2}) = {1,2}.
2. In this case, we observed that f := C2S , and g := C
2
T have no stable common
fixed points. However, the Immediate Rejection Algorithm proceeds as fol-
lows: N0 = {1,2,3}, f (N0) = {1,3}; g( f (N0)) = g({1,3}) = {3}; N1 =
N0−( f (N0)−g( f (N0))= {1,2,3}−({1,3}−{3})= {2,3}; f (N1)= {2,3};
g( f (N1))= g({2,3})= {2}; N2 =N1−( f (N1)−g( f (N1))= {2,3}−({2,3}−
{2}) = {2}; f (N2) = {2}; g( f (N2)) = g({2}) = {2}; M = f (N2) = f ({2}) =
{2}. Hence the Immediate Rejection Algorithm fails. Note that, again
g := C1T does not satisfies CR condition: 3 6∈ g({1,2} ∪ {3}) = /0, but 3 ∈
g(g({1,2})∪{3}) =Ct({1}∪{3}) = {3}.
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3. In this case, we observed that f := C3S , and g := C
3
T have exactly one stable
common fixed point, namely {1,2}. However, the Immediate Rejection al-
gorithm proceeds as follows: N0 = {1,2,3}, f (N0) = {1,2,3}; g( f (N0)) =
g({1,2,3}) = {1}; N1 = N0− ( f (N0)− g( f (N0)) = {1,2,3}− ({1,2,3}−
{1}) = {1}; f (N1) = {1}; g( f (N1)) = g({1}) = {1}; M = f (N1) = f ({1}) =
{1}. Hence the Immediate Rejection Algorithm fails (M is only a common
fixed point that is not stable). Note that g is the same as in Example 1, there-
fore does not satisfy CR condition.
The next theorem shows the correctness of the Immediate Rejection Algorithm
when the two choice functions f and g satisfy the CR condition.
Theorem 89 If f and g satisfy CR, then the Immediate Rejection Algorithm re-
turns a stable common fixed point of f and g.
Proof. Since N shrinks in every iteration, the algorithm terminates.
Let k be the number of iterations and let N0 to Nk be the values of N during the
algorithm. Then N0 =U , N j = N j−1−B j, where B j = f (N j−1)−g( f (N j−1)), for
j = 1, . . . ,k, and M = f (Nk).
We first show that M is a common fixed point of f and g.
By the condition of the while-loop, we have g( f (Nk)) = f (Nk), therefore g(M) =
M, since M = f (Nk). Also, f (M) = f ( f (Nk)) = f (Nk) = M since f is idempotent,
by Propositions 80 and 84.
We next show that M is a stable common fixed point of the two functions, i.e.,
a 6∈ f (M∪{a})∩g(M∪{a}) for every a ∈U−M.
The elements not in M are the elements removed from N during the while-loop and
the elements in Nk rejected by f , i.e.,
U−M = (U−Nk)∪ (Nk−M).
Let a ∈ U −M be arbitrary. We distinguish two cases according to which of the
above (disjoint) two sets a belongs.
Case a ∈ U−Nk. Let i be such that a ∈ Bi = Ni−1−Ni. Then a ∈ f (Ni−1) and
a 6∈ g( f (Ni−1)). Since f (Ni−1) = f (Ni−1)∪{a}we can write a 6∈ g( f (Ni−1)∪{a}).
We show a 6∈ g( f (N j)∪{a}), for j = i, . . . ,k, by induction on j.
Since N j = N j−1−B j and f satisfies CC, we have
f (N j−1)−B j ⊆ f (N j−1−B j) = f (N j).
Since g( f (N j−1)) = f (N j−1)−B j, this implies
g( f (N j−1))⊆ f (N j).
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By induction hypothesis a 6∈ g( f (N j−1)∪{a}). By Proposition 88, g satisfies SCR
(with X = f (N j−1) and Y = f (N j)), therefore a 6∈ g( f (N j)∪{a}), and the induction
step is complete.
We have established a 6∈ g( f (Nk)∪{a}) = g(M∪{a}). Thus a 6∈ f (M∪{a})∩
g(M∪{a}).
Case a ∈ Nk−M. Then a 6∈ f (Nk). By Proposition 84, f satisfies LCR, therefore
a 6∈ f ( f (Nk)∪{a}) = f (M∪{a}). Thus a 6∈ f (M∪{a})∩g(M∪{a}).
2
By Proposition 84, the CR condition is the conjunction of SUB and LCR. While
substitutability is known to be a necessary condition for the correctitude of the gen-
eralizations of Gale and Shapley algorithms (see Hatfield and Kominers [HK16]),
the LCR condition (expressing the external stability of f (X) in any X ⊆U) is also
necessary as the following proposition shows. Let us denote by Immediate Rejec-
tion( f ,g,U ′) the subset of U ′ ⊆U returned by the above algorithm.
Proposition 90 Let f be an idempotent choice function on U such that Immediate
Rejection( f ,g,U ′) is a stable common fixed point of f and g contained in U ′, for
any choice function g on U satisfying CR. Then f satisfies LCR.
Proof. Suppose that f does not satisfy LCR. Then, there is X ⊆ U and x ∈
X− f (X) such that x ∈ f ( f (X)∪{x}). Take U ′ := X and g the identity choice func-
tion on U : g(A) = A, for every A ⊆U . Clearly, g satisfies CR. Then, Immediate
Rejection( f ,g,U ′) = f (X) since f (X) is accepted by g and f ( f (X)) = f (X), by
idempotency of f . However, f (X) is not a stable common fixed point contained
in X since x ∈ X − f (X) and x ∈ f ( f (X)∪{x})∩ g( f (X)∪{x}). This contradicts
the hypothesis that the Immediate Rejection works properly, and the proposition
is proved. 2
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In this part (based on the paper [CM16]) we introduce opposition frameworks, a
generalization of Dung’s argumentation frameworks. While keeping the attack
relation as the sole type of interaction between nodes and the abstract level and
simplicity of argumentation frameworks, opposition networks add more flexibil-
ity, reducing the gap between structured and abstract argumentation. A guarded
attack calculus is developed in order to obtain proper generalizations of Dung’s
admissibility-based semantics. The high modeling capabilities of our new setting
offer an alternative instantiation solution (of other existing argumentation frame-
works) for arguments evaluation.
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6. A New Generalization of
Argumentation Frameworks
6.1. Introduction
In this chapter we introduce Opposition Frameworks (OFs for short) that general-
ize Argumentation Frameworks (AFs for short) without self-attacks, by consider-
ing more fine-grained notions of conflict-freeness and admissibility.
An OF is a labeled directed multigraph whose directed edges represent attacks be-
tween its nodes. A node is no longer an atomic argument as in AFs, but a composed
object, interpreted as the position of an agent in a debate. The position of a node v
is a finite set g(v) of facts granted by v. Depending on the real world problem mod-
eled, the facts can be statements, claims, pieces of evidence, locutions, issues, etc.
The set g(v) of facts granted by a node v has no mathematical structure associated;
it is, simply, a list of facts approved by the node v, based on which v develops its
attacks. Each attack a has a source node s(a), a target node t(a), and is labeled by a
pair (γ(a),δ (a)) of (disjoint) sets of facts. Here γ(a)⊆ g(s(a)) is the guard of the
attack a, and δ (a) is a nonempty subset of g(t(a))−g(s(a)), representing the facts
(granted by the node t(a)) that are denied by the source node, s(a), of the attack a.
So, if a node v attacks a node w via the attack a, that is s(a) = v and t(a) = w, then
the guard γ(a) specifies the set of facts – granted by v – based on which v does not
admit the facts in δ (a) – granted by w.
It follows that, in OFs, arguments are seen as ensembles formed by the facts
granted by a node together with the attacks issuing from this node. To illustrate
how this can arise in real world situations, let us consider the following possible
political debate.
Example 1 (adapted from Wang and Luo [WL10]). Let us construct an OF by
assigning a node for each of the 5 positions in the following debate on the set
{ f1, . . . , f9} of facts:
v1 : ”Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
f1 is crucially for the protection of our health f2 and,
clearly, it is more important than developing economy f3 .”
v2 : ”Developing economy
f3 will ensure creating job positions f4 and it is obviously more significant
than simply protecting the environment f8 .”
v3 : ”We do not have to focus on developing economy
f3 but instead urgently should take mea-
sures in order to protect environment f8 , e.g., reduce emissions of greenhouse gases f1 , and
save water f5 .”
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v4 : ”Currently it is more important to create job positions
f4 for increasing number of graduates f6 ,
than being concerned with reducing emissions of greenhouse gases f1 . It is obvious that by
hiring new people f9 it is not necessary to be concerned with protecting human health f2 .”
v5 : ”Instead of creating several job positions
f4 in order to increase the number of graduates f6 , we
should concentrate on protecting the environment f8 to guarantee earth security f7 .”
Graphically, in Figure 6.1 below, each node is decorated with its granted set and
each attack a, with source s(a) = vi and target t(a) = v j, is labeled with the pair
(γ(a),δ (a)).
v1 v2
v5v4
v3
{ f1, f2} { f3, f4}
{ f7, f8}{ f4, f6, f9}
{ f1, f5, f8}
({ f1 , f2},{ f3})
({ f7, f8},{ f4 , f6})
({ f4 , f6},{ f1})
({ f9},{ f2})
({ f4},{ f8})
({ f8},{ f4})
({ f4},{ f8})
({ f1 , f5 , f8},{ f3})
Figure 6.1.: OF modeling the political debate in Example 1.
Note that we have two attacks from v4 to v1 which differ by their labels, and this
kind of multiple attacks does not exist in Dung’s argumentation frameworks.
This example is considered only for illustration purpose. A software system for
automatically modeling such a debate, that is to construct positions, facts and at-
tack’s labels, must use appropriate natural language processing tools, e.g., Finegan-
Dollak and Radev [FDR15], and/or specialized debating websites, e.g., Debatepe-
dia1, (see also Rahwan et al. [RZR07], or Leite and Martins [LM11]), but it is
beyond the scope of this work.
The above example shows that an OF can model which precise part of an ”ar-
gument” is in conflict with which part of another ”argument”, without requiring a
logical language and an inference relation. Our new formalism is more abstract than
the existing structured AFs and it is well suited to represent complex non-logical in-
formation.
Intuitively, a guarded attack shows the reason why a node attacks another one.
Let a be an attack on the node w (that is, t(a) = w). We say that a is harmful to
w if w can not counter-attack a: there is no attack a′ from w to the source of a
1http://dbp.idebate.org
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denying at least one fact in the guard of a (∀a′ with s(a′) = w and t(a′) = s(a) we
have δ (a′)∩ γ(a) = /0). We develop a guarded attack calculus in order to extend
the basic notions which underly the classical Dung’s semantics, so preserving the
diversity of reasoning schemes for AFs. Our new formalism is based on the graph
operation of contraction and can be described as follows. To decide if a given node
v can be accepted, we look at the attacks on v; if there is no attack harmful to v,
then it is accepted; otherwise, we search a node w which is not in ”conflict” with
v (no fact denied by an attack from one is granted by the other) and denies at least
one fact of the guard of an attack harmful to v; if w does not exist, then v can not be
accepted; if w exists, we consider their coalition {v,w} as a new super-node v{v,w}
with g(v{v,w}) = g(v)∪ g(w), delete the nodes v and w, and replace them by the
super-node v{v,w} as the source or the target of each attack from or to v and w; the
decision process is continued using the super-node in the new OF. Adapting the no-
tions of conflict-freeness and defense, we show that there is a sequence of coalition
choices for which the above outlined process ends with an accepted (super)node if
and only if there is an admissible set of nodes containing v. Since AFs are particular
OFs (see the end of Subsection 6.2.1), we obtain a more intuitive and algorithmic
way of handling classical admissibility argumentation semantics.
Returning to the Example 1, if we want to see the status of v2 in this OF using
the above outlined process, it is obvious that it needs to make a coalition with v4 in
order to deny a fact in the guard of the attack from v1. The super-node v{v2,v4} has
no harmful attack in the contracted OF, therefore v2 is accepted.
If we delete the set-labels, replace the multiple attack by a single directed edge
and call the nodes arguments in the OF in Figure 6.1, we obtain (the digraph of) an
AF; in this AF the set of arguments {v2,v4} is a preferred and stable extension (see
Section 0.2). Hence the outputs of the two frameworks agree. On the other hand,
the set {v1,v3,v5} is another preferred and stable extension in the AF. However, the
set of nodes {v1,v3,v5} can not be considered as a ”solution” in the OF in Figure
6.1, since it does not (collectively) defend the node v1 against the attack with source
v4 and labeled ({ f9},{ f2}). It follows that the use of guards, on which OFs are de-
veloped, provides more accurate outputs than the dichotomy between the existence
and lack of attacks, on which Dung’s frameworks are based (further differences are
highlighted in Subsection 6.2.1 in the comments after Figure 6.2).
Note the difference between our OFs and structured/deductive argumentation
frameworks (e.g., Caminada and Amgoud [CA07], Prakken [Pra10], Hunter and
Gorogiannis [HG11], Amgoud [Amg14]): while in these logic based frameworks
the internal structure of the arguments generates and explains the (inferential) na-
ture of the attacks expressed as uniform (i.e., the same for all nodes) rules, the users
of OF’s are free to choose between uniform or non-uniform rules to construct the
attack’s labels. These labels can be automatically constructed if the content of a
node (that is, its granted set of facts) is equipped with a mathematical (logical, com-
binatorial, algebraic, etc.) structure. The gain over the AF’s instantiation approach
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is that our model is more general and the use of attack’s labels reduces the number
of ”arguments” to be considered (see also the discussion after the Proposition 101
in the end of Section 6.2.5).
6.2. Opposition Frameworks
6.2.1. Defining the new framework
In this subsection, we define OFs, discuss their compatibility with Dung’s structures
and specify how to see AFs as OFs.
Definition 91 (Opposition Framework (OF)) An opposition framework is a tuple
OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ), where:
• N is a finite set of nodes; F is a finite set of facts; g : N → 2F is a function that
associates to each node v ∈ N, its granted set g(v) of facts in F,
• A is a finite set of attacks; s, t : A→ N are functions that associate to each attack
a ∈ A its source node s(a), and its target node t(a),
• γ,δ : A→ 2F are functions that associate to each attack a ∈ A its guard γ(a) ⊆
g(s(a)), and its denied set of facts δ (a), with δ (a)⊆ g(t(a))−g(s(a)).
In words, an OF is a labeled multi-digraph in which each directed edge (v,w)
corresponds to an attack a from the node s(a) = v to node t(a) = w, that is based
on a set of facts γ(a) ⊆ g(v) granted by v, and denies the set δ (a) ⊆ g(w) of facts
granted by w. Throughout this thesis we assume that the sets g(v), γ(a), δ (a) are
non-empty.
The condition δ (a) ⊆ g(t(a))− g(s(a)) forbids the attack a to deny the facts
granted by its source. In particular, there is no attack in A such that s(a) = t(a)
(there are no self-attacks). However, we can have parallel attacks: a set of attacks
A0 ⊆ A with |A0| ≥ 2 and s(a) = s(a′) and t(a) = t(a′), for every a,a′ ∈ A0.
Graphically, each node is decorated with its granted set and each attack a with
source s(a) = v and target t(a) = w is labeled with the pair (γ(a),δ (a)), as depicted
in Figure 6.1. Let us observe that the granted sets of nodes v1 and v4 are g(v1) =
{ f1, f2} and g(v4) = { f4, f6, f9}. The two attacks (a1 and a2) from v4 to v1 form
a multiple attack of v4 against v1. They differ by their labels: (γ(a1),δ (a1)) =
({ f4, f6},{ f1}) and (γ(a2),δ (a2)) = ({ f9},{ f2}). The meaning is that the attack
a1, based on f4 and f6 (granted by the source node of a1), denies f1, one of the facts
granted by the target of a1, while the attack a2, based on f9, denies f2. We will
assume in the following that multiple attacks have different labels.
The granted set g(v) of a node v can be interpreted as a node interface, exhibit-
ing its pieces of evidence which can be accepted or attacked by the other nodes.
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The set g(v) can not be replaced in the digraph representing the OF by a set of non-
conflicting nodes (viewing the items in g(v) as sub-arguments) due to the rule-based
way the attacks are conceived. For example, in Figure 6.2 (i), we consider an OF
having only two nodes v1 and v2, with g(v1) = { f1, f2, f3} and g(v2) = { f2, f4}, and
a symmetric pair of attacks a1 and a2. In Figure 6.2 (ii), we transform this OF into a
digraph (AF) with vertices set { f1, f2, f3, f4} and attacks generated by the rules as-
sociated to a2 (({ f2},{ f1})) gives the attack ( f2, f1)) and a1 (({ f3},{ f4})) gives the
attack ( f3, f4)). But then, the set { f1, f2, f3} is not conflict free, which contradicts
the intuition that in the OF the set g(v) granted by a node v is not conflicting.
v1 v2
{ f1, f2, f3} { f2, f4}
a1
({ f3},{ f4})
a2
({ f2},{ f1})
f2
f1
f4
f3
(i) (ii) (iii)
v1 v2
Figure 6.2.: Trying to model an OF as an AF.
Hence OFs offer a more general approach of modeling collective attacks as the
one proposed in Nielson and Parsons [NP06], where sets of arguments rather than
single arguments may be needed to attack another argument.
On the other hand, if we view the OF in (i) simply as the AFwith two arguments v1
and v2 attacking each other (as in Figure 6.2 (iii)), then each argument is credulously
stable accepted (see Coste-Marquis et al. [CMDM05b]), which is not what the OF
suggests (the attack a2 against v1 can not be defended, because of f2, which is not
denied, and the attack a1 against v2 can not be defended, because of f3). It follows
that the semantics of the two models (AF and OF) differ.
It follows that the acceptability based semantics for OFs must be defined in an
appropriate way in order to capture the intended intuition and, therefore, to have
stronger versions of the Dung’s semantics imposed by the fined-grained environ-
ment considered in OFs.
We close this subsection by noting that any AF without self-attacks can be seen as
a (trivial) OF, specified (for further use) in the following definition, and illustrated
by a simple example in Figure 6.3.
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Definition 92 (OF associated to an AF) Let AF = (Arg(AF),De f (AF)) be an ar-
gumentation framework without self-attacks. The opposition framework associated
to AF is OFAF = (N,F,g,A, s, t,γ,δ ), where:
• N = F = Arg(AF); g(a) = {a}, ∀a ∈ Arg(AF); A = De f (AF);
• ∀d = (a,b) ∈ De f (AF), s(d) = a and t(d) = b, γ(d) = {a} and δ (d) = {b}.
a b c
AF
a b c
{a} {b} {c}
OFAF
({a},{b})
({b},{a}) ({b},{c})
Figure 6.3.: OF associated to an AF.
6.2.2. Conflict-freeness
Let OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) be an opposition framework. For S ⊆ N, we denote
by α−(S) (α+(S)) the set of attacks having the target (source) in S:
α−(S) = {a ∈ A| t(a) ∈ S} and α+(S) = {a ∈ A|s(a) ∈ S}.
We write α+(v) (α−(v)) instead of α+({v}) (α−({v})).
A weak conflict-free (wcf) set of nodes is any set S ⊆ N such that there is no
attack a with s(a), t(a) ∈ S. Clearly, singletons {v}, for v ∈ N, are wcf sets.
In AFs, wcf sets are simple called conflict-free sets, and can be conceived as
collective (super)arguments. Formally, if S is a conflict-free set of arguments in an
AF, we can replace it by a (super)node aS and each attack from (to) an argument
in S is replaced by an attack from (to) vS (multiple attacks are replaced by a single
attack). This graph operation (called contraction) creates no self-attacks, since S is
a conflict-free set. The contraction operation of a wcf set S in an OF assigns the
union of the granted sets of the members of S as the granted set of vS, the sources
(or targets) of attacks from (to) a member of S are replaced by vS (multiple attacks
are accepted).
The problem that can arise is that for some new attack a with s(a) = vS we can
have δ (a)∩g(vS) 6= /0. This can be avoided as follows.
A strong conflict-free (scf) set of nodes is any set S ⊆ N such that ∀a ∈ α+(S),
δ (a)∩g(s′) = /0, for every s′ ∈ S. In words, no attack with source in S denies a fact
granted by a node in S.
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The following lemma holds.
Lemma 93 (i) In an OF any scf set is a wcf set. (ii) If in an OF the granted sets,
g(v), are disjoint (i.e. g(v)∩g(w) = /0, for all distinct v,w ∈ N) then a set of nodes
is wcf if and only if it is scf. In particular, if OFAF is the OF associated to an AF
AF, then a set S of arguments in AF is conflict-free if and only if it is scf in OFAF .
Proof. (i) Let S ⊆ N be a scf set. If S is not a wcf set, there is an attack a with
s(a), t(a) ∈ S. By the definition of functions δ and γ , we must have γ(a)⊆ g(s(a)),
and δ (a) ⊆ g(t(a))− g(s(a)). Let s = s(a) and s′ = t(a). Then, a ∈ α+(S) and
δ (a)∩g(s′) 6= /0. This contradicts the hypothesis that S is a scf set.
(ii) Suppose that S⊆ N is a wcf set. Let a ∈ α+(S). Since S is a wcf set, we have
t(a) 6∈ S. Since the granted sets of nodes are disjoint, it follows g(t(a))∩g(s′) = /0,
for every s′ ∈ S. Hence S is a scf set. 2
Scf sets can be safely used in the OF’s contraction operation:
Proposition 94 Let OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) be an opposition framework and S⊆
N a wcf set of nodes. Let OF |S = (N1,F1,g1,A1,s1, t1,γ1,δ1) be the tuple, where
N1 = (N−S)∪˙{vS}, F1 = F, A1 = A, γ1 = γ , δ1 = δ ,
g1(v) =
{
g(v) if v ∈ N−S⋃
w∈S g(w) if v = vS
s1(a) =
{
s(a) if a 6∈ α+(S)
vS if a ∈ α+(S)
and t1(a) =
{
t(a) if a 6∈ α−(S)
vS if a ∈ α−(S)
.
Then OF |S is an OF (obtained by contraction of S) if and only if S is a scf set of
nodes.
Proof. Suppose that OF |S is an opposition framework. To show that S is a scf
set in OF , let a ∈ A with s(a) ∈ S. In OF |S we have s1(a) = vS and therefore
δ1(a)∩ g1(vS) = /0. By the definition of functions δ1 and g1, it follows that in OF
we have δ (a)∩⋃w∈S g(w) = /0, that is δ (a)∩g(w) = /0, for every w ∈ S. Hence S is
a scf set in OF .
Conversely, suppose that S is a scf set in OF . To show that OF |S is an OF, we have
to prove that δ1(a)⊆ g1(t1(a))−g1(s1(a)),∀a ∈ A1 = A. By the definition of OF |S,
this holds trivially for every a with s1(a) 6= vS. If s1(a) = vS, then t1(a) 6∈ S (since
S is wcf set) and , therefore, δ1(a) = δ (a), t1(a) = t(a), and g1(t1(a)) = g(t(a)).
Because g1(s1(a)) = g1(vS) =
⋃
w∈S g(w) we have to prove that δ (a) ⊆ g(t(a))−⋃
w∈S g(w). But this holds, since s(a) ∈ S and S is a scf set (i.e., δ (a)∩g(w) = /0 for
every w ∈ S). 2
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6.2.3. Extending Dung’s semantics
Let OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) be an opposition framework, S ⊆ N and v ∈ N. Let
us denote g(S) =
⋃
s∈S g(s). We say that v is defended by S if
• ∀a ∈ α+(v) we have δ (a)∩g(S) = /0, and
• ∀a ∈ α−(v), ∃ac ∈ α+(S) such that t(ac) = s(a) and δ (ac)∩ γ(a) 6= /0.
In words, a node v is defended by a set S of nodes if, firstly, no attack with the source
v denies a fact granted by a node in S, and, secondly, for any attack a targeting v
there is a counter-attack coming from S, targeting the source of a, and denying at
least one fact of the guard of a.
In Figure 6.4, the set {v3} defends the node v1, but the set {v4} does not defend
v1 despite of the attack of {v4} (against the attacker v2 of v1), which doesn’t deny
the fact f4. Note that there is no attack with source v1, hence the first condition in
the definition of defense holds trivially.
v4 v2
v3
{ f1, f2} { f3, f4}
{ f3}
({ f1 , f2},{ f3})
({ f3},{ f4})
({ f4},{ f1}) v1
{ f1}
Figure 6.4.: {v3} defends v1, but {v4} does not defend v1.
The set of arguments defended by a set S is denoted by D(S).
Definition 95 An admissible set is any scf set S ⊆ N with the property that for any
a ∈ α−(S) there is ac ∈ α+(S) such that t(ac) = s(a) and δ (ac)∩ γ(a) 6= /0.
In words, a scf set is admissible if the guard of any attack targeting a member of
S has at least one fact that is denied by an attack with source in S.
The following proposition gives some basic properties of admissible sets.
Proposition 96 (i) In an OF a set S of nodes is admissible if and only if S⊆ D(S).
(ii) (Dung’s Fundamental Lemma for OFs) Let OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) be an OF,
S⊆ N an admissible set, and u,v ∈ D(S). Then,
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1. S′ = S∪{u} is an admissible set, and
2. if {u,v} is a scf set then v ∈ D(S′).
(iii) A set S of arguments in an argumentation framework AF is admissible in AF if
and only if it is admissible in OFAF .
Proof. (i) If S ⊆ D(S) then, by the first condition in the definition of the defense of
a node by a set of nodes, it follows that S is a scf set. The second condition in the
same definition shows that S is an admissible set. Conversely, if S is an admissible
set and v∈ S, since S is a scf set it follows that ∀a∈α+(v) we have δ (a)∩g(s′) = /0,
for every s′ ∈ S. By the definition of an admissible set, it follows that any attack
targeting v has at least one fact that is denied by an attack with source in S. Hence
v ∈ D(S).
(ii) Since S is admissible, it is a scf set. From u∈D(S) it follows that S′ = S∪{u}
is a scf set. Any attack targeting a member of S′ has at least one fact that is denied
by an attack with source in S, since S is admissible and u ∈ D(S). Hence S′ is an
admissible set. To prove the second statement, observe that it is sufficient to prove
that S′∪{v} is a scf set. This follows since S∪{u} and S∪{v} are scf sets and the
hypothesis that {u,v} is a scf set (note that this hypothesis is not necessary for AFs).
(iii) If S is an admissible set of arguments in AF then it is conflict-free in AF
and therefore is a scf set in OFAF , by Lemma 93 (ii). Furthermore in AF we have
S− ⊆ S+ and, by Definition 92, any attack targeting a member of S has at least one
fact that is denied by an attack with source in S. Hence, S is an admissible set in
OFAF . The converse implication can be proved in a similar way. 2
By Proposition 96, Dung’s admissibility based extensions for AFs can be ex-
tended to OFs as follows: in an OF
• a complete extension is an admissible set S satisfying D(S) = S,
• a preferred extension is a maximal (w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension,
• a grounded extension is a minimal (w.r.t. set inclusion) complete extension, and
• a stable extension is an admissible set S with the property that each node v 6∈ S is
the target of an attack in α+(S).
To keep things simple, we will consider here a simple form of acceptance of a
node in an OF, which corresponds to credulously preferred acceptance in AFs.
Definition 97 A node v is accepted in an OF if there is an admissible set S in OF
containing v; otherwise it is rejected. The node v is inceptively accepted if {v} is
an admissible set.
Using the definition of an admissible set (Definition 95), Propositions 94 and 96,
we obtain the following result, which is very useful from the algorithmic point of
view.
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Proposition 98 A node v is accepted in an opposition framework OF if and only if
there is a scf set S such that v ∈ S and vS is inceptively accepted in OF |S.
Since AFs are very special cases of OFs, using Proposition 96 (iii), we obtain the
following result on the complexity of deciding if a node can be accepted.
Proposition 99 Deciding if a node is accepted in an OF is an NP-complete prob-
lem.
Proof. The hardness follows by adapting a known polynomial reduction from
the satisfiability problem given by Dimopoulos and Torres [DT96] or Dunne and
Bench-Capon [DBC02] for AFs (see Section 0.3). Obviously, verifying if a guessed
set contains the given node and is admissible can be done in polynomial time (in
the ”size” of the OF), so the decision problem is in NP. 2
6.2.4. A DPLL type Acceptance Algorithm
In this subsection, we give a Davis-Putnam-Logemann-Loveland (DPLL) type al-
gorithm (Davis et al. [DLL62]) for deciding the acceptance of a node in an OF, that
improves a backtrack search exhaustive algorithm by the eager use of a ”unit rule”
at each step in the construction of a scf set S as in Proposition 98.
Let OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) be an OF and v ∈ N. If we denote by ∆(v) =⋃
a∈α+(v) δ (a) the set of facts denied by the attacks out of v, then the set of harmful
attacks to v is
α−harm(v) = {a ∈ α−(v) |γ(a)∩∆(v) = /0 or s(a) 6∈
⋃
a′∈α+(v)
t(a′)}.
If α−harm(v) = /0 then v is inceptively accepted, otherwise we are looking for a node
w to make a coalition with v in order to deny as many attacks as possible from
α−harm(v). The coalition {v,w} must be a scf set, therefore w must belong to the
backing set of nodes associated to v:
bck(v) = {w ∈ N |{v,w} is scf, ∆(w)∩ ( ⋃
a∈α−harm(v)
γ(a)
) 6= /0}.
For each attack a ∈ α−harm(v), we denote by nem(a) the set of nemeses nodes in
bck(v) which have at least one attack that denies at least one fact in the guard of a:
nem(a) = {w ∈ bck(v) |∃a′ ∈ α+(w)∩α−(s(a)) s.t. δ (a′)∩ γ(a) 6= /0}.
If there is a ∈ α−harm(v) with nem(a) = /0, then v can make no coalition in order to
counterattack a, so v can not be accepted. If nem(a) is a singleton, nem(a) = {w0},
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then v is forced to make a coalition with w0 for denying at least one fact in γ(a)
(there is no scf set S such that v ∈ S, w0 6∈ S and S counterattacks the attack a on
v). This is the ”unit rule” which will be followed every time when a candidate for
coalition is searched.
If |nem(a)| ≥ 2, then v must try to make coalitions with each node in nem(a) to see
if it can extend to a self-defending scf set.
The resulting algorithm can be described as follows:
Accept(OF,v)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Input : OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) an OF , v ∈ N .
Output : Y ES i f v i s accepted , NO otherwise .
(ACCEPT) if α−harm(v) = /0 then return Y ES .
(REJECT) if ∃a ∈ α−harm(v) s.t. nem(a) = /0 then return NO .
(UNIT RULE) if ∃a ∈ α−harm(v) s.t. |nem(a)|= 1 then
let w ∈ N s.t. nem(a) = {w};
return Accept(OF |{v,w},v{v,w}) .
(BRANCH) Candidates←⋃a∈α−harm(a) nem(a)
while Candidates 6= /0 do
w← a node in Candidates
if Accept(OF |{v,w},v{v,w})
then return Y ES
else Candidates←Candidates−{w} .
Proposition 100 Accept(OF,v) returns YES if and only if there is an admissible set
S in the OF OF such that v ∈ S.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 98 and the discussion before the de-
scription of the algorithm. 2
To see the advantages of this algorithm over chronological backtracking schemes,
we consider the OF associated to the AF in Figure 6.5 (showing also its favorable
position over similar algorithms for AFs, e.g. Nofal et al. [NAD14]).
Applying Accept(OF,v), the attack a with s(a) = z and t(a) = v is from α−(v),
and since nem(a) = {w}, the ”unit rule” Accept(OF |{v,w},v{v,w}) is called, which
returns YES, that is v is accepted since {v,w} is an admissible set. On the other
hand, a chronological backtrack search could try any of the 2n scf sets {v} ∪ A,
for A ⊆ {u1, . . . ,un}, (which are not admissible sets) before the solution {v,w} is
discovered.
Note that the algorithm described can be easily modified to return the ”explana-
tion set” S in case of acceptance.
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y w
zv
u1 u2 un−1 un
Figure 6.5.: No scf set {v}∪A is admissible, for A⊆ {u1, . . . ,un}.
6.2.5. Logical Semantics
In this subsection, we characterize admissible sets in an OF by the models of a for-
mula expressed in propositional logic (for AFs this is done by Besnard and Doutre
[BD04]).
More precisely, if OF = (N,F,g,A,s, t,γ,δ ) is an OF, then we consider a propo-
sitional variable xv for each v ∈ N. We want to construct a formula Φ over variables
{xv|v ∈ N} such that S⊆ N is an admissible set in OF if and only if there is a model
m of Φ with S = {v ∈ N |m(xv) = true}.
To characterize the scf sets, let us consider the formula AtMostOne(x,y) =¬(x∧y).
Two nodes v and w belong to the same scf set if and only if there are no facts granted
by one and denied by the other: g(v)∩∆(w) = /0 and g(w)∩∆(v) = /0. Therefore
the formula
Φ1 =
∧
v,w∈N,v6=w
g(v)∩∆(w)6= /0
AtMostOne(xv,xw)
has the property that if m is a model of Φ1, then S = {v ∈V |m(xv) = true} is a scf
set, and if S is a scf set then taking m(xv) := true for v ∈ S and m(xv) := f alse for
v ∈ N−S, we obtain a model of Φ1.
To characterize the admissible sets, let us consider
Φ2 =
∧
v∈V
(
xv→
∧
a∈α−(v)
( ∨
u:∃a′∈α+(u) s.t.
t(a′)=s(a)&δ (a′)∩γ(a)6= /0
xu
))
.
If m is a model of Φ2 and S = {v ∈ V |m(xv) = true}, then each vertex v in S is
either not attacked (α−(v) = /0 and
∧
a∈α−(v)
(
. . .
)
is true), or for each attack a on
v at least one fact in the guard of a is denied by an attack from a vertex u in S (that
is, m(xu) = true and ∃a′ ∈ α+(u) such that t(a′) = s(a) and δ (a′)∩ γ(a) 6= /0). It
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follows that if m is also a model for Φ1 then S is a scf set counterattacking each
attack against it, that is S is an admissible set. Conversely, if S is an admissible
set then it is easy to see that taking m(xv) := true for v ∈ S and m(xv) := f alse for
v∈N−S, we obtain a model of Φ1∧Φ2. Hence we have the following proposition.
Proposition 101 If m is a model of Φ=Φ1∧Φ2 then S = {v ∈ N|m(xv) = true} is
an admissible set in OF. Conversely, if S is an admissible set in OF then m, given
by m(xv) := true for v ∈ S and m(xv) := f alse for v ∈ N−S, is a model of Φ.
Proof. Let S= {v∈N|m(xv) = true}, for some model m ofΦ=Φ1∧Φ2. If S is not
a scf set, then there are v,w ∈ S such that ∆(w)∩g(v) 6= /0. Hence m(xv) = m(xw) =
true and m does not satisfy AtMostOne(xv,xw). Since ∆(w)∩ g(v) 6= /0, it follows
that AtMostOne(xv,xw) occurs in Φ1. Therefore m does not satisfy Φ1 and hence m
is not a model of Φ, a contradiction. To prove that S is an admissible set, suppose
that there is an attack a ∈ α−(S) which is not counterattacked by S. If t(a) = v and
s(a) = w then m(xv) = true and m(xw) = f alse, since S is a scf set. Since a is not
counterattacked by S, it follows that for each u ∈ N such that there is a′ ∈ α+(u)
with t(a′) = w and δ (a′)∩γ(a) 6= /0, we have u 6∈ S, that is, m(xu) = f alse. We have
obtained that the conjunction in Φ2 corresponding to xv evaluates to false under m
and hence m is not a model of Φ2, a contradiction.
Conversely, let S be an admissible set in OF , and m the assignment given by
m(xv) = true if and only if v∈ S. Then, m is a model ofΦ1 since S is a scf set. Also,
m is a model of Φ2 since for v /∈ S the implication xv→ . . . evaluates to true and for
v ∈ S the same implication evaluates to true since S counterattacks any attack on v.
2
Example. For the OF in Figure 6.4 the above Φ1,Φ2 are:
Φ1 = AtMostOne(xv1 ,xv2)∧ AtMostOne(xv2 ,xv3)∧AtMostOne(xv2 ,xv4)∧ AtMostOne(xv3 ,xv4).
Let us writeΦ2 =Φ21
∧
Φ22
∧
Φ23
∧
Φ24, whereΦ2i =
(
xvi→ . . .
)
, for i∈{1,2,3,4},
are the following implications: Φ21 = xv1 → xv3 , Φ22 = xv2 → f alse = ¬xv2 , Φ23 =
xv3 → true, Φ24 = xv4 → true. Hence, Φ2 = (xv1 → xv3)∧¬xv2 . It is not difficult
to see that the only models of Φ1∧Φ2 are those obtained by setting xv to true, for
v ∈ S, where S is an admissible set of the OF: /0, {v3}, {v4}, {v1,v3}.
The above proposition shows also that it is not possible to simulate an OF with
the set of facts F , by considering an argumentation framework AF = (A,E) with
A⊆ 2F . Indeed, as Φ=Φ1∧Φ2 shows, we have to consider additional constraints
to bind the subsets of F (nodes in AF) corresponding to the guards of the attacks
issuing from each node in OF. In structured (logical) argumentation this is done by
considering an argument together with all its sub-arguments, but this is not practical
for most of OFs.
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6.3. Related Work
In this chapter we introduced a new generalization of Dung’s argumentation frame-
work which is conceptually different from other generalized abstract argumentation
frameworks, see Brewka et al. [BPW14], or Modgil [Mod13].
The main idea is to keep the abstract level of the original structures, its simplicity
and intuitive approach but, at the same time, to increase their modeling capabil-
ities. The ”nodes” of our OFs have a minimal content expressed as finite non-
empty sets of facts (the node’s position), which are used to relate the ”attacks” be-
tween two nodes to their positions. This gives a new perspective on the ”consistent
sets of nodes” which goes beyond the usual conflict-freeness (which is responsible
for some rationality violations observed in the instantiation-based argumentation,
Caminada and Amgoud [CA07], Amgoud [Amg14]). More precisely, in our strong
conflict-free sets we forbid not only the attacks between their members but also re-
quire that the outside attacks are not in contradiction with their members positions.
Unfortunately, this does not prevent that (when our OFs are used as instantiation
destination of logical structured argumentation frameworks) nodes with mutually
consistent positions to be globally contradictory. This happens because the attack
relation is binary.
We introduced a simple recursive definition of acceptance: a node (the position
expressed by a node) is accepted in an OF if either it can counterattack all attacks tar-
geting it or there is another ”compatible” node such that in the OF obtained by ”con-
tracting” these two nodes in a single ”supernode” this supernode is accepted. Note
that this type of acceptance is different from that considered in abstract dialectical
frameworks Brewka and Woltran [BW10], or GRaph-based Argument Processing
with Patterns of Acceptance [Brewka and Woltran [BW14], where the acceptance
of a node is a function defined on the set of its parents (that is the nodes having a
directed edge to it). Also our approach is conceptually different from proof proce-
dures, see Modgil and Caminada [MC09]. Technically, using ”guarded attacks” and
a suitable graph operation of contraction, we proved that this type of acceptance is
compatible in the particular case of AFs with Dung’s admissibility-based semantics,
showing that it is actually a proper generalization of the Dung semantics. Hence,
if we use OFs instead of AFs as a target system to evaluate arguments in structured
argumentation frameworks, then we obtain the same results if the OFAF (see Defi-
nition 92) is considered for reusability reasons. However, a more fine-grained gen-
eration of the target OF – by explicitly devising rules of attacks (via their guards),
which are non-uniform (depend on the source/target node) – may be used to obtain
improved modeling. We note also that in our guarded attack calculus, the attacks
on the attacks Villata et al. [VBvdT11]) are implicitly considered. The use of the
set of attacks (α−(v) in OFs) instead of the set of parents (v− in AFs or ADFs) in
the study of the acceptability of a node v simplifies the description of acceptabil-
ity algorithms. A novel DPLL type backtracking acceptance algorithm is described.
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Some improvements can be further obtained by using abstract DPLL with learning,
Nieuwenhuis et al. [NOT06] (see also Brochenin et al. [BLWW15]). The idea is to
add dummy facts to nodes in order to learn that some (set of) nodes are not useful
in finding a successful coalition for the acceptance of a given node v.
The characterization of admissible sets in an OF by the models of a formula ex-
pressed in propositional logic shows a lazy way to map an OF to an AF (via naive
transformations of this formula) in a manner preserving semantic properties of the
first one. The study of the efficiency of such a mapping (similar to that initiated by
Brewka et al. [BW10] for ADFs) is an interesting future research direction.
AFs have been generalized (see, e.g., Bench-Capon [BC03], Bourguet et al. [BAT10],
Dunne et al. [DHM+11]) by adding weights to arguments or attacks in order to
increase their modeling capacity. We can consider a similar extension for OFs, by
providing the facts and attacks with weights, called vitality for facts, and strength
for attacks. The facts effectively denied by an attack a are those facts in δ (a) having
a vitality smaller than the strength of the attack a. In this way, an weighted OF could
be used to represent families of OFs.
117

Concluding Discussion
A summary of my specific contributions rendered in this thesis is given below.
• Properties of the equivalent classes of attacked-related and attacking-related rela-
tions expressed in Proposition 9.
• The two-way scanning algorithm QK(D,pi) devised in Section 0.4 used to con-
struct three quasi-kernels in a digraph without kernels (see Figure 0.7).
• Proving that deciding if there exists a quasi-kernel in digraph containing a speci-
fied vertex v is a NP-complete problem, in Section 0.4 (see Figure 0.8).
• Proving in a formal way that a discipline policy can be adopted in forming of an
argumentation framework, without changing the semantic properties, in Section
2.3 (Theorem 32 and Figure 2.4).
• The set of integral vectors of the polyhedron Padm(AF) associated to the argumen-
tation framework AF (Definition 38) is exactly the set of characteristic vectors of
the admissible sets of AF , in Section 3.4 (Theorem 42).
• The set of integral vectors of the polyhedron Pstab(AF) associated to the argumen-
tation framework AF (Definition 43) is exactly the set of characteristic vectors of
the stable extensions of AF , in Section 3.4 (Theorem 46).
• Using the polyhedron Pstab(AF) to obtain the set of characteristic vectors of the
complete extensions of AF , in Section 3.4 (Theorem 49).
• Introducing bipartite debates (Definition 50), consensual debates (Definition 51)
and debate operations, in Section 4.2, implying an unusual definition of aggrega-
tors (Definition 52), in Section 4.3.
• Characterization of the majority rule (Theorem 53), in Section 4.3.
• Characterization of the approval & disapproval rule (Theorem 54), in Section 4.3.
• Introducing the conceptual aggregation correspondence (Definition 58), in Sec-
tion 4.4.
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• Introducing the argumentation frameworks associated to a debate (Definition 60),
the debate corresponding to an argumentation framework (Definition 59) and
proving that the two debates associated to the debate corresponding to an argu-
mentation framework are isomorphic (Theorem 61), in Section 4.5.
• Introducing different type of coalitions in a debate: legal, autarky, strong autarky,
oligarchy, corresponding to conflict-free sets, admissible sets, complete exten-
sions, stable extensions in the (opinions)-argumentation framework associated to
the debate (Definitions 64, 65, and 66) and characterizing them using the opera-
tion of contraction (Theorem 69), in Section 4.5.
• Introducing compromises (Definition 71) and the argumentative aggregation cor-
respondence (Definition 73), in Section 4.5.
• Proving that argumentative aggregation operators does not satisfy Independence
(Theorem 74), in Section 4.5.
• Reducing the study of the existence of a Stable Choice Matching (Definitions 76,
77 ) in a Bipartite Choice System (Definition 75) to the study of the existence of
Stable Common Fixed Points (Definition 78) of two choice functions, in Section
5.2. Note that this approach is in principle different from the existing fixed point
approaches (using Tarski’s fixed point theorem, e.g., [Fle03] or [HM05]).
• Proving a new characterization of Path Independence choice functions by show-
ing that a substitutable choice function satisfies the Path Independence condition
if and only if it satisfies LCR condition (Theorem 87), expressing the external
stability of f (X) in any X ⊆U , in Section 5.3.
• Devising a generalized Gale-Shapley algorithm – called Immediate Rejection –
which returns a stable fixed point of two functions satisfying the Conservative
Rejection condition (Theorem 89), in Section 5.4. The name is motivated by the
rule that once an element (corresponding to a contract in many-to-many two-sided
markets), is selected by the first function and rejected by the second function, it is
not considered further.
• Proving that the LCR condition is necessary (in the maximal domain sense) for
the correctitude of the Immediate Rejection algorithm (Theorem 90), in Section
5.4.
• Introducing Opposition Frameworks (Definition 91), in Subsection 6.2.1, as a la-
beled multi-digraph in which each directed edge (v,w) corresponds to an attack a
from the node s(a) = v to node t(a) =w, that is based on a set of facts γ(a)⊆ g(v)
granted by v, and denies the set δ (a)⊆ g(w) of facts granted by w.
• Introducing strongly conflict-free sets, in Subsection 6.2.2, which can be used
safely in the graph operation of contraction (Proposition 94).
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• Approaching the (credulously) acceptance using the graph operation of contrac-
tion (Proposition 98) in Subsection 6.2.3.
• Devising a DPLL type backtracking acceptance algorithm in Subsection 6.2.4,
reducing the search time as explained in Figure 6.5.
• Characterization of admissible sets in an opposition framework by the models of
a formula expressed in propositional logic, (Proposition 101) in Subsection 6.2.4.
An obvious future work (necessary for the validation of our various proposals) is
to implement real world argumentative decision-making systems and to do system-
atic experimental evaluations. The principal difficulty is that the problems arising
in the field of argumentation are computationally hard. Hence, any implementation
must face the problem of reducing the number of sophisticated NP-oracles calls
such as SAT, ASP or CSP solvers.
Another compelling future direction is to use the (path independent) choice func-
tions in order to provides the node’s granted sets in the opposition frameworks with
a (combinatorial) structure and to use the intuitive rejection associated with choice
functions to construct the guards of the attacks.
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